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ABSTRACT
The topic of this thesis is the notion of dialogue and how machines have not only influenced
the development of our understanding of this fundamental human social activity but also the
possibilities for engaging in mediated dialogue. In particular, the concern is with its adoption
and distortion from a computational point of view. An interactional perspective is developed
that provides insight into the problems and limitations of computer dialogue models, motivates
the investigation of the achievement of dialogue mediated 'through' machines, and informs
the conception and design of computer systems (or artifacts) that support the metaphor of
dialogue 'with' machines.
To motivate a reconstruction of the notion of dialogue and a different understanding of the
status of machines in terms of action, a critical analysis of computer models of dialogue,
concerning theory, data and implementation, is given. In general, computer models lack a
consideration of interaction as a constitutive domain, assume the interchange model of
dialogue, promote a sanitised view of data, and are a poor foundation for the design of
machines that are to engage in dialogue-like behaviour with a user. An alternative
interactional perspective is derived from hermeneutics and ethnomethodology in which it is
argued that the machine is an intelligible - not intelligent - artifact, and communicative activity
is circumstantial, situated and interactively constituted. Instead of reifying dialogue as the
repeated exchange of discrete messages between isolated cognitive processors (the
interchange model), dialogue is understood here to be the collection of practices in which
parties are mutually engaged in coordinating communicative actions and achieving shared
understanding out of the materials at hand. The empirical methodology of the thesis comes
from conversation analysis and forms the basis for the investigation of the achievement of
dialogue 'through' machines.
A detailed audio-visual study of a particular computer-mediated communication modality is
presented. Parties engaged in cooperatively constructing mutual orientation in dialogue (in
a virtual dialogue space) were recorded and features of their conduct were rendered for
analysis with the aid of a notation system specially developed for this study. The findings
are that the computer-mediated dialogue activity is a skilled, interactive accomplishment in
which dialogic presence, monitoring and participation are contingently created and
maintained. An emergent transformation of the dialogue activity demonstrates the situated
work of constructing participation, a process that is shaped by the dynamics of that activity.
A brief study of copresent collaboration documents two further features: the embodiment of
actions and their complementarity. The consequences of the interactional perspective and
the empirical study for computer models and dialogue 'with' machines are discussed.
Suggestions are also made about an alternative use of computer modelling for dialogue
'between' machines, and about the future of dialogue mediation and artifacts.
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Not only does the movie and television screen reinforce, by the very velocity of
its image andsoundpresentation, ourpreconception ofpast, present, and future
in a single line, but only the most sophisticated are aware of the coercion of the
technology which prepares the record.... It is extraordinarily difficult to be
constantly alert to the extent of control exerted by the focus and the selection
of the camera-man and his recording team. Closeups feel right to the
experienced viewers, the shift of camera from speaker to auditor, or from
speaker to speaker seems natural, too. They influence all of us trained by
Western and, particularly, American dramaturgical conventions which see
communication, the interpersonal situation, and interaction itself, as
action-reaction sequences. (Birdwhistle 1971).
The term 'dialogue' has a long history and a varied range of senses. Consider the following
examples from a dictionary definition:
1. a conversation between two or more people,
2. an exchange of opinions on a particular subject,
3. the lines spoken by characters in drama or fiction,
4. a political discussion between representatives of two groups.
There are Plato's philosophical dialogues, the dialogues of Shakespeare, the lack of dialogue
between the United States and the Soviet Union in the cold war, the dialogue debates of
political opponents in public, and the dialogues of friends at home over a coffee. The practice
of dialogue itself of course has a longer history, indeed as long as humanity. But recently,
since the Second World War, the term has appeared in connection with machines and
computers. The application can vary from the vision of a conversational, talking computer in
dialogue 'with' a human being, to a description of that part of the computer interface that
mediates the user's actions through the machine. In addition, what would count as an
adequate explanation or description of human dialogue itself has taken a turn both in its
conception in a theory and in the techniques adequate for demonstrating a point or argument.
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The topic of this thesis is the notion of dialogue and how it has been adopted, changed or
coerced from a mechanistic point of view, ie. the technology, metaphors and models
associated with machines and their behaviour have led to a largely uncritical adoption of a
range of ideas about human conduct that need to be examined to see if they must be rejected,
adapted or enhanced in some way. In particular, it is argued here that the interchange model
that regards dialogue as the recurrent exchange of discrete messages between individual
cognitive processors must be abandoned. Instead, the focus is on the relevance of an
interactional perspective that has largely been taken for granted or dismissed from computer
models, and therefore from the design and conception of computer systems supporting the
dialogue metaphor. Dialogue will be understood to be the collection of practices in which
participants are mutually engaged in coordinating communicative actions and achieving
shared understanding out of the materials at hand.
Besides the influence of the machine on models of human dialogue activity, recent work in
artificial intelligence has suggested conceptions of what role the machine could play in terms
of supporting or engaging in human practice itself. It is important to evaluate how successful
this research will be, what is required, and what consequences there are, because answers
to these questions reflect on what we understand about human conduct, how it works, why
it is the way it is, and what forms it could take. Three aspects of 'dialogue and the machine'
will be considered at different times throughout the thesis: first, dialogue 'through' machines,
which is the use of the computer to support or mediate communicative activities between
people: second, dialogue 'with' machines, which is a common metaphor in artificial
intelligence proposing that computer systems engage as partners with people in activities
that could be called dialogic, and thus the machine's behaviour is to be understood and
interpreted in terms of what people do; third, a logical extension is to dialogue 'between'
machines, which posits a number of machines engaging in forms of interactive behaviour
that might be compared to human communicative activity.
The thesis begins with a consideration of models of dialogue that use computer techniques
to explore assumptions about dialogue through the internal representations and programs
that can be interpreted to generate simulacrums of the behaviour of people. Current research
on discourse and dialogue for complex natural language systems in artificial intelligence has
largely drawn upon philosophical and conceptual approaches to language as action or
extended linguistic models. However the influence of the human sciences, especially social
theory and research, has not been felt. Benefits can be gained by drawing upon empirical
studies of language and social action that balance the cognitive emphasis and thus focus on
dialogue as an interactive, joint process with unavoidable but crucial local emergent social
properties or dynamics. It is argued that abstract computer models of dialogue are too
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theoretical and ignore the interactive circumstances of situated dialogue. One particular
representative approach, that of Grosz & Sidner (1986), will be examined in detail. It is argued
that it has a weak theoretical background and a poor empirical methodology. Also, the
interchange model implicit in such computermodels may bias the design of natural language
dialogue systems and lead theorists to over-rationalise interactional phenomena as the
product of an intentional cognitive machinery or ignore them completely. Dialogue systems
will then be denied the rich dynamics of interactive dialogue and the development of
efficacious systems will be severely retarded.
In order to recover a position that provides a basis for reconstructing more suitable models
of dialogue, we need to examine the assumptions about how modelling should be done and
justified, what human behaviour is like, and what it is that machines can do. Some terms will
be explained briefly at this point to illustrate the nature of the reconstruction. This will also
clarify some of the aims and fundamental assumptions of the thesis.
The social objects of interest are the machine and computer, which are often portrayed as
mindless, emotionless, hard reasoning and intensely logical, and capable, in principle, even
of intelligence and language use. Machines have also influenced how we work and think,
and, as Woolgar (1987, p. 325) states, "discussions about technology embody fundamental
preconceptions about the character of mankind." Two uses of the machine are of special
interest here: first, the dialogue artifact, which is a computer whose use is premised on the
metaphor of human dialogic communication and is embedded in human practice and intended
for human consumption; second, the virtual dialogue space, which is a computer-simulated
graphic space in which people can participate as if in a dialogue.
The starting point of the thesis comes from ethnomethodology, conversation analysis and
hermeneutics, all of which study interpretation and the social construction of intelligible
action in human conduct. Unfortunately they are difficult fields to understand and for a
number of reasons: they are from a completely different paradigm of explanation, they are
often published in a foreign language and translations are late, the style of writing is found
difficult, and the theories are radically different from the rationalist tradition of theorising about
human conduct exemplified by Chomsky, Descartes and Plato. But once understood, these
fields provide the basis for a reconception of the nature of the machine in human practice,
for an empirical methodology for the analysis of fleeting conduct, and for a radically different
idea about action and communication. To expand on the latter idea, situated action is a
term used to suggest that action is always situated, always comes out of some set of physical,
social and temporal circumstances and is contingently achieved by those engaged out of the
materials that make up that activity. This is in marked contrast to the view of action and
dialogue supported by computermodels that favourthe exchange and recognition of intended
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messages between individuals. Instead, shared understanding is a local achievement that
is not the result of instantiating social norms or the playing out of cognitive rules. In the
following quotation, Schegloff sums up the situated character of communicative action, and
argues clearly that a notion of interactivity is essential to the investigation of discourse:
Good analysis retains a sense of the actual as an achievement from among
possibilities; it retains a lively sense of the contingency of real things. It is worth
analert, therefore, thattoo easy a notionof'discourse'can lose us that. If certain
stable forms appear to emerge or recur in talk, they should be understood as
an orderliness wrestedby the participants from interactionalcontingency, rather
than as automatic products of standardizedplans. Form, one might say, is also
the distillate of action and/in interaction, not only its blueprint. If that is so, then
the description of forms of behaviour, of forms of discourse (such as stories
included), has to include interaction among their constitutive domains, and not
just as the stage on which scripts written in the mind are played out. (1982, p.
89)
The thrust of the present thesis is to demonstrate that an interactional perspective on dialogue
can help us come to an understanding of the problems of computer models of dialogue and
a conception of the dialogue artifact. A step towards this is made through an empirical study
of the circumstantial and interactive achievement of dialogue 'through' machines. It is the
aim of the thesis to demonstrate that not only the description but also the modelling,
simulation, and practical generation of human-like dialogue conduct must take into account
interaction as a constitutive domain of dialogue and cognition. In order to do this,
hermeneutics and the empirical methods and insights of ethnomethodology and conversation
analysis are used to investigate problems with computational theories of dialogue and action
as well as to understand the nature of interactive artifacts and their future design and use.
Human dialogue has been studied by many disciplines, but one of the most successful
accounts of everyday dialogue - conversation analysis - has explained a number of sequential
and interactional details of conversation and institutional talk. In contrast, the thesis
considers a particular example of machine mediations of human dialogue in which dialogue
'through' the machine is achieved. An empirical audio-visual study of computer-mediated
dialogue forms the basis for revealing features of the taken for granted achievement of
dialogue in restricted contexts and for testing the applicability of a methodology derived from
conversation analysis. The primary focus is on the methods and resources, usually taken
for granted, that people use for achieving and maintaining the 'sense' of their talk and actions
and for displaying that 'sense' to each other. Techniques are used for engendering accounts
of the engagement in dialogue and a complex transcription system is developed to render
the detailed work of constructing contributions in the dialogue. The analyses focus on the
achievement of presence and participation. Action is constructed in and through technology
at hand, and its use is shaped by the demands of the activity. Thus inscriptions in the virtual
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dialogue space are only sensical in the context of the practices that gave rise to them. Also,
participants must monitor their own and each other's actions and construct their participation
from the materials provided for in the virtual dialogue space. Because of this, the model of
conversational turn-taking is undermined and new orders of participation emerge. A second,
brief study looks at how the collaborative work of two people is finely coordinated through
the embodied performance of action and the complimentarity of actions by the same or more
than one person.
From the analyses it is concluded that a wealth of resources and constraints are contained
in the taken for granted work of dialogue activity. It is also concluded that dialogue activity
is shaped by circumstances such that the order of participation is transformed unintuitively.
Thus the interchange model which takes no account of the circumstantial, situated and
interactional constitution of dialogue is inadequate and must be abandoned. Dialogue is
more than the abstract exchange of discrete messages between entities. This means that
the following three consequences of the model must be acknowledged and dealt with: the
lack of self-coordination and repair, the lack of recipient design in concurrency, and the strict
interchange of participation. It is recommended that the findings of interaction analysis be
incorporated into the design of artifacts supporting the metaphor of dialogue 'with' machines.
In particular, dialogic presence and local participation are features of mutual engagement
that can be designed for with careful evaluation. It may be possible to achieve a satisfactory
user and machine engagement from discrete materials, and avoid the time-consuming,
computationally inefficient, and over-representational procedures characteristic of computer
artifacts in artificial intelligence. The success of the interaction analysis methodology for
exposing the situated work of dialogue in reduced contexts of presence means that the
methods and findings may be useful in general for studying and evaluating dialogue 'through'
and 'with' machines. A major consequence of the arguments in the thesis is that traditional
computer modelling techniques may not reveal an understanding of how people engage in
activities such as dialogue and thus a reconstruction of the nature of modelling is proposed
briefly for future work.
The linear structure of the thesis will be briefly summarised. In Chapter 2 the development
of computer models of human dialogue is traced from its origins in traditional models of
dialogue, computer modelling and natural language processing. The chapter demonstrates
the problems and limitations of such computer models and motivates an alternative
interactional perspective that is expanded in Chapter 3. One particular approach, that of
Grosz & Sidner (1986), is examined closely in terms of its theory, empirical methodology,
explanatory power and implementation criteria. Three major points made in this chapter are:
that computer models of dialogue such as Grosz & Sidner's have a weak theory of action
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and activity, that the empirical methodology leads to a sanitised view of dialogue, and that
such computer models provide a poor foundation for the conception and design of computer
dialogue systems supporting the metaphor of dialogue 'with' a user.
Following on from the critique, Chapter 3 develops an interactional perspective on the nature
of dialogue and an understanding of the machine in use. First, it is important that the
conception of the machine and its behaviour be examined in order to understand in what
ways the machine can be considered to take part in practical dialogue. Drawing from
hermeneutics, the notion of the machine as an intelligible artifact is discussed in contrast to
the notion of the 'intelligent' machine in artificial intelligence. Next, the field of
ethnomethodology is described because it provides an alternative conception of the practice
of activities such as dialogue. Rather than reconstruct dialogic interaction as the recognition
and coordination of plans, the specific mutual achievement of dialogue in situ - from which
rational accounts emerge - is studied. From the field of conversation analysis, dialogue is
understood to be a collection of practices in which participants are mutually engaged in
coordinating communicative action and achieving shared understanding in situ. The major
principles and naturalistic methods of these two fields are explained and illustrated. From
the review and arguments above, an interactional perspective is derived that remedies some
of the major problems brought out in Chapter 2.
An investigative audio-visual study of dialogue 'through' the machine or computer-mediated
dialogue is described in Chapter 4. The study examines the achievement of dialogue
between people when it is mediated through the use of the computer. It was carried out to
reveal some of the situated and circumstantial details of dialogue that are taken for granted
or ignored in computer models of dialogue; to demonstrate the applicability of an approach
derived from conversation analysis to computer-mediated communication; and to
recommend resources and environments for computer dialogue artifacts. A brief overview
of the study is given, and a survey of related research brings out contrasting principles and
techniques to those used here. The principles and procedures of the study are described in
depth. Techniques of recording and transcription were developed specifically for this type of
dialogue setting. Finally, the complex records that form the corpus for the analyses in
Chapters 5 and 6 are explained and illustrated. The complete set of notation conventions
are in Appendix A, and some of the longer examples are to be found in Appendix B.
Chapter 5 presents a detailed analysis of the situated, interactional achievement of dialogue
'through' the machine in a virtual dialogue space. Communication is a skilled
accomplishment wrested by the parties from the circumstances and emergent dynamics of
their mutual engagement. First the chapter argues why the screen display and a turn-based
rendering of the data are inadequate for analytic purposes, and then a variety of interactional
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concepts relevant for the analyses are presented. The analyses document with examples:
the situatedwork of constructing action in and through the technology, the visual and temporal
monitoring of conduct, the local management of participation, the relevance of contributions
to each other in dialogue, and the emergence of interesting new orders of participation
constructed out of the materials at hand. In conclusion the relevance of the findings to
computer models of dialogue is discussed.
The study reported in Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrates that an interactional analysis can reveal
the situated, interactional work of constituting dialogue 'through' machines, and Chapter 6
considers the consequences of the methodology and findings for dialogue 'with' machines.
It is argued that features of dialogic presence and interactivity are essential for the design of
more appropriate computer dialogue artifacts, some of which have been restricted by the
interchange model. Also, a brief study of copresent collaborative work in a workspace is
presented that documents two other features of interactivity: the embodiment and
complementarity of actions. Thus the thesis documents a range of features, if designing for
interactivity, that are both valuable constraints on interpretation and resources for
constructing intelligible action. However, much more careful design and evaluation is needed
if an appearance of 'interactive flow' is to be achieved in which participation in dialogue is
itself locally constructed and artifacts are maximally sensitive to the user's participatory
needs.
The concluding chapter discusses a number of issues arising from the preceding chapters.
The criticisms of computer models of dialogue are considered in the light of the findings of
the thesis, and prospects for incorporating the insights into modelling are discussed.
However, the interactional perspective suggests a more radical reconstruction of the way
modelling could be carried out, so the use of computers to model dialogue activities is
returned to at a deeper level in order to reconstruct an alternative modelling paradigm for
investigating the emergence of embodied and dynamic activity. A brief summary of
'embodied modelling' is given that emphasizes the emergence of interactional dynamics and
aims to realise interesting communicative activities 'between' machines. The empirical
methodology is looked at reflectively to see what improvements could be made in hindsight,
and what further work could be undertaken. Much further research is needed to investigate
how people coordinate their mutual activities with body, speech and artifacts. Further
applications of the findings and interactional perspective are discussed in relation to dialogue
'with' and 'through' machines. Possible extensions to the interaction analytic methods are




COMPUTER MODELS OF DIALOGUE: THEORY,
DATA AND IMPLEMENTATION
2.1 Introduction
It is appropriate, first of all, to consider how conceptions of dialogue in research have been
influenced by the machine and mechanistic notions of behaviour in order to consider in turn
how an understanding of dialogue has influenced the design of machines intended to engage
in dialogue 'with' people. Of course, this is not a natural ordering - ideas about human
behaviour and the development of technology have gone hand in hand. However, currently
it is claimed that computer models of dialogue can help designers of 'intelligent' interactive
computer systems, so it is important to know just what the assumptions and limitations of
these models are. This chapter sets out to demonstrate the problems and limitations of
computermodels of dialogue similar to Grosz & Sidner (1986) and to suggest an interactional
perspective to supplement or supplant the weak notion of dialogue in these models. In
particular, it is argued here that the traditional understanding of dialogue in artificial
intelligence and cognitive science is derived from an individualistic, procedural account of
action that is over-rationalised and misconceived. The assumptions that coherence and
order is based upon intent recognition, that there are conventions forthe expression of intent,
and that there is an enumerable body of shared background knowledge are challenged.
Because of the weak empirical methodology, theories and models are allowed to develop
without due care forthe interactional, situated and circumstantial details that are endogenous
to the achievement of action and dialogue activity. The fictional treatment of dialogue
examples in the documentation and analysis of intent ascription shows a disregard for the
circumstantial production of dialogue, and thus the interchange model of dialogue is
reproduced. Consequently, if models are applied to the conception and design of dialogue
artifacts then impoverished performance will result, for example, inflexibility in situated
-8-
contexts or poor opportunities for the user to 'interact' with the system at appropriate
moments. Solutions to the problems that arise in performance, or that are hypothetically
raised by the analyst intuitively considering the possibilities, are then suggested by those
same theories resulting in a closed consideration of internal problems that do not address
the fundamental issues. An attempt to rethink the conception of dialogue and the machine
is undertaken in this thesis.
Dialogue will be understood as mutual activity involving multiple participants engaged in
practical coordination and communication using natural language, eg. correspondence,
conversation, debates, etc.. The focus of the chapter will be on research that studies how
dialogue can be interpreted or generated in practice. A brief survey of work on traditional
models of dialogue, computer modelling and natural language processing is described in
order to trace the developments leading towards the investigation, using computational tools
and a mentalist vocabulary, of communicative action in dialogue. The focus is on those
models that turn away from the problem of describing a phenomenon as a structured product
to the issue of how individuals produce or interpret the phenomenon. Another concern is
with models that would be useful for conceptualising or building a computer dialogue system.
Unfortunately most work is primarily concerned with written language use and spoken
language use to a lesser extent, with little research on the non-verbal and situational
characteristics of communicative action.
The main classes of computer model are described and then one particular computer model
of dialogue is examined in detail in terms of its theory, empirical methodology and
implementation. In Grosz & Sidner (1986) a theory is described that tries to account for
purposeful discourse activity, discourse structure and the processing of discourse
contributions. This model has advantages over other models, but there are limitations when
dialogue is considered with respect to a theory of situated interactivity and an empirical
perspective that would provide much evidence for theory development. For example, the
evidence that the treatment a contribution gets in dialogue is not static, but can be reclassified
or misplaced, must point to a reconsideration of the integrity of the segment and the
segmentation procedure. The intention here is not to develop or replace their model with
another, but to indicate the problems and resources available for alternative directions that
may supplement or supplant the class of similar models. The remainder of the thesis will
then examine empirically the constitutive domain of interaction in the context of a particular
study of computer-mediated dialogue, and consider the development of appropriate
methodologies for designing and evaluating useful computer dialogue systems - dialogue
'with' machines - and for exploring the nature and emergence of situated dialogue activity.
2.2 A Short History of Traditional Models of Dialogue
To trace the development of traditional theories of dialogue within the extraordinarily diverse
and rich field of discourse analysis would be a difficult task1. It is not undertaken in this thesis.
But, a few key developments and issues must be mentioned to understand the recent interest
in computer models. Useful guides can be found in Coulthard (1985/77), Stubbs (1983),
Brown & Yule (1983), Levinson (1983), and Dijk (1985) that consider dialogue as well as
other forms of discourse, eg. monologues. Dascal (1985) is a multidisciplinary collection
based on the theme of human dialogue that acknowledges that the phenomenon of dialogue,
a natural human activity, is a major research topic.
Research on dialogue was fragmented up until the second world war and confined to that
which was considered to be historically, artistically or rhetorically momentous or important.
Indeed, everyday language use was largely ignored and dismissed. Since then work has
proliferated and progressed on two levels - the utterance and discourse level - within the
fields of psychology, linguistics, philosophy of language, and sociology among others. The
methodology adopted has varied from the deeply empirical and descriptive to the intuitive
and constructed. One of the first formal linguistic approaches by Harris (1952) proposed a
linguistic model "for the analysis of connected speech and writing" that attempted to apply
distributional techniques to discourse. Since then many models have been proposed, for
example, the exchange structure model of the Birmingham discourse school described in
Coulthard (1985/77) which analysed institutional dialogues in order to develop a structural
analysis in terms of the realisation of units of discourse in the manner of a grammatical theory.
Philosophy has also had a great influence on theories of dialogue that attempt to ground
language in action and cooperation. For example, speech act theory was developed by
Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), but is not really concerned with dialogue, only the conditions
required for the successful achievement of a speech act by a speaker. This approach has
been heavily criticised recently: for example, Levinson (1981a and b) arguesthat speech act
theory is problematic as a model of dialogue. A truly dialogic analysis came from Grice (1975)
who examined the cooperative basis for conversation in terms of conventional conversational
maxims and the logic of the inferences or implicatures that can be made by speakers and
hearers in conversation. These studies come under the banner of pragmatics. A radically
different approach, conversation analysis, also emerged at this time to study empirically the
1 The terminology is a great problem as well. For instance, dialogue, discourse, and text are not
cognate concepts.
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interactive achievement of natural everyday conversations. This development, which informs
the remainder of the thesis, will be discussed later in Chapter 3.
Debates have been furious across the fields that uneasily congregate under the flag of
discourse analysis. Multidisciplinary perspectives unfortunately have led to paradigm
clashes and misunderstandings. In particular, a key concern has been with the nature of the
order to be found in dialogue. Structural notions - eg. move, turn, interchange, section,
lesson, exchange, conversation, story - have been introduced in order to explain an order of
dialogue amenable to analysis or categorisation. In many approaches these structures are
posited as knowledge. However, the status of that knowledge in the dialogue itself and how
that order is produced is unclear. For example, are there rules that govern dialogue conduct?
These issues lead into the most relevant development for considering computer models and
that is the emergence of a process or procedural perspective.
Brown & Yule (1983, p. 23-4) note three distinct stages in the field of discourse analysis.
First, the sentence-as-object view, which is mainly descriptive and includes most of the field
of linguistics. Second, the text-as-product view, which looks at the discourse textual record
as produced by a speaker in a context, but without regard to how the product is produced or
interpreted. And lastly, the discourse-as-process view which is summarised as follows.
We shall consider words, phrases and sentences which appear in the textual
recordofa discourse to be evidence ofan attemptbyaproducer (speaker/writer)
to communicate his message to a recipient (hearer/reader). We shall be
particularly interested in discussing how a recipient might come to comprehend
the producer's message on a particular occasion, and how the requirements of
theparticular recipient(s), in definable circumstances, influence the organisation
of the producer's discourse, (ibid, p. 24)
Discourse is:
a dynamic process in which language was used as an instrument of
communication in a context by a speaker/writer to express meanings and
achieve intentions (discourse). Working from this data, the analyst seeks to
describe regularities in the linguistic realisations usedbypeople to communicate
those meanings and intentions, (ibid, p. 26)
The essence of this third development is that the production or comprehension of discourse
is itself a constitutive domain of discourse organisation that must be studied. For example,
a schema-based approach that emphasizes data structure schemata in the process of
comprehension of stories is described in Rumelhart (1975). He claims that the theory
embodies not only a general theory of meaning but a procedural one as well. In other words,
the procedures implemented in the model parallel the procedures by which people
comprehend discourse. This approach was part of the developing cognitive science
perspective to language and cognitive phenomena that uses the computer metaphor in its
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study of mentalist processes like dialogue reasoning. (See Cicourel (1980) for a critique of
this type of model as well as non-procedural models.)
To summarise, there are many approaches within discourse analysis and there is no attempt
here to bring them into a unified perspective. What is important is the contrast between the
descriptive tradition and the newer interest in explanation or description through simulation
- or as Levinson (1981b, p. 487) puts it, "analysis-by-synthesis". Moreover, the process view
traced and outlined above has come to mean more than describing the regularities in
discourse as the product of a linguistic process. For instance, Cohen (1984) discusses the
work of Labov & Fanshel (1977), a standard approach in discourse analysis, and criticises
the extent of their claims:
Theiranalyses presented rules for interpreting the intentions behind utterances
of various syntactic forms - eg. rules for when a hearer will interpret utterances
as indirect requests for physical action or verbal confirmation. However, these
rules were stipulated as regularities of discourse rather than as derived from
underlying processes. Their findings should serve as data to be explained,
rather than as a satisfying account of discourse, (p. 100)
2.3 A Background to Natural language Processing and
Computer Modelling
Before looking at recent work in computer models of dialogue, a summary of the principles
of computer models of language phenomena is needed. The use of computers in the study
of language has given rise to the field of natural language processing in which most work is
on grammar in the domains of morphology, syntax, lexis, etc.. Winograd (1983), Grosz et al
(1986), and Spark-Jones & Wilks (1983) contain useful summaries and readings of the
developments in the field. For various reasons, the development of complex computer
models of interactive discourse has been slow compared to the intensive work on
intra-sentential language structure, semantics and text generation. It seems probable that
this was in part a result of the work on computer languages in the 1950s, combined with the
rise of Chomskyan linguistics, which led to parsers that can procedurally categorise strings
into constituent structures. However, the important point is that the confluence of ideas from
computer science and linguistics led to a quite different conception of language and how it
should be studied.
The computational metaphor has been adopted in different forms by many disciplines.
Winograd & Flores (1986) summarise the main assumptions of the 'computational metaphor'
in terms of cognitive systems:
1. All cognitive systems are symbol systems. They achieve their intelligence by
symbolising external and internal situations and events, and by manipulating
those symbols. 2. All cognitive systems share a basic underlying set of symbol
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manipulating processes. 3. A theory of cognition can be couched as a program
in an appropriate symbolic fashion such that the program when run in the
appropriate environment will produce the observed behaviour, (p. 25)
The metaphor is also deeply embedded in how human communication is theoretically
understood, and how artifacts should be conceived and designed. The standard model is
summarised in Winograd (1983, p. 12-3):
Language is a process of communication between intelligent processors, in
which the producer and the comprehender perform complex cognitive
operations. The producer begins with communicative goals, including effects
to be achieved, information to be conveyed, and attitudes to be expressed....
In order to communicate theproducermustmap this multidimensional collection
of goals onto a sequence of sounds that can be uttered or marks that can be
drawn on a page.... The choice of words, the structure of phrases, and the
patterns of emphasis and intonation all play a part in providing the necessary
cues for the comprehender to infer the producer's goals.
What the metaphor has given researchers is rigour in the specification of the theory in the
form of a computer model. Any procedure must be computationally decidable, ie. it must be
possible to compute the procedure in finite time, and also tractable, ie. computable in
reasonable time and resources. But the exact status of the computer program - its behaviour,
procedures and symbolic representations - to a theory is unclear, thus computational rigour
is not necessarily useful as proof of the 'correctness' of a theory. Anyway, provided explicit
accounts of the procedures are given, the rigour of implementation also supports a paradigm
principle similar to that found in the physical sciences, namely reproducibility. Another person
should be able to reproduce the machine behaviour or results in another place and on a
different machine from the formal specification of the computational procedure.
With variants of this metaphor, computer models have formed into three general types. The
success of any account is to be judged in terms of the following kinds of adequacy:
i) Descriptive: allows extrapolation of assumptions by the computer generation
of descriptive linguistic regularities. This is common in computational linguistics.
ii) Generative: simulation of human-like language behaviour in artificial
intelligence.
iii) Cognitive reality: a postulated computational mechanism faithful to human
mental language processes without having to specify neurological or biological
details. This is the basis of most work on language in cognitive science.
In account i) the aim might be to produce a macro model that describes or categorises the
global properties of language or discourse, or a discourse process description that predicts
the referent of an anaphoric pronoun in a discourse script. A primary aim is to propose
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procedures for mapping one representation onto another, but there is no claim for adequate
simulation of behaviour or cognitive adequacy. The next two measures of adequacy concern
relations between representations on the one hand, and the world and action on the other.
Account ii) requires the engineering of computational processes in order to build 'intelligent'
systems with some exploitation of an understanding of human language conduct, but that
also incorporates a "do it anyhow" method, eg. plan-based approaches to intelligent interface
design, discourse models, user models, history models, quantitative methods, etc.. This may
be achieved with no resemblance to postulated human subpersonal mechanisms. Also, it
may result in real artifacts that are designed to engage with people in similar activities to
those modelled. The operational Turing test is a somewhat old characterisation of machine
intelligence appropriate to the aims of much of this work (Turing 1950). It is the enterprise
of simulating or realising appropriate behaviours that is most widely considered here. In
account iii) psychological validity places an additional set of restrictions because production
and generation mechanisms and representations must all be justified in mentalist terms, with
the hope that neurological and biological theories will eventually support them.
What about the origin of examples of the phenomena to be explained and evidence for the
theory, and the status or use of computational procedural models? Examples of the
phenomena are usually derived from intuition or verbal records of restricted experimental
interactions. An additional source of data is from the implementation, which is a testing
ground for behavioural aspects of the theory. Assumptions can be tested within the model's
limits by running long computations that cannot be done by hand. But there are problems
with many implementations, especially when one considers the practical generation of
human-like language use. Implementations tend to have the following characteristics:
pre-constituted inputs and outputs; no real practical consequence or situation; human
interpreted and assisted process; hypothetical scenarios and results; and unlimited
computation time and space. For example, an utterance in a hypothetical discourse may be
preconstituted as a grammatically correct string of words to be input in written form to a
computer program that will output a similar form to be judged by a fellow analyst as the next
utterance in the hypothetical discourse. Also, plan-based systems, for example systems
such as described in Appelt (1985), based on intentional models of language generation and
action can take several minutes or even hours to compute a next linguistic action.
The computational metaphor has been subject to many criticisms, eg. the inadequacy of
representation as a means of producing intelligible conduct through computational
processes. Even Winograd, an early proponent of the metaphor, has himself reflected and
altered his position in Winograd & Flores (1986). They place the work of Al within the
rationalist tradition derived from the physical sciences and pervasive in philosophy since the
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times of the Greek philosopher Plato. Emphasis in this tradition is placed on the formulation
of identifiable well-defined objects and formal rules which operate on the objects, such as
in symbolic logic or automata theory. The particular problems for achieving an appropriate
model of dialogue are to be found in the tendency to align with the rationalist tradition applied
to the study of human interpretation and understanding. The discursive and conceptual
explanation is presumed to be above the practical and situated, and consequently there is a
tendency to reify the explanation in the head of an individual, ie. as the means by which
conduct is generated. But, because of the requirement for computer implementation,
problems are exposed in the less than perfect performance of the artifact, designed on the
basis of a theory, in practical circumstances with human users. This has been shown by
Suchman (1987) in the case of an expert help system, based upon plan-based theories of
action, for users of a photocopier.
However, besides the complex of difficulties, a progressive part of computational accounts
is the move towards an examination of the relations between structural models and the
processes of production and interpretation, ie. descriptions and intuitions about language
structures vs. the real-time process of producing and interpreting action in theworld that gives
rise to that structure. Much research is guided by the hope of building and subsequently
evaluating machine artifacts that can act intelligently and communicate with humans.
To conclude, given that computational accounts of language and action have moved from a
'product' to a 'process' view, computational theories claiming an abstract account of the
process of conduct have been reticent about the actual details of situated practices. Usually,
an account is formed from our folk notions about the nature of conduct, and then some
process or mechanism computing over representations is hypothesized in order to generate
the behaviour or regularities. This computational process is then reified as the cognitive
process or as some abstraction from it. Of course, this work is useful and productive, in that
interesting computer systems for real use may emerge as the result of these investigations,
as well as theoretically stimulating, in the sense that it may suggest through its efforts the
impossibility of building an intelligent computer. The weakness is that it is methodologically
individualistic and lacks external constraint, which consequently leads to over-representation
and reification.
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2.4 Computational Accounts of Dialogue: Theories and
Models
2.4.1 A Survey
Much current computational research on language is concerned with generation and
interpretation, particularly of single speaker/writer sentences or utterances. It is, however,
gradually expanding into the study of multi-sentential discourse. This thesis is only
concerned with approaches to dialogue that attempt to deal with mutual intelligibility and the
collaborative achievement of dialogue by participants. That is, the concern is with accounts
in which a response by one party is addressed in the next sequential slot by another party,
and so a response must be generated in real, practical circumstances.
First let us consider the early artificial intelligence (Al) systems that were claimed to be
demonstrations that machines can 'understand' human language in dialogue. Programs
simulating simple dialogue behaviour emerged parallel with the development of interactive
computers. Question-answering interfaces to database systems will not be considered
because they do not attempt to provide coherent linguistic messages over extended
exchanges with the user, but they are still an important link in the development of computer
models of language use. Instead, consider the infamous ELIZA program, Weizenbaum
(1966), that used simple techniques to achieve a simulation of a Rogerian therapist. This
was lucky for the programmer, because the fundamental principle of this form of psychiatric
therapy is to remain passive and reflect problems back to the patient for them to discursively
mull over with therapeutic consequences. The program is quite successful in achieving a
reasonable dialogue; or rather, the users are quite successful at finding the language output
intelligible as contributions in a dialogue. In fact, for limited periods people can believe that
they are engaged in intelligent dialogue 'with' a machine. However, it does not take long for
the program to inadvertently slip up and thus demonstrate also its simplicity. Several similar
systems developed, but after the initial excitement it was realised that something more was
required than just a clever set of procedures exploiting the propensity of people to find sense
in almost anything (as Garfinkel (1967) has demonstrated) and certain stable forms of
language that occur in particular activities. McTear (1987, p. 67) summarises the simple
techniques that were used in these systems:
1. The domain was highly restricted,
2. The subset of natural language input was restricted,
3. A keyword matching procedure was used,
4. The input was mapped onto an underlying artificial/formal language.
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A major step forward came with Winograd's SHRDLU which was supposed to answer
restricted questions about the state of a simple microworld consisting of different coloured
toy blocks, to perform the user's linguistic commands with the aid of a hypothetical robot arm,
and to gain knowledge from statements by the user (Winograd 1972). Thiswas a big advance
on the earlier template-matching programs because of the use of syntactic and semantic
theories to design the procedures and modules of the program. Even though the robot was
passive, Winograd explored some of the key problems of how language is used in
multi-utterance dialogue in which utterances have to be interpreted in the context of physical
objects and activity.
Since this period, various attempts at simulating human dialogue in restricted task domains
have been made, eg. Bobrow et al (1977). But, in common with cognitive theories of
discourse processing, there has been a separation into both real system development and
focused research on particular modules that may play a part in the generation or interpretation
process. This work has led to the publication of several collections of research on computer
modelling of dialogue, eg. Joshi et al (1981) and Brady & Berwick (1983). In Joshi et al (1981,
p. 1) the following four features are stated as necessary parts of a model accounting for
discourse:
a. Utterance meaning,
b. The discourse participant's evolving model of what underlies the discourse,
c. Their similarly evolving models of each other, user modelling,
d. Situational characteristics.
The over-riding concern within the artificial intelligence tradition since then has been to specify
what sorts of 'knowledge' are required in order to interpret or generate a discourse
contribution using the model of language use shown in Figure 2-1.
The specification of knowledge in terms of user or discourse models is considered in Kobsa
& Wahlster (1988a and b). In the proliferation of knowledge-rich approaches, two lines can
be distinguished: those that use language structure and those that look outside the linguistic
context at the mental state or activity that a participant is engaged in. Adherents of the
possibility of a linguistic explanation or model of dialogue come mainly from linguistics and
adherents of the over-riding importance of 'world knowledge' are from philosophical and
psychological domains, among others.
Just before looking in general at linguistic and non-linguistic models, the type of data used
in computer models and its status needs clarification. Evidence of language use in dialogue
is usually intuitive or constructed for the concerns of the theory. This is very much in the style
of speech act theory and traditional linguistic analysis. Examples of plan-based or rational
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theories of speech action are to be found in Cohen & Levesque (1988), and in most of the
work in Joshi et al (1981) and in Kobsa et al (1988a). Some data derived from human dialogue
is obtained from experiments, eg. Cohen (1984), or naturally recorded, eg. Reichman (1985),
but the data is poorly rendered for analysis with little attention to the local circumstances of
interaction. The examples are then used as the input to an 'understanding' model to
categorise, segment ormake valid inferences from on the basis that they are representations
of coherent utterances in a dialogue. One could say that the results of a 'generation'
implementation are data, too. But, in many cases implementation is not fully achievable, and
thus idealisations of data sets must be used in order to gloss over the parts of a complete
model that are not implemented. For example, the difficult problem of speech perception is
avoided by working with decontextualised utterance objects made up of strings of characters
forming words. Also, the evaluation of the performance of an implemented model as a
'dialogue partner' is limited, usually being at a conceptual level of agreement by analysts over
whether or not a particular structure or 'interpretation' could be assigned or an appropriate
response given to a speaker's utterance in a constructed or cleaned-up real dialogue, eg.
Walker(1989). We shall see examples of this later in the critical consideration of Grosz &
Sidner's data and their implementation criteria.
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2.4.2 Linguistic Approaches
At one end of the spectrum, Polyani (1983) has favoured a strict extension of the linguistic
approach to the study of discourse structure. He posits different levels - local structures,
discourse units, speech events - with a grammar of each level analogous to linguistic
patterning at the sentence level. Other approaches are not so entrenched within a strictly
syntactic framework but they do posit some ordering at the linguistic level. The majority of
computational models have drawn upon rhetorical units that are deeply embedded in the
social action vocabulary of analysts and actors. Some sort of discourse unit is defined and
then a recursive embedding structure relating units to each other is hypothesized to explain
the structure of discourse. Reichman's approach to 'everyday conversation' is explicitly
linguistic (Reichman 1985). She is interested in functional relations between rhetorical
conversational moves that are indicated by clue words in dialogue. The ultimate aim is to
derive a model grammar that governs our conversation and that can be implemented as a
computational procedure reflecting the process of human dialogue. In Reichman-Adar (1984)
she acknowledges the abstract nature of the model she presents but argues that to build
natural language interfaces one has to be sensitive to the rule-governed nature of extended
human communication that her model outlines. Bateman (1986) takes a distinct linguistic
stance to the organisation of dialogue derived from systemic linguistics, in the style of the
Birmingham discourse school, and incorporates some of the elements of conversation
analysis. He explicitly avoids the use of an intentional vocabulary by investigating the
discourse functions of linguistic items, and the relations between the deployment of linguistic
resources and contextual development.
2.4.3 Non-Linguistic Approaches
The principle adopted in the non-linguistic modelling of dialogue is that the coherence of
dialogue cannot be explained at the linguistic level itself but must be the result of an underlying
order or structure that is perceived and used by participants in the dialogue. The underlying
structure is derived from facts about the world, the activities the dialogue participants are
engaged in, or their mental states. For example, the work of Levin & Moore (1977) uses a
dialogue game approach that typifies certain distinctive features of the possible activities that
dialogue participants could be engaged in - eg. helping, information probing, that are similar
to discourse-level speech acts. Dialogue consists of the application of a dialogue type to
constrain interpretation and production on the basis of recognition of the speaker's goals and
knowledge states identified from an utterance. But, the dialogue types are too restrictive and
clumsy, and the model does not have a well developed theory of action.
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Conceptual approaches that hypothesize mental states, like intentions and beliefs, of
individual actors and that use a theory of language as action that relates language form to
performed action have become popular. This is because of the realisation that dialogue is
conducted for a reason and participants usually have a purpose in acting the way they do.
This work in computational fields has borrowed and developed philosophical accounts of
language. For example the early development of this form of computer model tried to
combine the speech act model with a plan-based theory of action, eg. Cohen & Perrault
(1979). Appelt (1985, p. 1) argues that "human language behaviour is part of a coherent plan
of action toward satisfying a speaker's goals" and that speech contributions encode speech
acts designed to effect certain actions in the plans of the speaker. Also, Cohen (1984), talking
about the plan-based approach to communication, states that:
the coherence of dialogue is to be found in the interaction of the conversant's
plans. That is, a speaker is regarded as planning his utterances to achieve his
goals, which may involve influencing a hearer. On receiving an utterance, the
hearer attempts to infer the speaker's goai(s), and to understand how the
utterance furthers them. The hearer then adopts new goals, andplans his own
utterances to achieve those. A conversation ensues, (p. 111)
Oviatt (1988, p. 47-51), on cooperative conversation, says:
Computer systems that function as cooperative conversants... are based on an
approach to communication that treats utterances as actions that a speaker
plans and reasons about in attempting to alter a listener's mental state. Such
actions have been called speech acts by philosophers of language.... a theory
of rational interaction provides the foundation for understanding
communication.... In the analysis of cooperative dialogues, it is postulated that
listeners are motivated to understand why speakers say what they do, and to
infer their communicative goals and plans. It is important to specify that
cooperative dialogue ideally involvesmutual recognition of the intentions behind
one another's utterances.... That is, listeners attempt to infer what the speaker
intends to accomplish through communication, rather than adoptinga superficial
interpretation based exclusively on literal statements and observable events.
Recently it has been recognised that a more general theory of rational communication is
needed in order to understand "autonomous action by rational agents." (Kiss 1988/86, p. 4).
Cohen & Levesque (1987) argue that analysis in terms of speech acts is unnecessary
because properties of speech acts can be derived from the principles of a general theory of
rational interaction. Crucially, they claim that "what speaker's and hearer's need do is to
recognise the speaker's intentions" (p. 3) rather than recognise the illocutionary act
performed.
This type of model will be examined in greater detail in the next sections. Basically, the
conception of interaction and language use is rather narrow, viz. a view of dialogue as the
rational exchange of extended utterances by more than one participant in which complete
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actions with an underlying intent are recognised by the recipient at the utterance-level and
over extended exchanges. One contemporary model that has tried to span both the linguistic
and non-linguistic approaches discussed in the last two sections is that of Grosz & Sidner
(1986). The remainder of the chapterwill take a detailed look at this theory and its computer
model of dialogue.
2.5 Grosz and Sidner's Theory of Discourse
So far, a number of computer theories and models have been described that are relevant for
an understanding of the processing of dialogue, ie. for the computational representations and
processes required for the production and interpretation of adequate dialogue contributions
as a participant in that dialogue. Note that the thesis is not immediately concerned with the
identification, categorisation and representation of structures to be found in dialogue activity
using computer models. Many models only aim to provide such an account and they are
beyond the scope of the thesis because the structures may play no role, tacitly or discursively,
in the practice of dialogue itself. For instance, participants do not draw upon statistical
measures of utterance-type frequency across gender categories in order to construct their
intelligible dialogue, though there may be a useful structural pattern to be found by computer
analysis. Of course representations of interesting structures may be useful for Al dialogue
systems that can use any computationally viable means to generate or interpret an action,
though a parsimony with respect to the importation of internal representations and
mechanisms is recommended in Chapter 6.
One particular contemporary approach, Grosz & Sidner (1986), has been reserved forcareful
consideration for a number of reasons. Grosz & Sidner's theory of discourse is a
comprehensive attempt to provide a model that relates linguistic structures of dialogue to the
non-linguistic processes of production and interpretation. First, the model is concerned with
purpose: participants in a dialogue engage in it for a communicative purpose, and this fact
informs the construction and coherence of the dialogue. Second, it deals with linguistic
structure: that language structure does exist above the sentence, and language form is crucial
in the process of dialogue and should be integrated with a non-linguistic model. The third
concern is with process: that a locus of focused processing of dialogue contributions occurs
over time. Fourth, the model includes activity: the general activities and tasks engaged in
by the participants are important. It has a number of improvements over previous theories,
including the implicit recognition of the shared nature of discourse structure - "Discourses are
fundamentally examples of collaborative behaviour." (Grosz & Sidner 1987, p. 4) - and
improvements on rhetorical approaches to discourse structure. As a consequence of this,
their theory is taken to be representative of many of the other approaches described earlier.
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In addition, their theory concerns communicative action, not specifically verbal dialogue, and
so it should apply to a wide range of dialogue contexts. The general applicability and appeal
of the theory has been shown in the referencing by those modelling language and discourse
as well as by developers of prototype systems, eg. Hirschberg(1990), Neal et al (1988), and
Kobsa & Wahlster (1988a).
Some details of their theory and proposed model of dialogue will be discussed in the following
sections. Given the aims of the thesis, four aspects will be considered: the workings of the
theory and the assumptions it makes about the nature of communicative action and the
achievement of dialogue; what phenomena are to be explained by their model and how; the
source of the data and its status in the model; and the possible implementations and uses of
the model in designing for human-computer interaction. First of all a brief summary of the
major elements of Grosz & Sidner's theory will be presented afterwhich the elements will be
critically analysed.
2.5.1 The Theory
Theoretically Grosz & Sidner want to explain what makes a discourse - a text or dialogue -
coherent and their approach stresses the role of processing and purpose (Grosz & Sidner
1986, p. 175). In order to achieve this, they argue for three components in the model: the
intentional, the attentional and the linguistic. They argue that linguistic structure or structures
of form beyond the sentence, which are built in the actual linear stream of discourse, must
be part of a theory of discourse process. The discourse segment consisting of more than
one dialogue contribution is the linguistic unit. So, linguistic structure is an important
constraint on processing, but the coherence of dialogue and the unity of the discourse
segment is found in the underlying intentional structure. The structure of a dialogue reflects
the rational intentional behaviour of its participants. But not all intentions are discourse
intentions or intended to be recognised. Grosz & Sidner are careful to restrict their notion of
intention to a generalisation of Grice's utterance-level communicative intent to the discourse
level. So, the initiator of a discourse segment has an intention, and the recipient must
recognise that intention, through the course of dialogue during the segment, in order to have
its intended effect. But linguistic and intentional components are not enough. The third
component of the theory introduces the abstract concept of cognitive attentional focus, which
mediates between the linguistic and intentional structures. Dialogue is the result of the
recognition and coordination of intentions by more than one party in which representations
of salient properties, objects and relations come in and out of focus. In this way, interpretation
and production can be constrained through the attentional state mechanism. To summarise:
Discourse processing requires recognising how the utterances of the discourse
aggregate into segments, recognising the intentions expressed in the discourse
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and the relationship among intentions, and tracking the discourse through the
operation of the mechanisms associated with the attentional state. (Grosz &
Sidner 1986, p. 175)
The key to Grosz & Sidner's theory is that the recognition and coordination of discourse
purpose or intention by parties in the dialogue must be a central concern of any theory of
dialogue process. A consequence of this is that linguistic form is relegated to signalling
segment boundaries and expressing intentions. Let us look more closely at the components
of their theory.
2.5.1.1 Purpose and Action
A fundamental claim of Grosz & Sidner's theory is that "intentions play a primary role in
explaining discourse structure, defining discourse coherence, and providing a coherent
conceptualisation of the term 'discourse' itself." (1986, p. 175) Thus, on a simple level, they
reiterate the common claim that language is embedded in action and is purposeful, with the
added claim that the coherence of action and dialogue is the result of underlying coordination
and recognition of mental predicates like intention, plan, belief, want, etc.. The theory of
discourse purpose is intimately related to extensions to Grice's notion of non-natural
meaning. They posit that in dialogue participants are continually engaged in determining
what each other meant by uttering a discourse contribution. The idea behind Grice's (1957)
notion is to clarify the differences between the incidental transfer of information - 'given off -
and communication that is openly intended. The difference between 'natural meaning' and
'non-natural meaning' is defined2 as:
S meant non-naturally Z by uttering U if and only if:
(i) S intended U to cause some effect Z in recipient H
(ii) S intended (i) to be achieved simply by H recognising that intention (i).
Thus, this philosophical notion of communicative intention is a special case of the more
general notion of intention. For example, "a compliment achieves its intended effect only if
the intention to compliment is recognised; in contrast a scream of 'boo' achieves its intended
effect without the hearer having to recognise the speaker's intention." (p. 178) There are
other intentions in dialogue that are not intended to communicate, for example, if a speaker
intends to con a hearer then the recognition of this intention will defeat the con-trick. A
summary of the basic points of Grosz & Sidner's intentional component is given below.
2 More sophisticated definitions have been developed from this in order to eliminate
counter-examples.
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1. The primary 'intention' is the purpose or task behind the discourse (discourse
purpose=DP) or the discourse segment (discourse segment purpose=DSP).
Each discourse or discourse segment has one primary 'intention' behind it.
2. The 'intention' is intended by the Initiating Conversational Participant (ICP) to
be recognised by the Other CP (OCP) over a 'discourse segment', and must be
recognised to be satisfied. Language is a means for achieving this.
3. The range of intentions is open-ended, but they hypothesize that structural
relations between them are a small closed set. The two they focus on are: the
dominance relation (DOM), or whatever satisfies one intention may partially
satisfy another, and therefore this is a constituency relation; and the satisfaction
precedence relation (SP), in which one intention must be satisfied before
another, and this is a sequencing or ordering relation.
4. The intentional structure is distinct from the plan or task structure. It is not
pre-built, but arises in the process of discourse construction.
5. The theory is derived from a generalisation of Gricean utterance-level
intention theory, though Grosz & Sidner point out that they are only concerned
with discourse structure and not discourse meaning. Their main concern is "with
the role of DP/DSPs in determining discourse structure and in specifying how
these intentions can be recognised by an OCP." (1986, p. 199)
Examples of the type of intentions that Grosz & Sidner take to be typical are in shorthand
English rather than a formal language and "are intended to be a gloss for a formal statement
of the actual intentions." (p. 184). Eg.
Intend A (Intend E (Tell E A (Location other setscrew))) or
Intend E (Know-How-To A (Use A wheelpuller)).
In relation to intentions, the main focus in the theoretical discussion is on beliefs and actions.
For Grosz & Sidner, the mutual intelligibility of talk and what is done through talk is a matter
of the recognition by the OCP of the ICP's discourse-level intention, and recognition of the
structural relations between the DSPs arising in the discourse. In addition, the relation of the
discourse purposes to the production or interpretation of dialogue contributions is expressed
as follows: "Our basic viewpoint is that a conversational participant needed to recognise the
discourse segment purposes and the dominance relationships between them in order to
process subsequent utterances of the discourse." (1987, p. 3) Communication is the
recognition and coordination of discourse plans that are intended to be recognised (1987, p.
5). Ultimately, they hypothesize:
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a discourse is coherent only when its discourse purpose is shared by all the
participants and when each utterance contributes to achieving this purpose,
either directly or indirectly, by contributing to the satisfaction of a discourse
segmentpurpose. (1986, p. 202)
The issues posed by taking such a stance are then: how is an intention expressed, how is it
recognised by the intended recipient, and what conventional or shared knowledge is available
for achieving the recognition and coordination? They argue that this 'process' involves
linguistic cues, and propositional content and utterance-level intention recognition. Also, they
need to specify the surface realisations of actions and the relations between the
utterance-action and intention so that intents can be realised as actions or recognised from
observable actions. Of these they have very little to say, but propose that:
A definitive statement characterising primary and subsidiary intentions for
task-orienteddialogues awaits further research not only in discourse theory, but
also in the theory of intentions and actions. In particular, a clearer statement of
the interactions among the intentions of the various participants (with respect to
both linguistic andnonlinguistic actions) awaits the formulation ofa better theory
of cooperation andmultiagent activity. (1986, p. 202)
It shall be argued later, as conversation analysts have argued, that what is required instead
is a painstaking empirical analysis of the practice of dialogue. In later work, Grosz & Sidner
(1987) do try and elaborate a better theory of action and intent using the notion of 'shared
plan'. Rather than seeing the coherence of action as the coordination and recognition of
intents as parts of individual plans, plans are constructed as shared objects separate from
an individual's private plans or intents. Also, they do not determine action but provide a means
of interpretation. This notion will be considered later when discussing the concept of
attentional state because of the similarities in the postulation of a shared representation
between individuals. It may be a useful step forward but it requires a specification of what
generates action if not plans.
2.5.1.2 Activity, Structure and Process
The prime locus of dialogue coherence in Grosz & Sidner's theory is the coordination and
recognition of discourse purposes. In the following, other features of the theory and how they
combine into a suitable processing model are described.
It has been shown by Grosz (1977) in her work on reference that activity can in particular
ways constrain linguistic interpretation and she suggests a possible computational
mechanism for doing this, eg. knowledge of the task resolves 'it' and 'that' anaphora
ambiguities. The earlier work is generalised from the observation that the notion of task
structure is essential for understanding task-oriented dialogues to a basic assumption of the
theory: that the dialogue participants regularly engage in purposeful activities that structure
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the dialogue in analogous ways to task dialogues. These activities can be discourse specific,
physical or mental. However, the task and the dialogue activity are distinct; the structure of
discourse segment purposes is a result of the dialogue and may have a different structure
from the task plan as well as a different level of detail. This generalisation is then filled out
by relating the coherence of activities to the mentalist account of purposeful action outlined
earlier: thus, not only are task-based activities purposeful and intentional, but so are activities
that are intrinsic to the dialogue itself.
The linguistic component is "the structure of the actual sequences of utterances in the
discourse" made up of discourse segments or chunks of 'utterances', viz. The actual saying
or writing of particular sequences of phrases or clauses." (1986, p. 177) It is a segmental
categorisation of discourse leading to a hierarchical organisation of discrete segments.
Discourse is broken down into segments in which utterances function in the segment to further
its discourse purpose. The motivation for connecting structure with purpose is "What
individuates a discourse? What makes it coherent? That is, faced with a sequence of
utterances, how does one know whether they constitute a single discourse, several (perhaps
interleaved) discourses, or none?" (1986, p. 175) It is unclear if they mean for the analyst or
the participants.
Finally, the attentional component is an "abstraction of the focus of attention of the discourse
participants", which mediates between the intentional and linguistic levels. They claim that
"attention is essential in explicating the processing of utterances in discourse." (1986, p. 175)
It provides a central locus of control by which discourse segmentation is achieved as the
product of recognising and coordinating discourse purposes. It also provides a constraint on
processing by making clear what elements are currently relevant. A stack model is used to
process contributions and the mechanism provides for a hierarchical organisation of
discourse segmentation. Contributions can push salient discourse segments and their
features onto the stack or pop them off to return to held-over segments requiring completion.
The attentional state is "a property of the discourse itself, not of the discourse participants"
(1986, p. 179). So, it is a postulated shared structure of discourse that is theoretically
separate from the mental states of an individual and emerges in the dialogue. This is an
important distinction that has since become topical in Al models of natural language, ie. the
dialogue record or score-board that is shared is separated from the 'individual' user model,
eg. private intentions and beliefs concerning others. Basically, the claim is that participants
if they are to engage in mutual activity must build shared representations that are publicly
inspectable. The focus mechanism and the notion of 'shared plan' are two such
representations that maintain a record of what beliefs are mutually known and what objects
are salient at a particular point in the dialogue. In the model these are computational
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representations that are maintained by each participant on the assumption that they are
mutually accessible; in fact, they are internal and not externally available nor authorised as
is the case in sports games for example. This is an interesting development but unfortunately
merely hides the problem of how mutual knowledge is achieved and maintained behind a
metaphor based on mutual access. Even if operations on the attentional state are identical
for cognitive individuals it is not true that the 'shared state' of each individual will correspond
in practice.
Grosz & Sidner's theory is trying to be very comprehensive in coverage. There are several
clear improvements on other computational models, like plan-based speech act theory and
rhetorical theories. For instance, they recognise a distinction between the intentional
structure and the plan structure. Previous accounts tended to conflate the intentional with
the task or plan structure and thus could not distinguish between what one knows about the
task and one's intentions for performing it. Thus the attentional component focus model was
redundant as a 'mediator' between the intentional structure and the task structure, and could
only serve as the 'realisation' interface, ie. the task plan was the same as the discourse plan.
In these accounts the emergence of purposes related to the task but specific to the dialogue
itself, eg. contingencies in the coordination of communication about the task, were
unaccounted for by the model. They also note the contingency of discourse structure and
its emergence during the discourse as a property of the discourse and not the participants,
even though the theoretical direction taken to explain this is problematic.
2.5.2 What Can Grosz and Sidner's Model Explain?
Grosz & Sidner apply their theory to two types of dialogue phenomena to illustrate the type
of explanation possible by having a three component model of discourse structure.
Unfortunately, they do not get at the richness of the phenomena that other disciplines have
uncovered.
2.5.2.1 The Structure of Interruptions
One dialogue phenomenon they look at commonly comes underthe category of 'interruption'.
Their 'definition' of an interruption has two forms of which the strongest is: "An interruption is
a discourse segment whose DSP is not dominated nor satisfaction-preceded by the DSP of
any preceding segment." (1986, p. 192) They give two examples of this type. First, the 'true
interruption' in which a discourse segment purpose (DSP) is pushed onto the focus stack.
No relation of dominance (DOM) or satisfaction-precedence (SP) exists between the DSP
and lower members of the stack, and access to entities in the lower members is not allowed
in this case. Second, the 'digression' which is as above except there is a common focus or
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salience, eg. an object referred to in both segments, between the focused DSP and the prior
DSP3.
The expectation of a return to the interrupted segment DSP is built into the stack model, but
it becomes more of an effect of the stack model than a normative expectation that is oriented
to by the participants and hence reproduced. It is on this point that the model fails to provide
an adequate account. The sense in which interruptions are produced and managed by all
participants in the talk is lost to a mechanical model that takes the environment of an
interruption to be a prior DSP. The interruption arises simply because there is no structural
relation between the new DSP and the prior. A limited number of conversational cues are
available to signal its absence.
2.5.2.2 The Function of Clue Words and Phrases
Because of the design of the model, 'cue phrases', eg. 'anyway', 'however', serve a certain
function in discourse structure. They are an abbreviated, indirect means of indicating change
in the attentional state and intentional structure. As discourse evolves through 'sequence
time', which is modelled by the stack mechanism, cue phrases can indicate sequencing or
constituency relations between DSPs, as well as an attentional state change. Also, changes
to the attentional state that do not involve intentional structure changes are possible. The
cue phrases are employed by the initiating conversational participant (ICP) to indicate
discourse segment boundaries to the other conversational participant (OCP). For example,
if a stack currently exists with a DSP A in focus, then what intentional structure changes can
cues enable coincident with a new DSP B being pushed onto the stack?
a) A dominates B (constituency relation), eg. "for example".
b) no relation (true interruption), eg. "excuse me".
c) B satisfaction-precedes A (sequencing relation: flashback), eg. "i forgot
about".
d) no relation but common focus (digression), eg. "by the way".
Note that b) - d) all relate to interruptions and it is claimed they are not rhetorical. Cue phrases
can also indicate attentional state change only.
3 This is an unusual property of a stack because it is a relaxation of the defining properties of a
stack that normally prohibits access to lower members.
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e) push DSP onto stack, eg. "now", "and", "but"
f) pop DSP(s) from stack, eg. "anyway"
g) complete a DSP, eg. "ok"
2.5.3 Dialogue Examples as Data
Grosz & Sidner have tried to connect their theory with records of discourse. However, it is
unclearwhetherthese are the prime motivation for developing the theory or simply to illustrate
its explanatory power. The main examples in the paper - a text and a dialogue from a corpus
- are not intuitive, but others are, eg. the interruption example (1986, p. 192). The dialogue
example can be seen in Figure 2-2 and is used to illustrate their analysis in terms of discourse
segment decomposition through the process of intention ascription and attentional focus
change. Later in this chapter an account is given of the problems encountered when an
alternative conversation analytic analysis was attempted.






















First you have to remove the flywheel.
How do I remove the flywheel?
First, loosen the two alien head setscrews
holding it to the shaft, then pull it off.
OK.
I can find one screw. Where's the other one?
On the hub of the flywheel.
That's the one I found. Where's the other one?
About ninety degrees around the hub from the first
one.
I don't understand. I can only find one. Oh
wait, yes I think I was on the wrong wheel.
Show me what you are doing.
I was on the wrong wheel and I can find
them both now.
The tool I have is awkward. Is there another
tool that I could use instead?
Show me the tool you are using.
OK.
Are you sure you are using the right size
key?
I'll try some others.
I found an angle I can get at it.
The two screws are loose, but I'm having trouble
getting the wheel off.
Use the wheelpuller. Do you know how to use
it?
No.
Do you know what it looks like?
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(22) A: Yes.
(23) E: Show it to me please.
(24) A: OK.
(25) E: Good. Loosen the screw in the center and
place the jaws around the hub of the
wheel, then tighten the screw onto the
center of the shaft. The wheel should
slide off.
2.5.4 Implementation of the Model
We did notpropose an actualprocessing model. A computational theory of the
recognition of discourse segment purposes depends on underlying theories of
intention, action and plans. (1987, p. 3-4)
With respect to implementation issues, Grosz & Sidner claim that they are only concerned
with an abstract model of discourse structure. Connecting theory with linguistic evidence
through either constructing a dialogue system or a psychological theory of language use is
a possibility, but not entertained. Grosz & Sidner hope that their abstract theory will be
implementable and thus be used in simulating human conduct. However, they do consider
some of the issues they must confront if the theory was used to build a computational model.
To do this they claim that it "requires determining how each of the individual components
projects onto the model of an individual discourse participant." (1986, p. 188)
2.5.5 An Example of the Model in Action
Consider the example quoted above in Figure 2-2. It is rather complex but the workings of
parts of the model will be illustrated based on the segmentation proposed by Grosz & Sidner
(1986). How does the segmentation into primary discourse segments get achieved in the
dialogue itself? For example, the whole fragment is ascribed as one discourse segment DS1
initiated by the apprentice A. Its primary DSP is: the expert E (ICP) intends that the apprentice
intend to remove the flywheel. It is claimed that this is expressed directly in the
utterance-intention on line 1. Also, the cue phrase 'first' marks the DSP as the first of several
intentions whose satisfaction will contribute to satisfying the larger discourse. This segment
is pushed onto the attentional state focus stack with the flywheel in focus. Lines 2-25 are
then coordinating the recognition by the apprentice A of this discourse intention which
happens to include several subordinate segments. In line 5, A initiates another discourse
segment DS2 with the DSP: A intends E to intend to tell A the location of the other setscrew.
This is also meant to be clear from the utterance-level intention of line 5. This discourse
segment is pushed onto the stack with the screw now in focus. A relation of dominance is
posited between the segments DS1 and DS2 on the stack because of the shared knowledge
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of the two participants and the commitment that A has made to removing the flywheel. By
classifying utterances in terms of their contribution to discourse purpose recognition and
dialogue segmentation, Grosz & Sidner explain apparent ambiguities. For example, in line
25 the phrase "the screw in the center" is potentially ambiguous between referring to one of
the screws on the flywheel in line 18 or to the screw on the wheelpuller. However, it is claimed
that the segmentation posited by the model and the current focus on segment DS5 (lines
19-25) makes the reference of the phrase clear.
2.6 Problems and Limitations of Grosz & Sidner's Theory
Grosz & Sidner attempt a comprehensive theory of dialogue, but there are a number of
problems and limitations. Some of these will be focused on in the remainder of this chapter.
Their work is particularly problematic as an adequate theory of human dialogue and also as
an appropriate model for the design and conception of dialogue artifacts. In the following,
the weak theory of action and activity will be analysed in detail first. The phenomena
explained by Grosz & Sidner's model will be re-examined in a different light. Then the
weaknesses in the empirical methodology characteristic of computer theories of dialogue will
be illustrated and discussed, and the possibilities for implementation and artifact design
considered. Finally, a reconstruction of their theory in an interactional vocabulary will show
that their account is founded on a rationalised mentalist account of dialogue activity in which
the situated achievement of that activity is unaccounted for.
2.6.1 Theoretical Problems
Problems begin with the intentional component that underlies the coherence of dialogue. An
intentional theory of rational, purposeful action forms the backbone of the model. Because
of the recognition that linguistic models do not suffice, earlier accounts of dialogue have tried
to find formal systems of speech action that could explain the coherence of dialogue, but they
suffer from many problems. Levinson has criticised speech act models and discourse
analysis in general, arguing that they lead to ad hoc theorising and a lack of empiricism
(Levinson 1981a and b, 1983). Contemporary process models are more sophisticated but
still need careful examination. Suchman (1987) and Agre & Chapman (1989) provide
extended critiques of the conception of action and plans in artificial intelligence and cognitive
science and the thesis is concerned with continuing their criticisms with respect to
computational dialogue models, and to suggest some missing details necessary for an
adequate account.
The most prevalent model of action in cognitive science and artificial intelligence has a long
heritage in traditional rationalist Western philosophy and science, as Winograd & Flores
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(1986) have pointed out. Grosz & Sidner (1987) fall back on the plan-based model in which
dialogue coherence is to be explained in terms of the recognition and coordination of
underlying plans of actions. However, is discourse intention recognition and coordination the
basis for discourse structure and coherence or the basis by which participants construct or
'process' discourse? It is true that analysts and participants do construct intentional
explanations in retrospect, but that does not mean it is a pervasive component of taking part
in that conduct. Criticisms of the plan-based model of action are to be found in Suchman
(1987) who suggests that plans are powerful for reconstruction and reflection, but necessarily
poor for the actual doing of action, and in Wynn (1980, p. 88):
Purposes can be, and typically are discovered in the course of interaction rather
than planned. Purposes are thus emergent from interaction rather than a priori
organising principles of it.
Following the line of Suchman (1987), I will attack three basic assumptions that underlie
Grosz & Sidner's theory that is claimed to explain the mutual intelligibility of action and
consequently dialogue structure. These are:
1) The significance of action is derived from the mutual recognition and
coordination of intentions - this handles the relationship of observable behaviour
to intent.
2) Conventions for the expression of intent - some form-intent correlation -
enable the recognition by the OCP of the ICP's intention.
3) The stability of meaning is achieved by a shared background knowledge.
The first assumption is primary for any plan-based account of agency and cooperation in
Al. Intuitively, it seems to be a sensible statement given that we often use the words 'believe',
'want', 'act', 'intend', etc. in talk and discourse. Our intentional vocabulary of plans, goals
and beliefs is rich and subtle for describing, talking about and thus reflecting on the purposeful
behaviour of others and ourselves. It is very helpful in projecting courses of action, but
ultimately vague in terms of the actual 'doing' of action. A plan is a powerful abstraction
because the indefinitely detailed situated actions do not need to be expressed; if such
expression were possible. Not in the sense that subplans need to be formulated to deal with
problems in the course of action, but that plan or sub-plan are necessarily indeterminate in
specifying the details of actions, ie. the actions are underspecified. They are also interesting
when used in a post-rationalisation of action's circumstances. For example, the court-room
is the setting for constructing 'what happened' from the accounts of witnesses.
Our imaginedprojections andour retrospective reconstructions are theprincipal
means by which we catch hold of situated action and reason about it, while
situated action itself, in contrast, is essentially transparent to us as actors.
(Suchman 1987, p. 39J
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The danger lies in the reification of our descriptions into the place of action's actual
circumstances, and taking the explicit Al procedures as an explanation of the significance of
those situated actions. Grosz & Sidner's analysis of the task dialogue does give the
impression of a post hoc rationalisation that can be continued ad infinitum. This
phenomenon, also known as 'indefinite glossing', is easily illustrated because it is an
unavoidable practical activity engaged in routinely by everybody (Garfinkel 1967). Grosz &
Sidner focus on the 'primary' intentions behind the discourse segments. How were these
decided? Can they be expanded upon? How many 'secondary' intentions are there? Given
the following quotation, how much filling in of the subtasks must the OCP have to do?
...in adopting the intention to carry out that action, the OCP also intends to
perform whatever subactions are necessary. Thus once the apprentice intends
to remove the flywheel, he also commits himself to the collateral intentions of
loosening the setscrews and pulling the wheel off. Note, however, that not all
the subactions need to be introduced explicitly into the discourse. The
apprentice may do several actions that are never mentioned, and the expert
may assume that these are being undertaken on the basis of other information
that the apprentice obtains. (Grosz & Sidner 1986, p. 185)
Not only could the analysts indefinitely gloss the 'underlying' intentions behind talk and action
in the task dialogue, but also the participants could expand in a similar fashion should some
trouble with the action's course or circumstances arise, or should he feel like it. What is
interesting is when and why do the participants invoke an intentional vocabulary? Does it
occur only when the transparency of talk suddenly becomes opaque? What are the
interactional consequences of the intentional talk? For example, in Lynch (1985, p. 210-212)
the use of an intentional vocabulary in modifications of accounts of 'objects' during
disagreement sequences for displaying agency or uncertainty is illustrated.
The claim here is that the first assumption underlies no explanation of the achievement of
talk or action in situ4. In fact, much talk seems to be unanalysable with this model. What
account can Grosz & Sidner give in talk occurring in doctor-patient, counsellor-interviewee,
court-room settings in which the notion of 'agenda', 'plan', or 'intention' is commonly not
recognised by the OCP? In these settings, Suchman (1987) has argued that the agenda is
not shared in the sense of it being recognised and coordinated. One party to the talk is largely
unaware of the other's reason(s) or intention(s) 'behind' the interaction. That party is
responsive to the other locally, and interactively constitutes the agenda and discourse
4 Indeed Du Bois (1987) argues that some meaningful language activities in some cultures can
only be understood if they are without intent.
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structure without knowledge of such a structure. The structure is the product of the routine,
transparent, local, orderly work of the participants.
An attempt is made in Grosz & Sidner (1987) to expand on the observation made in the earlier
paper about the shared nature of discourse by positing the notion of shared plans constructed
in collaboration. This is more subtle than most plan-based accounts of action in that plans
are supposedly not individualistic and do not determine actions but restrict the interpretation
and production of action. This is to be commended but still suffers from a heavy emphasis
that a shared plan is necessary to engage in mutual action and that intention recognition does
underlie the dialogue activities participants are engaged in. There is no alternative in the
model.
Discourses may exhibit two types of collaborative behaviour: collaboration in
the domain of the discourse and collaboration with respect to the discourse
itself... surface collaborations (eg. coordinating turns in a dialogue) but also
collaborations related to discourse purpose. (1987, p. 4)
This is a positive statement. However, they do not seem to acknowledge the importance of
the 'surface' collaboration for the constitution of action itself. This is important because,
rather than dependon the reliable recognition of intent, mutual intelligibility turns
on the availability of communicative resources to detect, remedy, and at times
even exploit the inevitable uncertainties of action's significance. (Suchman
1987, p. 69)
The second assumption has again a long lineage in the rationalist tradition of theories of
action and language. Given the first assumption, and consequently the recognition of
intentions as a real and continuous problem, some way must be found to connect up the
language in expression, or observable behaviour as action, with the underlying intentions. A
typical solution is to assume a 'conventional' procedure for a bijective mapping from one to
the other. Levinson (1981b) gives an in-depth critique of any attempt to relate form and
function in this way.
Grosz & Sidner base their theory on a Gricean account of utterance-level intention that
requires, for Grosz & Sidner, a specification of how any utterance can come to have a
particular intention. Unfortunately, such a formal account is not forthcoming, as argued by
Levinson (1981b, 1983), at the utterance-level so it is hard to see how The modes of
correlation between features of the discourse segments and types of discourse-level
intentions" (Grosz & Sidner 1986, p. 199) can be specified in advance. Within the framework
the proposal for more investigation into the formal mappings from surface forms to a deeper
level of intentions is missing the point. In fact, it has been shown in conversation analysis
that interpretations of utterances can only be found provisionally and locally on each occasion
of production.
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It is interesting to wonder how the intention categorisation and discourse segmentation that
is specified in Grosz & Sidner (1986) for specific examples could be justified. The ascription
of intentions and structure implicitly draws upon intuition: "the researcher must use his or her
knowledge of the world as a resource for interpreting discourse and textual materials"
(Cicourel 1980, p. 127). However, intuition should need empiricism - the reality of a structure,
a segment, is not considered empirically by Grosz & Sidner - and a theory that borrows from
Grice's utterance-intention notion is fraught with the difficulties of linguistic form and utterance
force correlation. Another crucial problem, that is recognised by Grosz & Sidner, is the
pre-ordained nature of segmental intention recognition. That is, only one primary discourse
purpose is to be recognised for each discourse segment after its initiation. For example in
the dialogue example in Figure 2-2, lines 18 to 25 are part of a discourse segment with the
discourse purpose that A, the ICP, intends that E, the OCP, intends to tell A how to get the
wheel off. During its life on the attentional stack a discourse segment and its purpose are in
the process of being communicated and recognised by its recipient. Thus the receiving
conversational participant has a conflict between not knowing what the purpose is until a
segment is complete and knowing enough in order to complete it. This could be explained
as the consequence of over-rationalising and reifying the vocabulary of post-hoc explanation
into a generatory mechanism. Hence, over-rationalisation of dialogue activity and the focus
on an explicit individual process leads theory to an impasse.
The third assumption is that there exists a background of shared knowledge implied and
presupposed in action that gives it significance and stability of meaning. Grosz & Sidner's
claims on this front are an implicit part of their whole approach, and are innocent enough at
first glance. It is argued that
the apprentice and expert share certain knowledge about the task. Some of this
shared task knowledge comes from the discourseperse..., butsome ofit comes
fromgeneral knowledge, perceptual information, and the like. (1986, p. 186-7)
Suchman (1987, p. 35) summarises this viewpoint as,
...the image evoked by 'shared knowledge' is a potentially enumerable body of
assumptions or presuppositions, that stands behind every explicit action or
utterance, and from which participants in interaction selectively draw in
understanding each other's actions.
However, Garfinkel (1967) has shown in his famous experiment on glossing, that indefinite
accounts of actions or talk can be given. But, such a practice is not relevant to participants
in talk in situ, unless troubles occur and accounts become relevant, whereupon they can be
constructed. In the experiment subjects were asked to explicitly describe what
presuppositions or knowledge the participants in a transcribed dialogue would possibly need
to have used in order to explain why the dialogue turned out as it did. Subjects on completing
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the task were asked to fill in more detail, again and again; they finally complained that there
was no end to this procedure. A contrary approach, ethnomethodology, concentrates on the
question of how the participants make 'sense' in the local circumstances on each occasion,
notwhat theoretical social mechanisms 'underlie' its achievement. Many accounts in artificial
intelligence and cognitive science try to over-rationalise in exactly the latter manner in order
to locate explicit 'cognitive' procedures that by their very nature require this enumeration5.
Thus they are susceptible to the
indefinitely extendable and unverifiable categorisation and speculation about
actor's intents so typical of DA-style analysis. [DA= Discourse analysis]
(Levinson 1983, p. 319)
Let us work through some important points and consequences of the criticisms of the three
assumptions above. Everyday 'rational' conduct itself, like dialogue, is routinely done without
explicit intents and their recognition.
An analytic focus on direct experience in the lived-in-world leads to emphasis
on a reflexive view of the constitution ofgoals in activity and to the proposition
that goals are constructed, often in verbal interpretation.... This retrospective
and reflexive character is not compatible with a linear view of action as directed
towards established goals. It suggests that action is not 'goal directed' nor are
goals a condition for action. (Lave 1988, p. 183)
For example, communicative intent usually becomes explicit in dealing with 'trouble' where
the flow of conduct is disrupted and practical reasoning about intents and plans, etc. can
usefully come into play in the repair of 'what was meant or intended'. The intentional
vocabulary is then available for descriptions, formulations, 'post hoc' rationalisations, etc..
Plans, in other words, are just an efficient way of projecting, interpreting and
classifying behaviour, without taking any strong stand on underlying cognitive
mechanism. The point of intentional description, in this folk psychological
sense, is not to control actions, but to comprehend them. (Suchman 1986, p.
5)
But this is not to deny purposeful activity and the relevance of intentions. Giddens (1979)
looks at the senses in which meaning is used in ordinary English usage: what an actormeans
to say or do, and what the meaning of his utterance or act is. He notes the tendency for a
reduction to take place. Meaning is eitherwhat they mean or intend to say, orwhat speakers
mean to say is irrelevant to an understanding of the nature of meaning.
5 It should be noted that there are interesting parallels between the conceptual intentional
theories of communicative action and the conventional signal theories of turn-taking. Both
need notions of convention, recognition and expression criteria, and explicit acts. See Wilson
et al (1984) for an analysis of several models of turn-taking in conversation.
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I regard the meanings of communicative acts - that is, acts in which one element
of the reflexive monitoring of conduct includes the intent to communicate with
another - as in principle distinguishable from, and are sustained in, the
differences expressed in the practices of language-games; but such practices,
as the active accomplishment of human subjects, are organised through and in
the reflexivemonitoring of conduct. The interplay ofmeaning as communicative
intent, and meaning as difference, represents the duality of structure in the
production ofmeaning. (Giddens 1979, p. 85)
Crucially, "intentions are only constituted within the reflexive monitoring of action, which
however in turn only operates in conjunction with unacknowledged conditions and outcomes
of action." (Giddens 1979, p. 42) Thus, we need to study how plans and representations are
brought into productive interaction with the contingent unrepresented circumstances of
situated action, given that action does not just occur in specific settings or circumstances; it
is constituted within them and reproduces them as contextual relevances.
Also, it is important to note the conceptual and representational bias in computational
theories. That is,
For centuries epistemologists have concentrated primarily on conceptual
representation and its problematic relation to objects in the world, assuming that
representation is cognitivelyprior to all else.... An epistemology that begins with
activity and perception, which are first and foremost embedded in the world,
may simply by-pass the classical problem of reference — of mediating
conceptual representations. Conceptual representation can be seen as
secondary, growing out of the direct 'negotiations' people conduct with the
physical and social world to which they have direct access in activity. (Brown
et al 1988, p. 32-33)
It has been argued by some researchers in artificial intelligence and computational linguistics
that all three components of Grosz & Sidner's model should be represented, but without
necessarily adopting their particular attentional process mechanism. The main point is that
as much as possible that can be conceptualised of dialogue structure should be represented.
For example, it is reported in Kobsa & Wahlster (1988a, p. 88) that some researchers have
claimed that a discourse model should contain "everything that should be derived from an
analysis of discourse, to present a representation for the structure of the discourse, useful in
subsequently responding." Dialogue components are some of the latest to be included on
the collective score-board of shared 'knowledge' that was criticised earlier. The structures
represented on the 'shared score-board' of dialogue are restrictions on the possible
interpretations. The aim is to include all the possible representations of structure and
'knowledge', in order that a participant in a period of reflection can decide what to say and
how to say it. In Grosz & Sidner, the attentional state is the mediating score-board. This is
another example of over-rationalising the activities we engage in. (See Hahn (1986) for a
recommendation for close connections between analysis, representations and evaluation.)
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Structural models may describe or conceptualise phenomena that are not available to those
engaged in the activity and this may of course be useful for a model that is interested in the
production and interpretation of conduct for pragmatic reasons, like building an artifact that
must accomplish robust behaviour, but it needs to be shown that it is useful, viable, tractable
and pertinent to include it.
In addition to the problems encountered above, the model, by focusing on conceptualisations
and pre-design, is not in the position of acknowledging or including emergent properties of
social interaction. For example, Cicourel (1980) has argued that,
the problem-solving or schema model is preoccupied with the individual's
knowledge base and the explicit attribution ofgoals, plans, intentions, actions,
and motives. The speech act categories and process descriptions of actions
can be used to create complex predicates that address the participants' use of
knowledge in pursuinggoals, plans, and actions, and the intentions andmotives
that seem to orient these objectives and activities. But the model does not
identify emergentproperties of discourse or interaction that are part of the local
production of everyday life. (p. 128)
Grosz & Sidner do consider dialogue as an activity, which derives from an earlier interest in
the effect of task activities on dialogue structure, but they do not have awell developed theory
of activity. Generalising from a philosophical theory of meaning they try to found an
intentional theory of dialogue activity, but this means that the local dynamics of dialogue that
are not predictable and emerge in the engagement in dialogue itself are unaccounted for in
the theory and the model6. It is the focus on a deeper level of explanation in computer models
of dialogue coherence that reproduces the 'conduit metaphor': our everyday vocabulary for
discussing language communication tends to distort any analytic explanation of that conduct.
The metaphor unfortunately takes linguistic communication as the transfer of linguistically
wrapped mental packages between a producer and a receiver that requires a shared linguistic
code to encode and unwrap the message (Reddy 1979). Thus local and emergent features
of the contingent achievement of dialogue in situ go missing. In a way this parallels the
distinction between competence and performance in Chomskyan linguistics. Intention
recognition and coordination is the meat; the realisation in language and interaction is the
gravy. The 'conduit metaphor' and the 'interchange model' in computational terms tend to
view talk as intentional speech exchange involving linguistic, symbolic communication by
rational cognitive processors. The computational theory of communicative action has
6 The concept of dynamics is illustrated by Simon (1970) with the example of the emergent
complex behaviour of an ant in its local ecology; also Agre (1988) discusses the importance of
a situated theory of dynamic activity. An example ilustrating the dynamics of dialogue will be
taken up in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
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consistently taken-for-granted situated interaction because of the conceptual formulations of
dialogue, action and discourse. This problematic development may have occurred partly
because most computer models of dialogue have their origin in the study of distanced written
textual discourses - in which the debate about the role of the writer's intentions in production
and interpretation when the reader is in a different time-space context is prominent and also
the early influence of communication theory on linguistics.
The attentional component is a traditional attempt at using the process-like notion of
experiential 'conscious focus' in a computer model and the linguistic component is almost a
mere formal realisation of the intentional structure. There are hardly any dynamicties between
language organisation and dialogue structure. For example, contributions are serving only
one function in the model and that is to complete the recognition of the discourse segment
purpose. The attentional state does result in a separation of the task plans from the emergent
intentional structure achieved in dialogue, but it seems too restrictive to allow only the
hierarchical embedding of complete discourse segments (Bateman, personal
communication). In addition, Fox (1987) argues that the notion of 'interactional
reconstruction' must be accommodated in models of dialogue. She draws from conversation
analytic studies to point out that analyses or assignments of structure should not be
unchangeable. In everyday talk it has been shown that contributions are not assigned a
structure or meaning that is communicated, but that interpretations of the relevance of a
contribution are negotiated and renegotiated in next and latertalk. Thus if a model of dialogue
assigns a fixed structure on the basis of one interpretation - for example, the assignment of
a contribution to fulfilling a particular discourse segment purpose - how can it accommodate
modifications that become necessary in later dialogue? This problem arises of course
because Grosz & Sidner's model gives priority to the underlying purpose of a discourse
segment that is not found or emergent but is to be communicated - first comes the intent and
then the realisation.
This section has put forward many problems and limitations with the theoretical side of Grosz
&Sidner(1986,1987), which unfortunately is fartoo general for computational consideration.
Even so, the bulky and complex structural baggage is still too static to accommodate Fox's
notion of interactional reconstruction (Fox 1987) or Anderson & Garrod's explication of the
dynamics of negotiated meaning, that require a model to have local dynamic structures
(Anderson & Garrod 1987). The concentration on purposeful interchange dialogue, speaker
production and knowledge structures has led to the backgrounding of the interactional
domain. Dialogue is not, however, alternating action-reaction interchange, but "joint action
accomplished through the participant's continuous engagement in speaking and listening."
(Suchman 1987, p. 71)
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Coherence is not just a conversational accomplishment to be met through
location, content, and the structure of an answer, but an interactional
accomplishment to be met through the actions and displays performed through
locally situated moves. (Schiffrin 1987, p. 119)
Grosz & Sidner's model, like many computational models, is independent of interactive
circumstances, even though the dialogue example contains particulars and structures
emergent from the circumstances of participants and their joint activity, as discussed later in
this chapter. It is maybe pertinent to consider instead a practical approach in which
interaction, joint negotiation and 'making do' have more consideration rather than rational
planning in advance.
2.6.2 The Explanation of Dialogue Phenomena
In the following a criticism of the specific details of the theory in terms of the explanation of
particular phenomena will be given.
2.6.2.1 Interruptive Activity
In order to illustrate the explanatory limitations of Grosz & Sidner's model and demonstrate
the local work of achieving dialogue coherence and structure, an alternative perspective will
be described. Conversation analysis (CA) has examined in detail the complex, detailed
achievements involved in managing interruptions. For example, Jefferson (1972) has tackled
in depth the same sort of phenomena as the 'digression'described above fromGrosz & Sidner
(1986). Her analysis is typical of CA's empirical approach that attempts to identify intrinsic
and unobvious features of talk with as little conceptual theorising as possible. In the paper,
the interest is in those occurrences of talk that constitute a 'break' in the activities, followed
by a return to those activities. The intuition explored in the analysis is that those occurrences
are not 'part' of the activity but are somehow relevant. In contrast to Grosz & Sidner, the
questions of importance are as follows. How do the participants understand and manage
the 'side sequence'? Are there characteristic structural 'parts' in the whole sequence that
participants orientate towards? How is the ongoing activity returned to, and what
conversational work must be done by the participants to achieve this? What are the
responsibilities for carrying the sequence through? Jefferson argues, from real examples of
conversation, that a three part sequence is demonstrably oriented to by the participants. The
first part is the "ongoing sequence" (O), the second part is the "side sequence" (S), and the
last part is the "return to ongoing sequence" (R). The sequences may be exploited or not,
but they are argued for as a normative expectation which analysably informs the ongoing
talk. An example will illustrate.
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[Example III in Jefferson (1972, p.317)]
1 0 A: An' everybody's askin 'im t'dance.
2 0 B: An' because he's scareda dancing he's gonna dance in private til he
learns how.
3 0 A: And a goodlooking girl comes up to you and asks you, y'know,
4 S B: "Gi(hh)rl asks you to-"
5 S B: Alright,
6 S C: Well it's happened a lotta ti//mes,
> 7 S B: Okay okay go ahead.
8 (1.0)
> 9 R B: So he says "no."
10 (1.0)
11 R B: Cause he's scared to admit that he can't dance an' he's scared
to try. Cause he's gonna make a fool of himself.
At line 7, B's "okay okay go ahead" is typical of a side sequence terminator leading into the
return to the ongoing sequence. In this case, the return is problematic as the silences at lines
8 and 10 show. Now, Jefferson argues that there are two particular ways in her data of
returning to the ongoing activity. 'Resumption' occurs when there is an explicit marker of a
problem in accomplishing a return, while 'continuation' is specifically directed at 'covering up'
the problem or leaving it transparent. Continuation retrospectively suggests a reinterpretation
of prior talk. In the example above, the "so he says 'no'" at line 9 is an attempted return
u nder the guise of 'continuation' which is deleting the S and tying in with the ongoing sequence
O. Thus, in the terms of Grosz & Sidner's model a segment is reclassified - what was a
digression is now a continuation in the ongoing sequence. It is difficult to see how this can
be explained in their model. How can a discourse segment 'digression' that is initiated with
a specific intent and pushed onto the stack come to be a coherent sequence in which it is
not a separate segment at all?
Similarly, Grosz & Sidner's other definition of 'weak' interruption can be investigated
empirically to see what happens in talk, as can all conversational phenomena of this type
that involve the management of current activity in relation to prior, that seems intuitively not
to be a 'part' of that prior activity. Taking the Grosz & Sidner divisions for a moment, another
set of phenomena that are open for empirical investigation is where talk is concerned with
current activity that is related to prior activities in some way, maybe constituency or ordering.
For example, insertion sequences, flashbacks, clarification sequences and elaboration
sequences. In fact, the resources available for the situated achievement and management
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of activities and their relationships are the phenomena for investigation, and any mechanism
or theory should be derived from the richness of the data, not by introspection or intuition.
2.6.2.2 Discourse Markers
It is not clear in Grosz & Sidner from what source the characterisations about the function of
language forms like "anyway", "however", etc. are derived from. It is never said whether they
are intuitions, or deductions from records of natural talk or texts, or analyses culled from prior
work that are to be usefully explained in their theory. Besides, the gross explanations of the
phenomena do not do justice to the local interpretations demonstrated in conversation
analytic research. Also, it seems that even though their model is distinctly better than other
computational models because these forms, cue words and phrases, are functionally tied in
with discourse sequencing, the mechanism of the attentional state is influencing the
explanation of phenomena adversely. The stack mechanism just does not do justice to the
complexity of the functioning of a marker. Consequently, the rich linguistic and interactional
environments are not explored, but ignored in the hope of a theory of dialogue based on
intention recognition underlying the use of markers. One might argue that Grosz & Sidner
are not interested in the complexities of cue phrases as such, but only in the role of them in
constraining intention recognition. However, besides the complications in attempting an
abstract account on which to base discourse coherence, other approaches suggest that an
attack from an empirical base with as little theoretical apparatus as possible is best when
language forms like these are studied. For example, from both linguistic and conversation
analytic perspectives. Levinson & Owen (1981), Schiffrin (1987), and conversation analytic
work by Heritage (1984b) and Schegloff (1982) among others, give a different picture of the
role of these forms in the achievement of coherent dialogue.
Some of the cue phrases explained by Grosz & Sidner are also investigated by Levinson &
Owen (1981). For example, "by the way" is interpreted as a 'digression' in Grosz & Sidner -
a focus space is stacked and no dominance or satisfaction-precedence relation is established
between the new segment and previous stacked segments, but a common focus is
maintained between the segment and the one below. Levinson & Owen argue that this
marker may occur when a conversational activity is seen to be less important than a prior
activity, sequentially not warranted, and that the prior activity is suspended. The design of
the new activity, and the environment of the marker are very important and are detailed in
each case. These interactional sensitivities are not available to Grosz & Sidner. They posit
that some 'topical' commonality is maintained across the focus spaces. This is not
necessarily the case, and is not important for some environments of the marker "by the way".
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Also, Levinson & Owen argue for several conversational functions of the marker 'anyway'
which involve the notions of ordering and presentation of activities, and the issue of
conversational closure. An initial analysis proposes that 'anyway' has the following
interpretations in talk:
Anywayl - activity resumption, eg. closing initiation with a return to the reason
for a telephone call.
Anyway2 - offer to close.
Anyway3 - misplaced activities, that should have occurred, but treated as having
occurred and now resumed.
Grosz & Sidnermight claim a similarity between anywayl and their explanation - that 'anyway'
is a cue functioning to pop a segment off the attentional stack - but they cannot detect the
subtle differences between the three above that their model would equivocate. For instance,
anyway3 shows how markers can be exploited for conversational and interactional reasons,
but Grosz & Sidner's model can say nothing about a pop to a segment that never existed as
happens with anyway3.
2.6.3 A Weak Empirical Methodology
Having a dialogue fragment is crucial in testing and illustrating a theory or claim, so a
non-intuitive example is to be commended. However, difficulties were encountered when
trying to analyse Grosz & Sidner's dialogue example according to their model, and when
trying to re-analyse it in more familiar terms. It seemed unlike human dialogue that occurs
in the routine circumstances of everyday life. Expectations lead to a feeling of flatness: the
lack of interruption or overlap, the odd responses, and omission of time or non-linguistic action
from the script.
A re-analysis of the data fragment that Grosz & Sidner (1986) use and which is the main
dialogue example for their paper was attempted. Unfortunately, it is problematic because
the setting of the example is not what at first it appears to be given the context of its
presentation. It was first thought that the transcript was of two participants who were in the
same room involved in a practical activity, but this hypothesis was soon dismissed because
the dialogue did notaccord with that view. For example, lines 10, 13, and 23 in Figure 2-2
(Section 2.5.3) are rather odd if they did occur in a dialogue in the expected setting. It was
then conjectured that the example must be a transcript of an activity in which communication
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was conducted over the telephone with some limited visual contact through a window.
Several analyses from different perspectives were attempted. But it would appear from
studying Deutsch7 (1974) that some experiments were done at SRI laboratory in the 1970s
in the context of the design of a computer 'expert consultant' to a human apprentice. The
experiments were designed in order to derive human protocols similar to those envisaged in
the human-computer environment. A task was chosen - an air compressor assembly - and
several modes of communication set up for experimentation. These are listed below:
1) copresence - both speech and vision, physically present,
2) telephone - verbal, but no vision,
3)&4) restricted communication - the set up described below was used to stop
interruptions.
In addition, mutual visual access was restricted - only snapshots could be requested or given
- and in 3) the apprentice was aware of the set-up, but in 4) the apprentice was told the
consultant was really a computer. The diagram below in Figure 2-3 is taken from Deutsch
(1974, p. 4) and also appears in Grosz (1977). The strangeness of Grosz & Sidner's dialogue
example was traced to its origin in a corpus of specific experiments, 3) and 4) above, that
were intended to eliminate interruptions in dialogue. In this particular fragment, the key point
is that the dialogues were disturbed by a human mediatorwho interpreted the novice's spoken
utterances and typed them to the expert on a Teletype; expert responses were typed and
then read aloud by the mediator. In addition the participants could only see 'the same world'
by explicitly requesting still snapshots of components; otherwise they were visually blind to
each other's actions8.
What is interesting about the example is where in this process did the dialogue fragment
come from? Was it from a transcription of the spoken exchange between novice and mediator
or an abstract record of the typed exchange between mediator and expert9? It is crucial to
realise that even though it was a dialogue of sorts it cannot be claimed as an example that
captures the essence of dialogue without the 'muddiness and unruliness' of talk on which to
7 In the publication literature Deutsch became Grosz after this paper.
8 The keyboard and speech dialogues from these experiments were recorded and features of
their structure and nature noted in Grosz (1977) and Deutsch (1974). Compared to Grosz &
Sidner (1986) the earlier open pre-theoretical attitude is refreshing. Some of the phenomena
noted are: interruptions, latched utterances, and conversational 'duets' commonly occur in
experiments 1) and 2); and there is an attempted analysis of the marker "ok" in terms of
sequential positioning; it is noted that it is possible to have multiple tasks - hypothetical and
competitive - and misinterpretations.
9 The former is a possibility because in Grosz (1977, p. 14) it is claimed that "computer terminals
were used solely so that transcripts could be easily obtained."
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base a theory of human dialogue. Also, many phenomena have a new significance in this
light, eg. the "OK" responses in lines 14 and 24 in Figure 2-2 may have occurred because of
the explicit work required to coordinate access to a restricted visual display; the lack of
interruptions is explicable not because of experimental shyness, but because it was not
possible for the apprentice or expert to interrupt each other if the mediator did not allow it;
the extended 'reflective' turn of lines 16-18 could have occurred because of the slow and
erratic times of the speech simulator responses, that are out-louding the expert's typed
response. In addition, many interesting and extremely relevant phenomena have been lost
from the record, eg. the temporal delays and mediation strategies, and from the description
of the experiment itself, eg. the mechanical techniques and procedures for constructing a
speech or Teletype response. Later in Chapters 4 and 5 an empirical audio-visual study is
FIGURE 2-3 - A diagram from Deutsch (1974, p. 4) illustrating the restricted
experimental setup.
reported that attempts to explicate important circumstantial features of a restricted modality
dialogue. In addition in this case it would be very interesting to study the mediator's work of
interpreting each participant's responses, and making the dialogue uniform and
uninterrupted. How did the mediator manage the transcription of the apprentice's speech
and the reading aloud of the expert's typed response? Did the mediator act as arbitrator on
turn boundaries? That is, how did the mediator break up the stream of speech, and how and
when was it sent to the expert? Did the expert decide on when his typed response would be
spoken by conventional typing cues? Raudaskoski (1989) has shown, in a 'wizard of oz'
simulation of a hypothetical telephone dialogue system, that the circumstances of interaction
-45-
are a crucial resource for the participants. For example, audio cues besides the speech
stream and silence itself are significant for the achievement of intelligible dialogue.
Unfortunately, the data (tran-)scripts are already structured by interpretation of the conduct
when rendering the analytic details, ie. the 'interchange' model is implicit in the practical
reporting of communicative action. In this case, the transcript is either an automatic,
temporally-abstracted trace of the mediator's translation to typed form and the expert's
response, in which case they have a naive faith that the translation typed rendering achieved
in the mediated interaction is somehow recoding those details that are relevant for the
apprentice. Or else it is a verbal transcription of the speech exchange between the
apprentice and the mediator. In either case it is not a record of what was significant for the
participants in the interaction.
Grosz & Sidner suggest in their presentation of verbal examples that they be read much like
one would read a dialogue in a story or a magazine, and this leads to an implicit claim that
our intuitions and constructions of dialogue are adequate and faithful to real dialogue. So in
fact it does not really matterwhat the script looks like as long as it looks like a 'dialogue' and
makes sense - which is unfortunately misleading. The data clearly shows that the interactive
circumstances are seen as a hindrance or problem in which the real core is the abstract
interchange and recognition of intentions through language, ie. they separate structure and
process from dynamic constitution and circumstance. Their analysis requires an ascription
of intent and a segmentation based on the analyst's intuitions with no appeal to empirical
justification outside of the manufactured verbal fragment. The validity of the model is in its
prediction of those intuitive judgements without questioning the intuition themselves; what is
required is an investigation of the participant's tacit knowledge implicated in dialogue practice.
Grosz & Sidner's empirical methodology is to present a verbal record of task-based dialogues
and a number of intuitive examples. For example, there is a tendency to give data examples
which are devised and imagined to be illustrations of everyday dialogue conduct, eg. (p. 192)
"John came by and left the groceries//Stop that you kids//and I put them away after he left."
From the problems described above, and given that the examples they use are restricted
purposive dialogues with short turns and task-centred sequential organisation, it does not
appear that a specific experimental task dialogue and a few intuitive examples are enough
to base a theory on.
To conclude, the origins of Grosz & Sidner's data are not as they first appear. In trying to
analyse their data from an interactional perspective it became apparent that the setting and
interactive circumstances of the data examples were not seen as important or relevant to
their theory. Their dialogues had been taken from a special experimental set-up that explicitly
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avoided the possibility of interruptions. If the task and dialogue structure is the product of
the orderly work of the participants in the local interactional setting, through practical
resources, then to claim a general theory of discourse structure without any representation,
notice or indication of these things is missing the phenomena it is claimed to deal with. It is
not simply that their theory needs a better and more detailed theory of the process of
coordination and recognition of intentions so as to fill out the abstract theory10. In the setting
from which the example came, the circumstances of the interaction will be important at all
levels of analysis and the precise details of their relevance cannot be taken-for-granted nor
explained intuitively. What is required is an empirical study of dialogue activities in terms of
their local and situated accomplishment and such a study is reported in Chapters 4 and 5.
2.6.4 Implementation and Artifact
What is the status of Grosz & Sidner's theory? It is not at all clear what could count as a
successful theory, and what kind of data could be used as evidence for or falsification of the
theory. It is hard to see how they could justify their intent or discourse structure ascription in
terms of the data rather than an appeal to the intuitions of a fellow analyst. Also, it is not
evident if the purpose of the theory is to give an intuitively satisfactory account of dialogue
structure, or to provide the means to label and segment a fragment of discourse. In practical
terms, it is puzzling just how a more concrete use of their model could be undertaken. There
are two possibilities: each of the components could be taken as useful a 'knowledge source'
that can be modelled in an implemented dialogue system so as to constrain interpretation
and production; or an implementation that could automatically label and ascribe structure to
dialogue examples that is faithful in some way to what can be found in human dialogue
behaviour. But they have nothing to say about either of these alternatives. Also, the latter
option does not validate the model as an accurate procedural model of dialogue as the
structure may play no part in the achievement of the dialogue for the participants. It is
unfortunate that the situated and circumstantial details of dialogue participation are ignored
10 For example, in Appelt (1985) an attempt is made to provide an account of the planning of
actions by an individual required to support a conceptual theory of action for language
generation. Situations are constructed to illustrate the cognitive and communicative processes
of two face-to-face participants - an expert instructing an apprentice - who are attempting to
collaboratively complete a task. The utterance that is used to illustrate the problems of
planning a contribution is: "Use the wheelpuller to remove the flywheel". This scenario is
remarkably similar to that in the data example in Grosz & Sidner (1986) derived from the
original corpus used in Deutsch (1974). However, the participants are now face-to-face
working over a table with a number of tools in front of them. It appears that the earlier example
first entering the literature in 1974 has become decontextualised and recontextualised in a
constructed example that perfectly matches the expectations of a reader of Grosz & Sidner's
example in Grosz & Sidner (1986). This is an indication of the field's acceptance of examples
into its 'repertoire for explanation' without regard for their circumstantial production.
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in their theory for they are constitutive of the dialogue and not to be taken for granted or
dismissed. These questions are hard to answer, but anyway it appears that Grosz & Sidner
have developed a general theory that is quite comprehensive in its attempted unification of
linguistic and non-linguistic aspects of dialogue, but they have not drawn upon the rigourously
empirical work of conversation analysis. Chapter 3 describes the work of this field, and later
in Chapter 6 its relevance to the conception, design and evaluation of computer dialogue
systems is discussed.
2.6.5 A Brief Interactional Reconstruction
Briefly an alternative version of the basics of Grosz & Sidner's theory for dialogue activities
will be presented. People engage in conjoint activities - lifting a large awkward table, walking
down a street as a group, shaking hands, chatting - which can be glossed in an intentional
language either before, as a projective plan for example, or after, as a retrospective
rationalisation. Some of these activities can be seen, by the participants and analysts, to
have certain relationships between them that are constructed in the discourse. In engaging
in dialogue activity, participants demonstrate and accomplish this order in and through the
dialogue. Accountable structures do emerge and are oriented to in dialogue activity. In
particular, these structures are oriented to differentially. For example, an interruption is a
recognisable achievement different from a side sequence. Accountable structures are
accomplished as unique structures that are sequentially displaced and juxtaposed with each
other. Certain sequential organisations can be displayed, or can be rationally reconstructed
if necessary. For example, opening sections of telephone calls expectably come before
closing sections - this is the sequencing or ordering relation. Also, side sequences or
insertion sequences are expectably embedded in other activities and will return to them
unless there is good reason - this is the constituency relation. Both relations have to be
achieved in the discourse sequence, by the participants, contingently. Flowever, they do not
have to take the course expected, and they are interactionally reinterpretable, ie.
interpretation is not once for all, as contributions can be located in different sequential
environments through the course of a dialogue. Because dialogue and other activities are
closely interleaved - participants are coordinating their bodies and talk in activities - it is
understandable that the structure of dialogue is closely linked with the organisation of
task-centred activity.
In the account above of the phenomena of interest to Grosz & Sidner and other models of
dialogue there is no need to appeal to plans, beliefs, goals and intentions in order to explain
the dialogue. Of course they can be used as part of a behavioural vocabulary - an intentional
vocabulary is undeniably useful for accounting for our own and other's behaviours as
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purposeful actions but like instructions they do not adequately specify action. Given this
simple reconstruction, one path seems to be open and that is to take an empirical stance and
study the orderly work that people do that constitutes the dialogue structure.
2.7 Summary
The problems and limitations of computer models of dialogue have been illustrated through
a broad survey of the development of current models and a detailed examination of one
particular comprehensive theory. Three crucial points brought out in this chapter are as
follows.
First, computer models of dialogue have a weak theory of action and activity. Grosz &
Sidner's theory does improve on previous computational accounts but is problematic for a
number of reasons: the intuitive ascription of intent and structure; the plan-based theory of
coherence; the lack of attention to processes for local constitution or improvisation; the
avoidance of interactive circumstances and dynamics; and the proliferation of
over-rationalised intuitive abstract representations. Modelling dialogue as the cognitive
process of recognition and coordination of plans or intentions is unworkable in practice.
Typically, computer models of dialogue are based on rationalised reconstructions and
representations of action and structure which derive from observer's idealisations and
intuitions that are used to generate and simulate dialogue behaviour. Interaction is not
considered an important domain for constructing models.
Second, there are no strong phenomenological or empirical methods. An additional reason
for taking an extended look at Grosz & Sidner's theory was to explicate how aweak empirical
methodology has led to the elevation of a rationalised and sanitised view of dialogue. In their
model the preconceptualisation of just what the phenomena is and what data is required is
not satisfactory if details of the practice of engaging in dialogue are required.
Third, computermodels of human dialogue provide a poor foundation for the conception and
design of computer dialogue systems. There is an implicit separation into dialogue
competence and performance, in which the interactive domain is peripheralised as something
to handled later once a theory of dialogue and action has been understood, but, it is the claim
of the thesis that the interactive and situated nature of dialogue is a crucial part of the
development of an appropriate model. It is not that an abstract model will allow tailoring for
each dialogue application. But it is the situated practices of achieving intelligibility in human
activity, from which reconstructions and representations emerge, that are paramount in
conceiving of appropriate dialogue artifacts. Four consequences can be found if these
models are used: first, that structure and intention are ascribed without foundation; second,
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that action itself is 'over-rationalised' so that the elaborated lay notion of planning replaces
the circumstances of action; third, that those ascriptions are 'reified' as the basis for
participant's work; and lastly, many emergent, tacit, mutual, local resources for action are
unaccounted for and unavailable. These consequences are not trivial, they are fundamental
misconceptions of the nature of dialogue and action that lead to impoverished notions of the
nature and design of dialogue artifacts. An alternative vocabulary that is social in origin will
be examined in the next chapter. Of course, aspects of computer models are extremely
useful forthe design of dialogue artifacts and interesting phenomena have been located and
reasonably explained using the models. The argument is not against the usefulness of
computational modelling in principle; for example, it may provide external 'etic' resources for
dealing with dialogue conduct that are unavailable to people. Instead, in Chapter 7 it will be
argued that an alternative use of computer modelling may provide interesting insights into
the emergence of communicative activity.
An attempt is made in the thesis to bring in an alternative empirical and interactional
perspective to inform future models. Chapter 3 will introduce the foundations of this
alternative in hermeneutics, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. The idea put
forward in Chapters 4 and 5 is that studying human dialogue empirically will reveal features
and phenomena that are constitutive of dialogue but have been missed by computer models.
The experiment conducted was partly in response to Grosz & Sidner's dialogue example,
and partly to study a modality that more closely resembles the possibilities available in design
than the simulation of everyday conversation.
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Chapter 3
THE PRACTICE OF DIALOGUE AND THE
INTELLIGIBLE MACHINE: AN INTERACTIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
3.1 Introduction
The last chapter considered contemporary computertheories and models of dialogue in terms
of their ability to model aspects of human dialogue, their empirical validity, and suitability for
the design of computer dialogue systems. In each case, the models were found to be
problematic. In this chapter, an alternative interactional perspective on dialogue will be
presented that supplies an understanding of dialogue as a collection of practices in which
participants are mutually engaged in coordinating communicative action and achieving
shared understanding. Rather than reconstruct interaction as the recognition and
coordination of plans and intentions, the specific mutual achievement of interaction in situ,
from which rational accounts emerge, is studied. This approach is derived from the
empirically naturalistic fields of ethnomethodology, which investigates everyday natural
activities, and conversation analysis (CA), which is particularly interested in the achievement
of everyday conversation1. Their main concern is with the ongoing practice of comprehending
events from the materials that make up the activity itself. The specific findings relevant here
are: the documentary method, the indexical nature of language and description, and the
methods of achieving intersubjectivity rather than the postulation of shared agreement.
The thesis will be concerned with the development of an understanding of practice and
achievement of participatory dialogue itself that can inform the design of dialogue 'through'
and 'with' machines. Additionally, given that computer models influence the design of
1 Both have a number of possible applications, eg. the achievement of work practice in and
through artifacts in workplaces.
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artifacts, the conception of dialogue and the machine's behaviour in the design of complex
'intelligent' systems will be examined. It is observed that the machine is intended for human
consumption and to be intelligible, it is complex and reacts to human action with language
forms. Thus, a shift has occurred in the conception of the machine from intelligent to
intelligble. It is important to conceive of the dialogue machine as an interpreted artifact in
human practice, and thus to understand the sense in which dialogue 'with' a machine in
practice requires an implicit suspension of disbelief by a user in order to find the activity
sensible. In addition, there is a clear sense in which designers of dialogue artifacts attempt
to represent, and thus recover a semblance of, aspects of presence, referential practice and
the living of language. The ambiguity between the machine as 'discourse medium' or 'visible
author' cum social subject is also explained.
Using the methods of interaction analysis described here, a study of dialogue 'through' the
machine will be presented in Chapters 4 and 5 that reveals some constitutive practices and
features of CMCs as they are achieved as 'virtual dialogue spaces', ie. they are constituted
as simulated shared graphic spaces in and through which dialogue can be conducted. This
is undertaken partly to demonstrate what is ignored or unaccounted for in computer models
of human dialogue, partly to study a restricted virtual dialogue space in its own right, and
partly to suggest some resources and principles for the conception, design and evaluation
of dialogue artifacts. The aim is to deflect attention from the over-rationalisation typical of
computer models and suggest an alternative range of constraints and resources for useful
computer models for dialogue artifacts. Later, in Chapter 6, interaction analysis is used again
to study the integration of talk and body in activity, and suggest resources for coordinating
and collaborating in dialogue activities interleaved with other activities and embedded in
space and time. In Chapter 7, an alternative use of computer modelling based on attacking
the fundamental problems discussed in Chapter 2 will be outlined.
The key issues for the remainder of this thesis, arising from the problematic computational
modelling paradigm, are as follows:
i) A perspective on the dialogue machine.
ii) An interactional perspective on communicative action and practice.
iii) Empirical methods for focusing attention on the situated details of human or
human-computer dialogue activity.
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3.2 Situated Action and the Intelligible Machine: Review,
Inspiration and Alternatives
The following sections are all concernedwith understanding action, dialogue and the machine
- how dialogue is conducted, achieved, and interpreted by people in everyday life and what
part the machine can play in modelling or acting in practice. Major critiques of the traditional
views adopted explicitly or implicitly by computational theories of behaviour and mind have
been undertaken byWinograd & Flores (1986), Suchman (1987,1988), and Agre & Chapman
(1989), among others. All draw upon alternative perspectives from the human sciences of
the nature of fundamental notions such as action, language, and interpretation. They also
inform some of the arguments presented in the next sections.
We begin by looking at the conception of the machine in human practice, particularly in terms
of inter-action and language-use. In order to develop an account, it is necessary to examine
the practical nature and intelligibility of conduct that is to be undertaken by an implemented
'intelligent' machine. Rather than test or argue for the 'intelligence' of the machine, it is
interesting to look instead at how the intelligibility of the machine relies on and is constructed
by the user in situ. The discussion will begin from the early critiques of the 'intelligent'
computer and move towards considering it as an interpreted and socially constituted artifact.
The designer, the user and the reactive machine with its complex behaviour incorporating
forms of language within the practices of its users need to be considered. Finally, a long
introduction to social conceptions of practice and action that are driven by empirical concerns
is given from which an interactional approach is derived and adopted in the remaining
chapters.
3.2.1 Early Critiques: Intelligent to Intelligible
Understandings of intelligence, action, and language have all been influenced by the
machine, and a number of disciplines or paradigms have arisen that use the computer to
model and explain human behaviour. Critiques of the two main schools, artificial intelligence
(Al) and cognitive science, have focused on the traditional rationalist assumption of
rule-governed conduct, and the mentalist explanation of that conduct. Instead, the
interpretative tradition in social science and philosophy provide an understanding of the
machine and its limitations. Dreyfus (1967/72) was one of the first critics of the newly-formed
field of artificial intelligence emerging from the fields of computer science and psychology in
the 1960s. He has brought the names of Husserl and Heidegger, and the fields of
phenomenology and hermeneutics to the attention of the cognitive sciences, even though
the early debates were not very self-reflective. Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986) continue the debate
-53-
with respect to the tacit and discursive nature of human practice that is claimed to be
embodied as knowledge in expert systems.
Winograd's (1981) "What Does It Mean to Understand Language?" is his statement of a
reconsideration of earlierwork on natural language understanding systems of which he was
an active proponent. Harris (1987) has also been critical of mechanical models of language
that exclude the moral and normative aspects. Later, drawing inspiration from Dreyfus,
Winograd & Flores (1986) and Winograd (1987) launched comprehensive critiques of the
rationalist tradition that informs cognitive science and artificial intelligence. The work of
hermeneutics, as well as the neurobiology of Maturana & Varela (1980), became the
cornerstone of not only an attack but a way of thinking of the problem of designing machines
as intelligible and not intelligent entities. InWinograd & Flores (1986) conclusions are drawn
about the nature of computer science and design in relation to work practice. This has been
explored further, for example, by Bodker (1989) in terms of the Russian school of activity
theory.
3.2.2 The Interpreted Machine
3.2.2.1 Winograd and Hermeneutic Philosophy
Winograd & Flores (1986) have brought a distinctive vocabulary to the understanding of
computers and their design and use, borrowed from the ideas of hermeneutics; particularly
some ideas of Gadamer and also Heidegger in a brand of philosophy known as existential
phenomenology. Hermeneutics arose from the exegesis of biblical texts and has developed
into a collection of theories of interpretation and understanding. One fundamental claim of
hermeneutics is that a text (or action) only has meaning in the activities of interpretation, and
thus the objective reading of a text is impossible. Interpretation is a pervasive everyday
practice in which an individual is continually involved in acting, understanding, and thinking.
Winograd & Flores read the difficult contributions ofGadamer and Heidegger as an alternative
vocabulary2 for explaining the condition of a computer user concernfully acting in the world
and the problems engendered in designing artifacts for such a user. Some conclusions from
their reflection on Heidegger in terms of the computer modelling of human conduct and
understanding are as follows. First, we cannot necessarily make the 'tacit' or non-discursive
explicit; thus representation is not a guaranteed enterprise resulting in exhaustive and explicit
2 The vocabulary is only derived and objectified for Winograd & Flores' purposes - it is not the
translated vocabulary of Heidegger, eg. Heidegger (1967/27).
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rules governing conduct. Second, practical understanding is primary and not to be
subordinated to theoretical reflection. Action in the world is articulated through practical
involvement in which artifacts are 'ready-to-hand' and not explicitly represented. Only in
'breakdowns' do artifacts or actions become 'present-at-hand' and represented. For
example, the pen in my hand when engaged in writing is 'ready-to-hand', it is used
unreflectively, but when the pen runs out it becomes 'present-at-hand', an object for repair,
a 'pen' which does not work, or is playing up. The point is that representation only emerges
from concernful practical activity, and the representation is not necessarily a part of that
conduct in situ for the participant.
Unfortunately, Winograd & Flores somewhat mar their insights by resorting to a variant of
speech act theory to explain 'language as action' and to build a system that supports
computer-supported work practices involving communication. An alternative conception of
action is presented in Section 3.2.3. Mallery et al (1987) have extended the debate by
broadening to the work of other more contemporary authors, like Riceour and Habermas.
The phenomenological hermeneutics of Riceourwill be used in the next section to shed light
on the nature of dialogue artifacts as part of the perspective on dialogue and the machine.
3.2.2.2 The Dialogue Artifact
In focused interaction participants engage in what Goffman has distinguished
as 'interchanges'. In an 'interchange' it is common that first one person does
something and then another does something, but these successive doings are
treated by the participants as being somehow linked together... a
characterisation of the principles that govern the way in which the succession
of 'doings' in an interchange are linked together and how, as a result, they are
organised into a coherent unit... attend to each other's behaviour in a highly
differentiated way. (Kendon 1988, p. 31)
What is the difference between a person talking with another person, a person using a
complex computer system, a person walking a dog, and a person cooking? Consider this
question in terms of the nature of the'interact ion'between the person and the objects implicitly
engaged with in the activity. Does a person interact with a dog in the same way as with a
person, or the egg being cooked, or the computer expert system? In some sense it can be
said that a sort of 'interaction' occurs, an influence or reciprocal relation between the actions
of one and the observable behaviour of the other, because the verb 'to interact' has many
connotations and applications much like 'dialogue'. People's direct engagement and
experience of the world is crucial for situated action and it is interesting how the actions of a
person and the observable events in the world come to have a significance for that person.
However, walking the dog and cooking the egg are usually not considered as social activities
in the same way as dialogue or communicative interaction between people. On the other
hand, technology has developed to the point where the significance of some machines'
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behaviour is to be accounted for in terms of its intelligibility as dialogue or mutual
communicative action. But it is problematic just how the actions of people and the behaviour
of machine are linked as if in interaction, interchanging and attending to each other in
successive doings of the machine and user and whether or not this can appropriately be
called dialogue.
The 'dialogue partner' perspective3 has been explicitly discussed in Kammersgaard (1985)
in contrast to the tool, the system, and the media perspectives of the use of computers.
When applying this perspective humans and computers are regarded as
partners in dialogue. The interaction process is regarded as a communication
process in which userandcomputerapplication actas both senderand receiver,
and the computer application is seen as being able to show communicative
behaviour similar to that of its partner, (p. 13)
Also, metaphors of person have been used to give perspectives on the different types of
interfaces, eg. direct manipulation of icons such as in the Macintosh microcomputer are
examples of first personness, and third person interfaces have processes mediating between
the possible actions in the domain and the user that give the appearance of willing 'agents'
carrying out your instructions if they are deemed safe. The names of books like 'The
Articulate Computer" by McTear (1987), "Getting Computers to Talk Like You and Me" by
Reichman (1985), and the subtitle "Towards Conversational Computers" to the book by
Waterworth & Talbot (1987), all lend to the idea of a computer and user in dialogue,
particularly with dialogue in the ultimate form of conversation.
How did the 'machine as dialogue partner' metaphor arise? First, the beginnings of the
metaphor are apparent in the emergence of the 'interactive computer'; instead of the
computing machine that computes uninterruptedly given a program and a set of inputs, users
could interrupt and change the flow of control in the machine at the time of execution. It was
a simple step to move from the switches and dials of early models to easily reproducible and
recognisable graphic character symbols, and then to stock textual language which became
crucial as a means, for example, of informing the user of progress and asking narrow 'yes'
or 'no' questions of the user that required a response at the run-time of the program. The
sophisticated user interface had arrived.
Let us briefly consider how the metaphor developed in two closely related fields: the practical
development of computer science, and the stormy progress of artificial intelligence. In
3 A reaction against the restricted metaphor can be found in Goranzon et al (1988). They
reinvest the concept of dialogue with the richness that has been lost by its appropriation as
computer jargon.
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computer science, Licklider (1960) suggests that man and computer could work together, by
moving away from the idea of a non-interruptable computation of a determined procedure to
the notion of shared load, between machine and human, of problem solving. He claims that
"human brains and computing machines will be coupled together very tightly and that the
resulting partnership will think as no human brain has ever thought." (p. 4) The 'partner'
metaphor seems to arise because of the ambiguity of determinate rule following in a
procedure and the 'lived work'4 of problem solving in program design. That is, procedures
were to be executed as logical symbol manipulations embodied in the computer, and the
process of refinement and correction of the algorithm by a human problem solver is iterative
over successive full executions. However, the possibility arises, apparently, of the computer
following the steps of an algorithm in the same way as a person might do, and therefore
'living' the work of the programmer or human problem solver. At appropriate points in the
execution the computer becomes not a blind rule follower but a problem solver. Licklider
foresees the problem solving activities "in which the computer cooperates, turning up flaws
in the reasoning or revealing unexpected turns in the solution." (p. 5)
Martin (1973) uses the term 'man-computer dialogue' to refer to what happenswhen the user
conducts some activity with or through the computer interface, screen, sound, etc. that has
since become common currency. A later contribution by Nickerson (1977), that presages
some of the work in the thesis, concerns the conversational metaphor for human-computer
interaction. He gave a list of features of conversation that may be suitable and which includes:
bidirectionality; mixed initiative; sense of presence; non-verbal communication; intolerance
for silence. The list, including many other items, is now ripe for re-evaluation given the rapidly
developing new technology and conversation research in the last ten years. For example,
consider the item 'rules for transfer of control' which is representative of the signal view of
turn-taking in speech exchange systems in contrast to the local opportunity management of
CA. (See Wilson et al (1984) and Section 3.2.3.3.)
Second, the flowering of the metaphor can be found in artificial intelligence research from
the 1950s that has been mentioned in the last chapter. Turing (1950) first raised in detail
some of the problems for a computational theory of mind and how it could be judged to have
succeeded. In an all too well known paper he suggests the possibility of an English
language-using machine: "it is best to provide the machine with the best sense organs that
money can buy, and then teach it to understand and speak English." (p. 460) Also, the notion
of a conversing machine is used in the familiar operational Turing test in which two people
4 See Livingston (1987) for an investigation of the 'lived work' of mathematical theorem proving.
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and a machine play an imitation game such that an interrogator must identify correctly which
of the other two is the human and which the machine by questioning through a reduced
dialogue medium that restricts the mutual access of participants to that which cannot
obviously determine the identity of the participants. Conversation is chosen because
language use in talk is a highly skilled accomplishment. A successful conversing machine
could be taken as a clear indication of intelligence. Unfortunately, the observation that people
judge the intelligence of others from conversational activity is extended too far in the
operational test; they do not routinely judge if someone is intelligent or not in conversation.
The possibility of machines engaged in dialogue is also entertained by Katz (1966), in 'The
Philosophy of Language". The separation of understanding from situated conduct in which
observable features of human conduct appear is demonstrated in the hypothesized
simulation of
two giant computers with no ability to formulate thoughts and ideas or
understand them but with the ability to produce speech sounds alternately in
such a fashion that verbal exchanges between the computers replicate the
publicly observable phenomena thatoccur when human speakers communicate
in a natural language, (p. 99)
It turns out that language use could be one of the least successful discriminatory tests,
because people find sense in most cultural products in which they do not have access to the
shared production of, and even when they do, the significance of actions can be indefinitely
enumerated, as Garfinkel (1967/84) and Weizenbaum (1966) have shown.
The development of implementations that have tried to demonstrate a working dialogue
machine, and thus support the 'dialogue partner' metaphor, has already been mentioned in
Chapter 2, but here is a brief summary. Weizenbaum's ELIZA program is reputedly a
conversing Rogerian therapist, that has been judged a skilful analyst by independent judges
from transcripts of the dialogue between a patient and the machine (Weizenbaum 1966).
Also, Terry Winograd's SHRDLU is famous as an early attempt at complete coverage of a
micro-world consisting of toy blocks (Winograd 1972). More recent approaches are the
expert systems of last 10 years that mainly use written forms of language, and the not very
robust speech systems of the last 5 years. However, the development of 'intelligent'
machines has resulted in a misuse of the vocabulary of mind and action. Many systems once
called interactive data processing systems, now have the titles: expert system, knowledge
engine, etc.. Equally, claims are commonly made about the relation of the programs and
their representations to the mind. But the machine-centred view that regards the machine
as an active partner able to deal with the contingencies of the human practice it supplants is
now giving way to a more human-centred perspective. For example, parallel to the rise of
the notion of the 'intelligent' computer and a computational theory of mind, Suchman (1987)
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has coined the useful term 'interactive artifact' that focuses attention on the interpretation of
machines in the activities of users, intelligibility instead of intelligence, and that the machine
is designed for human consumption and embedded in human practice, much as a hammer
or bicycle is. Machines can produce events in time, and 'sense' changes in the physical
world, and thus, can be reactive to that world. They can be designed to produce fragments
of behaviour, language forms, and they can be reactive to human use. The question arises:
can the behaviour of a reactive artifact in the environment of human action be interpreted as
meaningful with respect to the actions of people - ie. as social action? Suchman argues that
because the computer artifact is reactive, language-rich and complex for the user, these are
good reasons to consider it 'purposeful' in our everyday vocabulary.
Thus the properties of the machine in use give fuel to the argument that participants find the
machine interactive and purposeful in their interpretations of its complex behaviour. Of
course, this may not be appropriate for successful use but it does begin to explain the origin
of the dialogue partner metaphor. People are very good at finding the sense or
purposefulness of events in the world. Anyway, given that the machine exhibits language
forms in its behaviour, it is interesting to raise the issue of whether or not it is language-using.
This may be considered by comparing the similarities and differences between the 'language'
machine and texts. Ricoeur has formulated a stance on text from phenomenological
hermeneutics that is quite revealing in terms of human-machine interaction.
Only discourse not language is addressed to someone... But it is one thing for
discourse to be addressed to an interlocutor equally present to the discourse
situation, and another to be addressed... to whoever knows how to read.... The
co-presence of subjects in dialogue ceases to be the model for every
'understanding'.... In escaping the momentary character of the event, the
bounds lived by the author, and the narrowness of ostensive reference,
discourse escapes the limits of being face to face. It no longer has a visible
author. (Ricoeur 1981, pp. 202-203)
Riceour follows in the tradition of hermeneutics in developing a sophisticated theory of the
writer, text, reader and understanding. But the interactive computer presents a different form
of text that poses a problem for the notion of 'author'. At present all systems are designed
by people: theywrite the programs, and the language form, for instance written text or speech,
is predetermined within robust limits for successful human use. Also, the language is
discoursial as it is addressed to a 'someone', a user. However, unlike the presentation of
language in most texts, the machine has to present appropriate pieces of language form in
the context of the machine's use at the time of its use, ie. the momentary character of the
event, and the referential circumstances of the interaction are now relevant. To put it another
way: work on the interactive 'dialogue' machine is rediscovering the nature of copresence,
of living language and of 'going on', in order to present appropriate linguistic responses to
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the user's actions. The consequence of this is that the designer of a system cannot possibly
know beforehand all the interpretations there will be as a result of the machine's situated use
for the pieces of language she or he has decided to include there. Thus, the meaning of the
language still escapes the bounds lived by the designer-as-author and so the ambiguity
between the machine as 'visible author' or 'discourse medium' (authorless) is now clear, ie.
the design of interactive dialogue artifacts is attempting to recover procedurally what it is to
be a 'visible author' of language in practice when the language in discourse has broken free
from the limits of occurring in human face-to-face interaction.
It is useful to compare this notion with Giddens (1987, pp. 100-1) on the cultural object or
artifact. He argues that cultural objects, like texts and electronic media, have the following
characteristics:
i) distanciation of 'producer' from 'consumer',
ii) consumer becomes more important than the producer in the interpretative
process,
iii) a) durable medium of transmission across contexts,
b) a means of storage,
c) a means of retrieval.
The characteristics are similar for the interactive artifact. However, a stranger sort of distance
occurs because the artifact, in a sense, manages meaning in the absence of the 'producer'.
Meaning escapes the design horizons in processes of user-machine interaction as the user
attempts to interpret the artifact's responses, and so it is difficult to talk about the designer
or author, the user and the machine in appropriate ways. New hermeneutic accounts have
to be debated because of the dilemma created by considering the machine as a social object
or subject. For example, the interactive artifact is not like a static text; it is dynamic and
reactive. But yet, it has qualities of texts in that the designer plays an important part as author,
and there is a distance between designer and user. The interactive artifact must stand on
its own, with no help from the absent designer, in moments of user engagement, ie. the artifact
becomes a 'participant' in managing meaningful conduct. However, it must be remembered
that the user sustains and grounds the appearance of an interface. An alternative,
human-centred way of putting it is that the artifact must react in appropriate ways forthe user,
ie. the user finds it intelligible in terms of the project under way. In summary, this view of
the computer explains the development of dialogue systems and models as the gradual
progression towards recovering or replacing the referential qualities of talk. The dialogue
artifact, as can be seen in the design of instructional computer systems that can be contrasted
with textual materials, is reclaiming in small simple steps what the written language has lost,
though it has gained in other ways, by suspending reference and divorcing itself from the
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modalities of everyday experience5. Let us explore this example further as it helps reveal
something of the shift involved from texts to computer systems. So what are the differences
between instructional textual materials and reactive artifacts, like computerised 'intelligent'
help systems6? Instructional texts are written for a number of reasons including the
unavailability of a qualified instructor. Written and graphic documentation is produced that
is to be read at some later date in order to understand, repair, build, or locate a device. It is
advantageous in that it can be carefully designed and tested, and also re-read and mulled
over, but is disadvantageous in that it cannot replace the embodied experience of
apprenticeship with the qualified instructor (Brown et al 1988, and Lave 1988).
A simple observation is that though the language elements in both textual documentation
and computer help systems could be identical, and the inadequacy and indefiniteness of both
in specifying action is the same, a reactive artifact attempts to reclaim a part of the production
of intelligibility. Texts are available to be read by choice with reader reflection on the
consequences of a choice - an interpretation is constructed by the reader's work of looking
and finding nexts to read or re-read. However, in reactive artifacts elements of the practice
of finding a 'reading' are replaced or removed by the artifact. For example, rather than using
meta-language or convention - a "Go to page 9 to read more on this" or a footnote marker -
to make more explicit how to read the text, presentation of textual forms can occur without
the user finding that next piece intelligible as the next thing to read. Finding a 'reading' from
the flat textual page and the format of the book as a physical object are part of the routine
practices of reading and interpreting, eg. searching for a page, scanning the text, re-reading,
looking for a footnote. With 'intelligent' help systems much work of situated 'reading' required
of the reader is to be replaced by the machine's operation: the model for interpretation is
shifted from the monologic, that puts the emphasis on the consumer, to the dialogic.
Meta-questions may explicitly ask the user for answers bearing on the presentation of
material in a computer help system, but the user no longer has to engage in practices of
reading an order into the textual materials such that a meta-question is found that suggests
possible courses of action that must be carried out by the reader. In texts the guidance of
'reading' may involve meta-language, but the next courses are to be undertaken by the reader
from the instructions in the textual medium, ie. courses of action must be juxtaposed in the
text. However, in computer help systems presentation may be ordered in ways that are
5 In the sense of: "Meaning and reference are ordinarily closely combined in talk, not because
talk is in any way primarily oriented towards description, but because it is carried on and
organised within practical contexts of action." (Giddens 1987, p. 104).
6 Cawsey (1989) is an example of a prototype 'intelligent' help or tutoring system. Also, see
Suchman (1987) for a study of the use of an expert help system for a physical device.
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unobservable or unpredictable for the user, eg. the system models the user and presents
according to these constructed models.
For example, if the explicit manual instruction "if it works then do..." were to be adopted in
the design of a computer help system then the designer may have the machine determine
satisfaction of the condition 'working' if the system detects certain states of a device and
takes them as representative of the appropriate condition, and thus the contingencies of this
rule will be hidden from the user. Also, let us consider the meta-question "Do you want to
read more on this topic?" In a text manual the reader must find this as a relevant question
within the context of the page and instructions as to how to proceed from the question to
doing something sensible as a consequence must be provided nearby the question. The
reader must then work out what about the text suggests a possible course of action and
decide what course to take at this point, eg. "If yes then go to page 5", and then try to carry
out the instruction. In a help system the question may appear at particular junctures in the
use of the system in which it must be interpreted as a meta-question. What the user must
do next is answer the question whereupon the system will hopefully provide an intelligible
response, eg. if the user responds 'yes' then appropriate text (on page 5) will be provided.
The possibilities for alternative action may not necessarily be presented to the user as they
must be for the reader of a text.
Interpretation through 'reading' as a chronic and routine practice over time - a sort of
interaction between the reader and the textual material - is transformed as the author or
designer can remove some of the situated work of reading that is to the advantage of texts
as distanced cultural products. That is, the design of interactive artifacts is recovering some
of the situated practices of dialogue as the means to generate intelligible language material
in situ. Now the sense of the language is to be found in the reasons for a particular next
following a particular action, not in why a next follows a prior piece of text in the traditional
linear and transitive order of a text. There is an endogenous display of interpretation in a
next turn, that can confirm the appropriateness of prior action in instruction giving.
Because the design of interactive artifacts in the machine-centred view means recovering
situated practice it is useful to think of the designeror author in terms of the following quotation
from Perec (1987/70, p. xvii).
...despite appearances, puzzling is not a solitarygame: every move the puzzler
makes the puzzle-maker has made before; every piece the puzzler picks up,
and picks up again, and studies and strokes, every combination he tries, and
tries a second time, every blunder and every insight, each hope and each
discouragement have all been designed, calculated and decided by the other.
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The designer must puzzle out the trajectories of possible user conduct and requirements, but
in this case the puzzle is not static. System performance must provide a coherent and
consistent picture of the activity engaged in for the user. This requires the intense 'lived-work'
of programming and design. However, it is not possible to foresee every possibility, nor
anticipate every user blunder. Trying to design the machine in this or any way leads to
blindness and breakdown that is unavoidable in the circumstances of situated action. In this
case the task becomes understanding the nature of design horizons:
the main tasks of the study of... culturalproducts ofany kind... must beprecisely
to examine the divergencies which become instituted between the
circumstances of their production, and the meanings sustained by their
subsequent escape from the horizons of their creator or creators. (Giddens
1979, p. 44)
Another interesting issue that relates to the question beginning this section is if the machine
is interpreted then how do users of interactive artifacts make sense of it? There are several
ways to address this question depending on your interests. For example, artifacts are
encountered in specific locations and activities, they are encountered over periods of time
by an individual, and they are encountered in the context of communities of practice. For the
purposes of the thesis only the first aspect will be addressed. With what resources and
interpretative strategies does a user get on with an interactive artifact? The designer hopes
that in each reaction of the machine, the user will find the materials for interpreting the
significance of that reaction. Let us consider a typical language-based help system. The
computer reacts to the user with behaviours composed out of chunks from the top down, eg.
the system can output complex linguistic segments in simple orders, like chunks of spoken
text combined and altered in simple ways. The computer 'finds sense' in the primitive actions
of the user from the bottom up, eg. the user can input simple segments in simple orders, like
words in simple combinations, or apparently complex segments in simple orders, like a
language-formulated stereotyped command. What counts is that the designer cannot work
out the contingencies of complex combinations, but can rely on the user to ground a given
pre-designed complex segment given by the system. Because of the linguistic and reactive
nature of computer systems, through engineering and design, Suchman (1987) has argued
that users find sense in the artifact using the resources of interaction to be found in human
conversation. For example, what does it mean to take a linguistic form on a display as a
question, and how is it different from a question in conversation? Sequential placement and
the setting and activity are all relevant for interpretation. But, with an interactive artifact, the
'question' is a one dimensional exploitation of the regularities in language activity and the
documentary method of interpretation. In addition, it is not at all clear what slippage there is
between practical reasoning resources and social communicative resources, and how these
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resources develop in the practical contexts of engaging with the artifact, ie. the similarities in
the ways one interprets the physical and social world.
To conclude, in human-computer dialogue the computer can be roughly described as a
'dialogue partner' in the following terms: 1) it is reactive to human actions - when interpreted
in terms of human action and activity: 2) language form is present, eg. writing or synthesized
speech, that is to be interpreted in situ; 3) it is a complex system with no visible human author.
This is of course the user's interpretive framework and not the machine's.
3.2.3 Situated Action and Empiricism
3.2.3.1 Introduction
This introduction to the study of social action and practice wants to show that there are
traditions that are different to the rationalist conception of action, that can form the basis of
an interactional perspective to current dialogue models and artifacts. Ethnomethodology
provides the background for a reconception of dialogue that undermines computer models,
and conversation analysis provides an empirical methodology that makes available the
details of situated action that are otherwise taken-for-granted, ignored or lost. Dialogue can
then be understood as a set of social practices loosely defined as the participants'
communicative engagement in the interactional achievement of mutual intelligibility. The
study of dialogue is concerned with how participants find sense in each other's actions with
the circumstantial and situated resources of that activity.
3.2.3.2 Ethnomethodology
I use the term 'ethnomethodology' to refer to the investigation of the rational
properties of indexical expressions and other practical actions as contingent
ongoing accomplishments of organised artful practices of everyday life.
(Garfinkel 1967, p. 11)
The central recommendation is that the activities whereby members produce
and manage setting of organised everyday affairs are identical with members'
procedures for making those settings accountable... when I speak of
accountable... I mean observable-and-reportable, ie. available to members as
situatedpractices of looking-and-telling. Imean, too, that such practices are an
endless, ongoing, contingent accomplishment, (ibid., p. 1)
These two quotations from the founder of the group of studies known as ethnomethodology
illustrate the difficulty a reader can have in understanding the vocabulary and the substance
of its claims. The first step on the path to understanding is to recognise that the term
'ethnomethodology' is formed from the root 'ethnomethod' and the suffix 'ology' to denote the
study of ethnomethods. Ethnomethodology originated in opposition to the traditional
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sociological schools of thought in the mid-1950s and its stated aim was to investigate "the
body of common-sense knowledge and the range of procedures and considerations by
means of which the ordinary members of society make sense of, find their way about in, and
act upon the circumstances in which they find themselves in." (Heritage & Atkinson 1984, p.
4) Garfinkel is the originator of the group of studies under this name and there are several
classic analyses in his book Garfinkel (1967). Heritage (1984) contains a readable in-depth
discussion of Garfinkers contributions, and Sharrock & Anderson (1986) provide a similar
broad brushstroke. Other useful sources are Lynch et al (1983), Benson & Hughes (1983),
Heritage (1987), Livingston (1987), and Garfinkel (1986). Ethnomethodology7 is
representative of the confluence of approaches which Coulter (1989) calls 'epistemic
sociology' concerned with the intelligibility of phenomena in practical affairs as a social
achievement. Giddens has argued that it is also representative of a 'linguistic turn' in social
theorising. However,
the 'linguistic turn' is in a sense a turn away from linguistics, conceived as an
independently formed discipline, towards examining the mutual coordination of
language and praxis. (Giddens 1987, p. 80)
There has definitely been a turn away from cognitivism towards explanations that deal with
human activities, actions and their circumstances rather than an internal mental world.
Suchman (1987) has drawn on ethnomethodology in an important critique that argues against
traditional views of action in cognitive science. Also, Agre (1988), Norman (1988) and Lave
(1988) are some examples.
What we call cognition is in fact a complex social phenomenon.... 'Cognition'
observed in everyday practice is distributed - stretched over, not divided among
- mind, body, activity and culturally organised settings (which include other
actors).... explanations of cognition as a nexus of relations between the mind at
work and the world in which it works. (Lave 1988, p. 1)
3.2.3.2.1 Theory
In sociology, Garfinkel moved against the traditional view that social order and coordination
are the consequences of the application of sets of rules or norms that emanate from external
social structure. Rather, social actors are "involved in a continued ongoing practical process
of comprehending or making sense of the nature of scenes and activities... from the very
7 It is important to note that the field is fragmented in several ways, not least because of the
peculiar nature of ethnomethodology, in that a fail-safe method or general approach is difficult
to define because methods emerge from the specifics of each activity. Also, there are many
approaches that can come under the rubric of 'investigations of everyday social life', eg.
Coulter (1979), Goffman (1981), Cicourel (1973), and Douglas (1971), though they could not
be said to present a unified perspective.
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materials that they see as making up these environments." (Lee 1987, p. 23) Also, the roots
of ethnomethodology go back to Husserl and phenomenology. In common with
phenomenology's interest in everyday perception, the phenomena to be studied were not
hard to find (unlike searching for black holes in space.) The naturally organised ordinary
activities of everyday people were of great interest but had unfortunately been
taken-for-granted in mainstream sociology. The order to be found in these activities was now
made problematic and to be explained, but not as the result of the instantiation of social
norms, nor as the result of common cognitive structures.
In this brief survey three basic points will be discussed as they bear on the problems with
computer models of dialogue discussed in Chapter 2: how participants find sense in the world
and other's actions using the documentary method; the indexical nature of language; and the
mutual intelligibility of communication as a situated achievement. The 'documentary method'
or 'verstehen' is a principle process of sense-making - it describes the processwhereby action
appearances are treated as 'the document of an underlying pattern, and equally, the
individual documentary evidences are interpreted in terms of those underlying patterns, in
mutual elaboration. As Suchman (1987, p. 64) illustrates: "the ascription of intent on the basis
of evidence, and the interpretation of evidence on the basis of ascribed intent" are abilities
that are not reducible to formal relations between context and intent.
Interpretative schemes form the core of the mutual knowledge whereby an
accountable universe of meaning is sustained through and in processes of
interaction. (Giddens 1979, p. 83)
The routine and pervasive nature of this method was demonstrated by Garfinkel in an
experiment involving advice counselling between an experimenter and students in the
University. They were only able to communicate by intercom, and the students were told that
the advisor would answer their questions either "yes" or "no". Students were asked to
comment after every response with the intercom switched off. In fact, the experimenter
answered either way according to a random procedure. However, this did not perturb the
students who found sense in the responses as motivated by the questions and addressing
the substantive content of those questions. The documentary method thus explains why
artifacts can be used. Fundamentally, it is people who make sense of the behaviours of
animals, cars, and computers, evenwhen those behaviours are unmotivated by their actions.
Garfinkel was very much concerned with natural language use and its relation to social
practices. A fundamental claim is that all language is indexical, and that participants are
actively engaged in making definite sense of indefinite descriptions or indexical expressions
by invoking resources such as context or commonsense knowledge. It is true that
ordinary language is 'open'... most of the words and phrases used in everyday
talk do not have precise lexical definitions. (Giddens 1987, p. 102)
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But, settings of talk are used by participants to define the nature of what is said. Heritage
(1984, p. 151-2) illustrates the indexical nature of languagewith the example utterance "That's
a nice one" said in front of a picture. He concludes that in the example: i) the referent could
not be determined without physical (verbal) context, eg. 'that' in the picture; ii) the sense of
particular expressions could not be made without the use of context, eg. 'nice'; and iii) the
sense of the utterance (construed as action) could not be made without invoking a social
context coordinated with the sense of particular descriptive terms, eg. a compliment. Thus,
in this way, plans, such as in computer models, are indefinite representations abstracting
away from action and are indeterminate of action because they are necessarily incomplete.
The determination of the objective conditions and consequences of action or intent
recognition is an endless task not belonging to the world of action itself. Also, rules do not
govern conduct; they can be used to make practices accountable but not explicit. The
application of rules involves the use of ad hoc devices, like et cetera clauses.
'Shared agreement' refers to various social methods for accomplishing the
member's recognition that something was said-according-to-a-rule and not the
demonstrable mapping of substantive matters. The appropriate image of a
common understanding is therefore an operation rather than a common
intersection of overlapping sets. (Garfinkel 1967, p. 30)
It is crucial to understand that the intelligibility of action is constructed in situ according to
tacit methods - the documentary method - of sense making. To reiterate an argument in
Chapter 2, it does not rest on a shared agreement about background knowledge.
Situationalconstitution is essentiallya 'local'and immanentproduct ofmethodic
procedure rather than a result of 'pre-existing' agreement on 'matters of fact'.
(Heritage 1984, p. 132)
Therefore if it is methods and not mappings that underpin the achievement of mutual
intelligibility then it is clear why plans and representations fail to deal with situated action.
The normative order was demonstrated by Garfinkel (1967) in his famous 'breaching'
experiments in which students were asked to engage in conversation with a friend or
acquaintance and sublimely ask at some point for the other person to clarify the sense of a
commonplace remark. For example, if a friend said, "I had a flat tire yesterday", the student
replied, "What do you mean, a flat tire?" The students reported stunned, perplexed and even
hostile reactions in which the friend attempted to return to the 'normal' conduct that had been
upset or breached. Thus the experiment demonstrates the production of conduct is founded
in the perceivably normal that is continually ratified and achieved. In addition, this experiment
opens the way to the study of the organisation of action itself. If actions can be analysed in
terms of constitutive structures and they are displayed in the organisation of action itself then
the ordinary competences and structures are available to participants and observers by virtue
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of being a member of that community. This is the prime resource for the analyst in revealing
the competences implicated in members' practices, and is used in Chapters 5 and 6 with
respect to audio-visual study of dialogue practice.
It is important to note that two strains of ethnomethodology are present in Garfinkel and
continue on today. Cohen (1987) argues that activities do exhibit a formal structure
independent of any given cohort of actors, but are produced and recognised as the practical,
situated accomplishment of the members of a particular cohort. There are then two
possibilities: either thematise the practices and procedures by which standardised features
of forms of activity are produced which is the course of conversation analysis, or attention is
paid to the production and recognition of these forms in particular situations which has been
continued by Garfinkel's students. Conversation analysis will be described in detail later but
is basically concerned with "the possibility of achieving a naturalistic observational discipline
that could deal with the details of social action(s) rigourously, empirically, and formally."
(Schegloff & Sacks 1973) The latter studies will be briefly summarised next after the following
quotation which sums up the perspective towards situated action and structure taken in this
thesis.
The social world is constituted by situated actions produced in concrete
situations, that are available to the participants for their own recognition,
description, and use as warranted grounds for further inference and action on
those same occasions a well as subsequent ones. Situated actions are
produced through context-free, context-sensitive mechanisms [for example,
turn-taking] of social interaction, and social structure is used by members of
society to render their actions in particular situations intelligible and coherent.
In thisprocess, socialstructure is reproducedas an objective reality thatpartially
constrains action. It is through this reflexive relation between social structure
and situated action that the transparency of displays [the mutual intelligibility of
conduct] is accomplished by exploiting the context-dependence of meaning.
(Wilson 1983, p. 20)
3.2.3.2.2 Doing Ethnomethodology
In order to illustrate a number of points about ethnomethodology a summary of a typical
investigation of human conduct will be given. Examples of everyday social activities are the
encounters of strangers in public places, eg. standing in a queue, spitting in the gutter, asking
the time, street walking, crossing streets at appropriate places. The latter is a skilled
accomplishment carried out by a large cohort of people without much thought, though it is
not considered a great achievement of humankind. The following account of its structure and
achievement is taken from Livingston (1987) in order to illustrate a number of points relevant
to understanding and investigating the nature of dialogue activity.
How should the study of the behaviour of people crossing streets be undertaken? What is
to be explained? People stand on opposite sides of a traffic-ridden street at conventional
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places and then at the appropriate signal cars stop and people move from their side in order
to reach the other side safely. Preliminary observation shows that no simple rule operates
to order the flow of people. Crossing is accomplished in varied ways and how it is achieved
is in need of explanation. One approach would be to video from above the patterns of flow
that emerge on real occasions of street crossing. By using video analysis and photos it could
be argued that people form geometrical shapes - wedges, fronts - with their bodies and thus
by their collective behaviour achieve a crossing. However one thing clearly remains to be
explicated. How do the pedestrians manage the crossing themselves. It could then be
hypothesized that people orient to these structures in orderto achieve the crossing, otherwise
how could they manage it. It could also be argued that people have a shared plan to form
these structures by which they can coordinate their crossing. Or that they have been
socialised to follow these rule-governed patterns. They may even have been born with these
patterns in their genes.
However, an investigation of the achievement of the crossing needs to consider more closely
the routine social accomplishment of this activity by the members themselves. How is it that
individuals can cross a street in a multitude of other people and retain their anonymity? A
detailed ethnomethodological account would have to investigate from the perspective of the
participants in the cohort, for example, in terms of directed eye movements and body
orientations. They are bodily and perceptually involved in an emerging social activity inwhich
their practical action and reasoning is constitutive. Visually the action so to speak is not from
a disengaged observer's position above, from where representations become derivable from
the video records, but from the eye level of those engaged. Simply, during the ongoing
crossing pedestrians are engaged in the social production and maintenance of an 'interface'
between the two opposite moving groups of pedestrians. Livingston argues that They are
engaged in locally building, together, the developing organisation of their mutual passage."
(p. 22)
This example nicely illustrates some important points. First, the accomplishment of everyday
activities is studiable. Second, activities are the result of embodied and situated practices.
Third, the access to the competences is only available to members themselves. The analyst
cannot escape having to be a member in order to study a strip of conduct. The analyst and
the participant are both relying on everyday interpretative methods in orderto make sense
of conduct, ie. The description of human activities demands a familiarity with the forms of life
expressed in those activities." (Giddens 1984, p. 3) It would not be so easy to reveal the
sorts of competences implicit in the conduct if one was blind or paralysed, much as listening
to a conversation in an unfamiliar language is insufficient for doing analysis. Fourth, video
is not necessarily the provider of the correct data. It is problematic for locating what is
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demonstrably real and 'visible' for the participants. This problem for analysis applies to all
human activities and is to be determined for each individually. Lynch (1985, p. 7) argues that
"in many settings it is the embodiment of speech and gesture which provides work with its
visibility for practitioners." Morrison (1981) studied the sequential organisation of texts and
devised formatted questions and states that "a strictly 'literary' analysis of such texts (poems,
sociology textbooks) cannot assure the analyst of a grasp of the organisational use of texts
within the specific occupational activities which produced them." Fifth, inadequate
consideration of the data results in an abstract and disengaged Technical" analysis that can
lead to reification of those results as elements of a generatory account of the conduct.
Structures described from disengaged perspectives are posited as endogenous to the
conduct. This has been argued in Chapter 2 with regard to computer models of dialogue like
Grosz & Sidner (1986).
Other areas of study, from the enumerable practical activities that are available, are: scientific
laboratory work, martial arts, the reading of signs, the production of direction maps, jazz piano
playing, mathematical proofs, and typing. However, the next section introduces the
ethnomethodological investigation of a pervasive activity that is now considered an area of
in-depth study in its own right: everyday, mundane conversation. It is important because of
the ability to observe the process of social action, whereby the social world is
essentially built up anew for the purpose at hand, and interactants can be seen
sorting out the agreed-on premises from those that need to be established
between them. (Wynn 1980, p. 88)
Given the emphasis on the everyday competenceswhich members rely onwhen they engage
in social practices and the central place of language in accounts, it is understandable that
routine conversation itself, in and through which much social behaviour is constituted,
became the focus of great interest in the 1960s. However, at the time it was something of a
surprise.
3.2.3.3 Conversation Analysis (CA)
Conversation8 is a routine and complex accomplishment carried through by almost all
members of society with great skill and transparent ease. It is not only carried out in and
through speech but also in the sign language of the deaf community. However, the
8 There is a contrast between the everyday general use of 'conversation', ie. 'conversational
activity' versus the speech event 'conversation' which can be characterised as
talk-in-interaction maintaining equal speaker rights (Wilson 1989). Also, the term 'conversation
analysis' is sometimes ambiguous between CA and the studies of conversation in general,
including other approaches. Here it will refer to the specific field of studies.
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investigation of this pervasive activity was largely absent from academic disciplines until the
second half of this century. Before, only 'interesting' speech events, for example, of a
rhetorical nature with important social or historical consequences, were dealt with, eg.
debates or speeches which had associations with formal or written language. The term
'dialogue' has a higher status in this respect because of its associations with literature and
meaningful, significant language use. The discipline one would have expected to have dealt
with language use in its most natural form, namely linguistics, initially avoided the issue,
claiming disorder and unruliness.
Instead, the complex social order of conversation was revealed in a very different fashion by
an empirical discipline known as conversation analysis that grew out of ethnomethodology.
At first, no particular priority was assigned to conversation as its subject matter. But, as the
field progressed, mundane conversation was studied in its own right and in priority to other
forms of language use. The central goal of conversation analytic research is the description
and explication of the competences that ordinary speakers use and rely on in participating in
senseful conversation. Meaning is not built into the codes of language as in structural
accounts, nor is it to be found in the relation of cognitive representations to that which is
represented. Meaning is constructed in situ by interactants who are
simultaneouslyengaged in fine-grainedreal time co-ordination ofspeaking turns
tracked predominantly in terms of surface structural features and... organising
theiractions in terms ofpublicly accountable normative expectations bearing on
the nature and design of their turns at talk. (Heritage 1989, p. 26)
Of course, personal motivations, personalities, cultural conventions, etc. are not to be
discarded. However, conversation analysis, ethnomethodology and other 'interpretative'
approaches have had little effect on computational theories of human intelligence and
behaviour, though this appears to be changing gradually with the wide dissemination of
directly relevant work by Dreyfus (1967/72), Winograd & Flores (1986) and Suchman (1987).
In this survey of CA, the fundamental principles in relation to computer models of dialogue
will be described first. The empirical methodology will only be briefly outlined as it is dealt
with more thoroughly and in the context of the interactional analyses carried out in the thesis
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Some findings and other similar social approaches relevant to
considering dialogue activity from an interactional perspective will also be reviewed.
3.2.3.3.1 Principles
The work of Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson in the 1960s has been taken up increasingly in
Europe, especially in Britain. The original pioneering work of Sacks has been generally
unavailable except for a few monographs transcribed by Gail Jefferson, and the original
published papers. However, recently some of the transcribed lectures have been published,
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Sacks (1989), and all of them will be available later in full. Useful summaries of CA can be
found in Levinson (1983), Atkinson & Heritage (1984), Heritage (1984, ch. 8), and Button &
Lee (1987). Also, Roger & Bull (1989) contains a comparison between the perspectives of
CA and social psychology. The field has moved from an early interest in social category
membership devices and the accountability of conversational activity to the formal description
of regularities found in conversational data, in which details of the sequential organisation of
talk became prominent. After twenty years of research and critical attention the field has
achieved credibility and findings are being incorporated into other disciplines, such as social
psychology, linguistics, and discourse analysis. The main tenets of CA are summarised in
Heritage (1989, p. 22) as follows:
i) interaction is structurally organised,
ii) contributions to interaction are contextually oriented,
iii) these properties inhere in details of interaction so that no order of detail can
be dismissed, a priori, as disorderly, accidental or irrelevant.
The first tenet can be traced back to the divergence in interests between Garfinkel and Sacks
about what ethnomethodology should explain. Sacks (1984, p. 21) states that the central
findings of ethnomethodology are:
The detailed ways in which actual, naturally occurring social activities are
subject to formal description. Social activities - actual, singular sequences of
them - are methodical occurrences. That is, their description consists of the
description of formal procedures persons employ.
The methods persons employ to produce their activities permit formal
description of singular occurrences that are generalisable in intuitively
nonapparent ways and are highly reproducibly stable.
Conversation analysis has since become highly technical and detailed, painstakingly
revealing structures in talk that are accountably used by members of a society to construct
and interpret that talk.
The initialmost fundamentalassumption ofCA is that allaspects of socialaction
and interaction can be examined in terms of conventionalised or institutional
structural organisations which analysably inform their production. These
organisations are to be treated as structures in their own right which, like other
social institutions and conventions, stand independently of the psychological or
other characteristics ofparticular participants. (Heritage 1989, p. 22)
The second tenet states that communicative action is both context-shaped and
context-renewing. Actions in talk cannot be understood independently from the contexts in
which they were produced because
in ordinary talk, individuals routinely employ a diversity of aspects of setting in
order to understand others and to 'gear' what they themselves say to such a
process of understanding. (Giddens 1987, p. 100)
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In interaction, speakers and listeners rely upon a "saturated physical and social context for
making sense of what is said." (Giddens 1987, p. 127) Also, communicative actions
themselves provide more material for next interpretations and thus engage in and renew
those same contextual frameworks.
The third tenet underlies an empirical methodology that must be susceptible to not-yet-known
orders of structure. These orders are only revealable in the observable details of conduct
itself by careful analyses of recordings. This does not mean that as much as possible must
be observed and will be relevant empirically, as Oldman & Drucker (1985) misconstrue the
assumption. Rather, details must not be dismissed theoretically as irrelevant, for example
by coding the data, lest one get rid of the forest in order to see the trees more clearly. This
is a common mistake in computer theories of dialogue as was illustrated with respect to Grosz
& Sidner (1986) in Chapter 2. The naturalistic methods of CA will be returned to in Section
3.2.3.3.3.
3.2.3.3.2 Phenomena
Now we will turn to the consideration of some basic findings and their relevance to the thesis.
In detailing interactional and communicative resources, note that a mentalist vocabulary is
explicitly avoided. Two fundamental organisations of conversation are turn taking and
adjacency organisation, and they will be considered in detail.
In order to counteract the tendency for the 'interchange' model of message exchange to be
adopted in models of dialogue it is pertinent to consider just how the production of utterances
is achieved in talk. The classic work, much referenced and misinterpreted, is Sacks et al
(1978), which was first published in 1974. Turn-taking is a pervasive phenomena in any
speech exchange system, and can also be found in any interactional activity in which turns
at participating must be coordinated. CA has found a number of properties of conversation
in this respect which are in need of explanation. For example, how is it possible that parties
in a conversation can regularly achieve split second transfers between the termination of
speech of one party and the start of speech of another? Parties engage in talk in which the
number of parties may alter, the length of talk by one person is not predefined, and the order
of the 'turns' at talk is not determined in advance. CA has investigated this phenomenon and
found regularities in the way people achieve the orderly distribution of turns-at-talk. Before
explicating more about turn-taking it should be noted that conversational participation is
organised within the constraints of mutuality, in talk settings, the sense of talking together -
of mutual access to social and physical circumstances - is a coordinated, routine
achievement. It requires "the coordinated monitoring which copresent individuals carry on
as part of ongoing talk." (Giddens 1987, p. 100) In addition, participants use whatever
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resources are available in the circumstances, and thus, inherent in the participation in
conversation and other activities are emergent events that are available as a resource for
participants to accomplish the conversation (Wilson et al 1984).
To return to turn-taking in conversation, turns are produced, competed over and oriented to
by the participants. CA proposes that people construct turns out of turn-constructional units
(TCU) that project possible points in the course of the conduct of the speaker at which
transition may occur. At the transition relevance places (TRP) a simple set of ordered options
are recursively operative at each and all TRPs.
a) if a current speaker C selects a next speaker N, C must stop speaking and N
must start at the TRP,
b) if C does not select, then another person may self-select,
c) if neither b) norc) then the current speaker may continue.
These 'rules' are locally managed and are not generative of the turn-taking conduct.
Turn-taking operates on a turn-by-turn basis organising the transition to next speaker with
the materials at hand. The rules do not have to be obeyed but most conduct can be shown
to be produced and interpreted in the context of such a set. For example, the system provides
a motivation for organising conversation so that only one speaker speaks at a time, however,
overlaps do occur and are not breakdowns nor unexplainable because they do not satisfy
the set of rules. Overlap is an ordered phenomenon that is explicable in terms of orientation
to the rule set. An overlap can occur as a competing first start, as allowed by rule 1 (b), or as
a mis-projection of a possible TRP, as in the example below.
[Sacks et al (1978, p. 17)]
A: Uh you been down here before // havenche.
B: Yeah.
In this example, material has been appended by A to expand a turn. Tags or address terms
regularly accomplish this expansion and thus redefine locally the boundaries of the turn in
progress. However, B anticipates the possible TRP after "before" and fits a reply into this
slot. Overlap occurs, which is usually brief, and talk continues. Thus in the course of the
construction of the talk competing analyses by the two parties are an inherent part of that
talk. An analysis of overlaps will not reveal an underlying order or coherence that was
intended but realised incorrectly, because order is itself a contingent circumstantial
accomplishment. The turn-taking rule set does not govern the behaviour of people in
conversation but is merely a description of the orientations to what is a 'turn' that must be
routinely and tacitly achieved on every occasion. For example, collaborative turn
completions, in which one utterance is completed by another party before a recognised
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completion point, illustrate that participants must construct 'turns' interactional^ and this can
be shared by two parties, ie. conversation is fundamentally a joint activity.
The turn-taking rule set also can explain the significance of an absence of activity as well as
the presence. Thus in the following example the two pauses are differentially interpretable
within the developing talk.
[Sacks et al (1978, p. 25)]
C: Well no I'll drive (I don't mi//nd)
J: hhh
(1.0)
J: I meant to offer.
(16.0)
J: Those shoes look nice ...
The one second pause is a gap before the application of rule b) above. The second pause
can be interpreted as a lapse on the non-application of the rule set. Only incipient talk,
common at work or home, escapes the accountability of absences of talk activity, ie. two
people working in the same office may fall into silent activity for long periods without either
feeling uncomfortable.
Within the turn-taking of talk some relevance of turns to each other is necessary. Adjacency
is a prime locus of intersubjectivity. Adjacent positioning provides a resource for determining
the adequate interpretation of a speaker's turn by a recipient that would not be available if
turns addressing other turns were regularly positioned many turns away. Non-adjacent
positioning does occur in talk, but these occurrences 'prove' the systematicity of adjacency
because such occurrences are demonstrably accounted for in terms of their non-adjacency.
Thus, a speaker might say, "I'm sorry for not answering earlier but..." or "I won't reply until
later." Adjacency pairs are one routine structure available for the production and
interpretation of talk. They are an additional local resource for organising transition to next
speaker within the turn-taking system. Production of first part of a pair - a question, say -
sets up the expectation of a second part - an answer - and thus influences the interpretation
of what comes next. Of course second parts may not be forthcoming or may be positioned
much later in the talk, but that is not a disproof. The expectation of a second part is oriented
to in the production of whatever conduct occurs and a noticeable absence can be sanctioned
by the speaker if necessary. Thus, answers do not have to follow questions immediately, if
at all, and thus they are conditionally relevant. Also, repair is a pervasive practice: talk has
intrinsic mechanisms for the resolution of turn-taking troubles, eg. overlap resolution.
To conclude this section, it must be emphasized that the sequential and interactional
production of talk is not governed by rules. Some models propose that institutional rules
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govern the behaviour of those involved such that turns at talk are signalled, accepted and
then transferred (Duncan 1974). Computer models are similarly problematic in that they aim
not only to predetermine what is significant in dialogue but also that what is significant must
be intended. Rather, the set of rules can be said to tacitly inform the production and
interpretation of turns by parties engaged in talk. Kendon, writing about Goffman and the
'given' and 'given-off in talk, notes:
It is important to remember that the issue here is not whether the information
provided is in fact provided voluntarily or involuntarily. It is, rather, whether the
co-participants in the gathering take it that it is provided voluntarily or not. In
any situation of interaction, it seems, participants treat only some aspects of
each other's behaviour as if it were deliberately intended to convey something.
In conversations it is usually called 'content of talk' that is created in this way,
not the manner of talk, and certainly not the bodily stagings and ecological
arrangements within which talk is carried on. However, it is not as if these other
aspects of the situation play no role in the structuring of the interaction. Far from
it. Their role is crucial to the whole way the event is organised. (Kendon 1988,
p. 23)
Thus, work is carried out in conversation that may not be explicitly identified as intentional
but still is crucial to the achievement of talk. The recognition of intent as a prerequisite of
understanding is not required either. But participants may treat talk as intended, and this
may involve reinterpretations. Giddens argues that:
Human action occurs as a duree, a continuous flow of conduct, as does
cognition. Purposive action is not composed of an aggregate or series of
separate intentions, reasons and motives.... Terms such as 'purpose' or
'intention' ....extricate human action from the contextuality of time-space....
'Action' is not a combination of 'acts': 'acts' are constituted only by a discursive
moment of attention to the duree of lived experience. Nor can 'action' be
discussed in separation from the body, its mediations with the surroundingworld
and the coherence of the acting self. (Giddens 1984, p. 3)
Thus discursive reasons are different from the routine rationalisation of conduct, ie. The
reasons actors offer discursively for what they do may diverge from the rationalisation of
action as actually involved in the stream of conduct of those actors." (Giddens 1984, p. 4)
3.2.3.3.3 Empirical Methodology
Because of CA's third tenet discussed above, the analysis of conversations is strongly
'data-driven'. CA painstakingly studies how talk is methodically produced by members in
orderly ways that exhibit that orderliness for one another. The methodology avoids the use
of interviewing techniques, the use of field notes or pre-coded schedules, the use of native
intuitions to invent examples, and the use of experimental manipulation or directing behaviour
which may restrict the range and authenticity of the activities which are elicited. Instead, the
interest is in revealing the
-76-
organised procedures of talk as they are employed in real worldly contexts
between persons in real relationships whose talk has a real consequentiality
and accountability. (Heritage 1989)
Some record of the phenomena is essential in order to study it in detail. However, the record
must be of the details that were meaningful for the participants, and constitutive of the
activities under investigation. CA has shown that audio and video tapings are adequate for
investigating conversation on the telephone and in copresence. A recording allows repeated
viewing of the event and consequently peer group ratification of a finding. Also, an
impressionistic transcription system has evolved, that is now quite complex (Jefferson 1989).
For example, details of overlapping speech, particular speech production characteristics like
pace and mid-phrase cutoffs, and split-second timings of pauses are notated. This renders
the talk 'strange' and thus can expose the everyday accomplishment that is taken-for-granted.
Analysis can then take two directions: a qualitative analysis of singular fragments in great
detail, or a distributional analysis of occurrences across many fragments of talk. A primary
resource for the analyst is that in next turns participants display public interpretations of the
current action for each other in the mutual construction of the intelligibility of the talk. Thus
a competent observer or analyst has 'visible' evidence for the in situ work by the participants
themselves constituting the sense of the talk. Instead of ascribing intent or structure on the
basis of 'what you would expect' or 'that is what I would intend', analyses can draw on the
treatments given in the talk itself. To reiterate a point made earlier, an intentional language
of description and an investigation of speaker purpose is avoided in the work of CA.
And, although a shorthand 'intentional' language is employed in these chapters,
theperspective focuses on the underlying structures informing the interpretation
and treatment of a speaker's action by a recipient and maintains, except in
specific cases, a relatively agnostic stance on the question of how far the
speaker consciously aimed at some particular interpretation. This agnosticism
is consistent with the proposal that the objects of study are institutionalised
structures of talk that are oriented to by speakers with varying degrees of
reflexive awareness. (Heritage & Atkinson 1984, p. 7)
The early interest of CA was in everyday mundane conversation, particularly on the
telephone, with a parallel interest in institutional talk in comparison to the general core findings
about multi-party conversations. Later, in the last ten years, research has gradually located
talk in the context of the body and other activities participants might be engaged in. This
research is still in its infancy but suggests that language, body and perception are intricately
interwoven in the interactive achievement and coordination of those practical activities
(Goodwin & Goodwin 1987).
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3.2.3.3.4 Mistaken Views from Other Perspectives
A range of criticisms have been made of CA, and especially of ethnomethodology. I will
examine a few of them to illustrate further some of the principles. It is often argued that CA
has some interesting findings but that they are not theoretically interesting and are
uninformative. For example, Power & Dal Martello (1986) and Brown & Yule (1983)
acknowledge the results - turn-taking and adjacency pair - but claim they are simple and
theoretically they contribute nothing to a understanding for the analyst of how conversational
function is systematically realised in linguistic form, eg. when an interrogative form might
serve as a question. This demonstrates a misunderstanding of CA. First, the findings of CA
may seem innocuous and uninteresting for theories concerned with power or ideology in
discourse, but the local organisation of action is not irrelevant for the constitution of social
structures. Second, theorising was initially abandoned by CA because of the proliferation of
ad hoc categories and unjustified speculations. By taking a naturalistic approach, regularities
and patterns that are not intuitive nor immediately apparent were revealed and built on. Third,
CA cannot say anything about a general set of rules for mapping form onto function because
it is a local and circumstantial matter in which conversational sequence is a crucial resource
(Sharrock & Anderson 1987)). Linguistic form is not to be neglected or forgotten in analysis,
as Schegloff (1979) demonstrates, but it cannot be addressed in terms of the traditional
'linguistic' methodology.
There are also problems in understanding fully the notion of 'adjacency'. It is not a claim that
all talk is to be interpreted only with respect to the adjacent placement of responses, or only
as the exchange of adjacency pairs. Schegloff (1988) argues that Goffman made this latter
mistake. Adjacency is a resource for finding the sense of contributions in conversational
interaction which does not have to be obeyed nor does it always have to be satisfied by
producing an adjacency pair. Another criticism from those concerned with computational and
procedural models is that CA does not provide an adequate detailed account of how
"coherence and sequential organisation in discourse is produced and understood" (Levinson
1983, p. 286). For example, language and conversation structure has become topical
recently. This movement has unfortunately been taken up by some disciplines as superficial
evidence for a structural, rule-governed model. Computational linguistics has found the
systematics of turn-taking and the organisation of repair problematic if a formal specification
for generation or categorisation is required. Again this is missing the point. CA findings are
not woolly because they do not specify the motivations ormechanisms for producing conduct.
That is not the aim of CA. The rules or structures found by CA are predicated on the situated
practices of engaging in conversation - they do not specify courses of action. They are used
by participants to interactively construct the sense of their actions as accountably engaged
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in conversation. There is a very real danger of reifying the findings and notions of CA. This
is similar to the Al conception of 'plan', which regards action as the execution of a program.
The regularities found in conversational action by CA, eg. the adjacency pair and insertion
sequence, are very easily made into rules for classifying or generating. However, they are
indeterminate, indexical and constituted within the practice of dialogue.
3.3 An Interactional Perspective
Conversation analysis provides a perspective on routine communicative action that is a valid
alternative to the cognitive theorising of computer models. It has been shown that talk is not
the exchange of messages between individual cognitive processors in which meaning is
grounded in a shared background knowledge. Rather, participants interactively and
methodically construct the sense and shape of their conversational activities in situ.
However, the term 'interaction analysis' is used for the rest of the thesis as CA has taken
conversation as its prime subject matter. This is done for two other reasons, too. First, it is
not the aim of the thesis to promote the conversational metaphor as a valid direction fordesign
or modelling. Instead, an understanding of the fundamental practices of achieving
coordination and intelligibility in any interactive dialogue activity is essential for the novel
design of artifacts. Second, concentrating on a conversational context may miss substantial
orders of detail that are unavailable to such an analysis, though reference to conversation is
essential as it is the most general and least specific language-based dialogue activity. The
primary focus here is on the interactional achievement of multi-party activities involving talk,
body and artifacts interleaved in time-space in which the production and interpretation of
those activities is a situated achievement. Dialogue is a collection of practices in which
participants are mutually engaged in coordinating their communicative actions and achieving
shared understanding. Cognition is relevant but an account of practical activities must
include interactivity as a constitutive domain.
From ethnomethodology, an interactional perspective must be empirical and elucidate
descriptions of the 'architecture' of interaction: the structural organisations
through which interactants collaborate and/or compete in the construction of
conjoint courses of action. (Heritage 1984, p 18)
The intention of Chapter 6 is to locate some of the findings of the empirical interaction analysis
in terms of the design of dialogue artifacts. The following quotation from the domain of
improvised music indicates that the metaphor of 'ensemble' is more appropriate than that of
'interchange' for future conceptions of artifacts designed as partners.
8KN - (B-12)/R10 has been designed to provide a challenging context for
expanded participation. Each instrumentalist in the work can contribute to the
-79-
actual moment construction of its creative material as well as its infrastructure
materials. (Anthony Braxton, Composition Notebook - Vol. 1)
One of the first to entertain a CA perspective on artifact design can be found in Schegloff
(1980). He briefly summarises CA's findings about the nature of talk and gives a brief
indication of the extent of the problems to be faced if a conversing machine is to be built.
McTear (1985, p. 121) presents a more developed consideration of the applicability of CA
methods and findings to human-computer interaction and Al. He claims there are hints of
the possibility of developing more formal representations of "the rules which underlie the
organisation of conversation." To substantiate this from within the field of CA he quotes
Schegloff et al (1978, p. 362, fn.5): "As in the organisation of turn-taking, the gross factswhich
characterise large amounts of conversational data are the product of rules, and systems of
rules, which operate on particular sequential environments." Sacks (1984, p. 26) similarly
states that the aim of CA is to "transform... our view of 'what happened', from a matter of a
particular interaction done by particular people, to a matter of interaction as products of a
machinery." Also, McTear discusses the differences and similarities between the
organisation of human-computer interaction and human conversation, pointing out how the
findings of CA can help inform the design of 'gracefully-degrading' language-based systems
that inevitably breakdown in use, and that CA could be very fruitful in understanding the nature
of human-computer interaction (HCI) through empirical analysis of protocols of simulated and
real HCI. Also, Mcllvenny (1985) suggests that the methods and findings of CA should be
useful for the design and evaluation of advice-giving dialogue systems, based on the results
of a pilot study of advice in restricted circumstances using CAmethods and an implementation
of a simple dialogue interface based on the findings of CA.
Research has begun in a number of areas concerning the same issues. As mentioned earlier,
Suchman (1987) investigated participants' use of a photocopier expert system as they tried
complete a number of tasks. Attention is paid to the user's talk and sequential details of the
use of the machine which are in the style of conversation analysis. The COSMOS (1988)
project contains research that has used insights in conversation analysis to understand the
fundamental problems occurring for participants using asynchronous computer-mediated
communications, particularly conferencing or e-mail facilities. In addition, Frohlich & Luff
(1989) report the design of an advice system that incorporates findings from CA in the design
of the opportunities for machine and user participation in an interaction between the general
public and an expert advisor in the domain of social security; Agre & Chapman (1989) have
applied the insights of Suchman, with regard to the nature of plans, to the design of automata
that do not plan their actions in their practical activity; and Cooper (1989) develops an
ethnomethodological approach to the contextual and culturally embedded work of using a
standard graphics-based microcomputer.
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3.3.1 Empiricism, Situated Dialogue and Artifacts
Three issues were put forward at the beginning of this chapter, derived from the critique of
computermodels of dialogue, that needed clarification in orderto provide a basis for attacking
the problematic conception of dialogue in models and artifacts. The chapter has developed
approaches to these issues that are summarised below.
First, a perspective on communicative action and practice for models and artifacts is provided
by social science in the form of ethnomethodology. It delivers a foundation for explaining
some of the problems that artificial intelligence and cognitive science has in dealing with
practical action and activity. It is not denied that a vocabulary of plan, intention or motive is
a part of everyday praxis; on the contrary. It can be argued, however, that vocabularies are
not generative of nor underlying explanations of conduct - just emergent from and useful in
action in an unscheduled world of multiple constraints and indeterminacies.
A basic research goal for studies of situated action... is to explicate the
relationship between structures of action and the resources and constraints
afforded by physical and social circumstances. (Suchman 1987, p. 179)
Unfortunately for models of dialogue, the tendency has been to over-extrapolate the relation
of this vocabulary to action itself and develop a logic of planned action and communication.
For 'intelligent' artifact design this has meant the unappealing prospect of determining the
plans, beliefs, etc. of a human user 'in the moment' from highly limited and predetermined
resources. An alternative, rich source of constraints or possibilities becomes apparent if one
only looks at situated action itself, giving an alternative vocabulary and method that can guide
the design of interactionally dynamic artifacts and entities.
Second, a perspective on the dialogue artifact is supplied both by ethnomethodology and
hermeneutics. It is not an intelligent agent that conducts conversations with people, but a
social, reactive object produced for human consumption - an artifact - that is constituted or
grounded through the metaphor of dialogue, and thus can be called interactive. It can be
called language-using, distinguishing it from texts, because of the properties of language
form in reaction, lack of a visible author and complexity of behaviour.
Third, an empirical methodology is derived from CA. It studies human conversational talk
focusing attention on the situated details of human, and by extension to human-computer
dialogue. The careful observation, collection, recording and analysis of the details of
interaction that can be seen to be important in the achievement of that activity for the
participants themselves is elaborated in Chapter 4.
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3.3.2 Aims, Methods and Tools
The aim here is to explore the dynamics of communicative 'dialogue' interaction by means
of interaction analysis. A study of dialogue 'through' machines was conducted to show that
Grosz & Sidner's (1986) theory is unavoidably misrepresenting crucial aspects of dialogue;
it was similar to the study which was the source of their own data. The possibility of using
these findings to enhance computer models is discussed later in Chapter 7 but this is not a
primary goal of the thesis. The analysis of the achievement of computer-mediated dialogue
provides material for recommendations about the design and evaluation of dialogue artifacts.
This is because the investigation explores the use of data collection and transcription
methods for complex dialogue spaces mediated by machine that are similar to envisaged
human-machine interfaces. The methods of interaction analysis applicable to the study are
derived from CA with the aim of examining instances of conduct carefully to determine their
local, methodical production by the participants themselves. The collection of repeatably
observable records of events or conduct with attention to emergent sequential and
interactional characteristics of the achieved dialogue was undertaken. The main aim of the
investigation was to clarify the notion of interactivity in communicative interaction and to pin
down and describe some of the dynamics of embodied human communicative action. The
basic tools required for the study are the camera, microphone, monitor and the recorder.
Video and audio recording are immensely useful for an observer's analysis of accountable
conduct that otherwise cannot be studied because of the temporally detailed, 'tacit' and
'unrecognised' nature of that conduct. Also, a novel notation system has been developed




AN AUDIO-VISUAL STUDY OF
COMPUTER-MEDIATED DIALOGUE
4.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces an empirical perspective. An investigation of dialogue 'through' the
machine - or computer-mediated communication (CMC) - was conducted, and there follows
a broad introduction to the study in order to map out its basic constituents. From the
arguments in the last chapter, what is needed is an empirical and descriptive approach to
the study of human action and discourse. In the rest of the thesis, such a methodology will
be used to reveal some of the contingent and situated aspects of human dialogic interaction,
and to give a perspective on machines that are to take part in activities such as communication
and interaction with human users.
The two basic points made in Chapter 2 were as follows. First, it was argued that
computational approaches to dialogue take a particularly weak view of interaction, and
disregard the situated character of human conduct in order to make general and abstract
claims about discourse. Second, it was suggested that if such a proposed narrow perspective
on dialogue is adopted, whether to simplify the data or to focus on the design of interactive
artifacts, such as natural language interfaces, then crucial features are ignored, which leads
to an abstract and ad hoc theory of dialogue and interaction. So, to counter this tendency
an empirical study of human dialogue 'through' machines was initiated in order to take a
closer look at the nature of dialogic interaction. The study examined the achievement of
dialogue between people when it is mediated through the use of the computer. Most
everyday interaction takes place in face-to-face encounters in which the body plays a crucial
role. Other dialogues are undertaken, for example, on the telephone or in the form of
correspondence or texts. Flowever, the computer can be used as a mediating technology
that allows for dialogues to take place in real-time or contexts of presence that are markedly
different from conversation and correspondence. So, rather than investigate asynchronous
electronic mail, which is rather similar in many respects to correspondence, we will examine
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a synchronous CMC that allows people who are spatially but not temporally distant to take
part in dialogue even though they may be a hundred miles from each other. The particular
CMC used is a relatively old example of collaborative technology that is widespread in a
similar form on many multiuser mainframe computer systems supporting a large community.
It allows spatially separate userswho are connected by the same computer to construct typed
'messages' on a shared virtual screen supported by each monitor, ie. I see what you do and
vice versa or 'what you see is what I see' (WYSIWIS).
The initial motivation for the study was to look at a CMC that is similar to the dialogue
modalities envisaged as feasible or suitable in human-computer interaction (HCI) and artificial
intelligence (Al). McTear (1987) claims that the study of modalities of communication and
the simulating of interfaces are useful research directions for Al and HCI that can also inform
the study of human conduct. In this case, Grosz & Sidner's empirical methodology is shown
to be deficient, and the situated, embodied local achievement of dialogue turns out to be
crucially important. For unfamiliar and odd dialogue modalities that are bound to develop
unintuitive interactional dynamics in situ, Grosz & Sidner's model is hard to apply because
almost no account is taken of circumstantial and interactional features of the production of
dialogue. Our central interest is in how dialogue is achieved between participants who can
engage in synchronous mutual dialogue activity within the constraints of the modality. Since
the complexities of everyday conversation have been documented in different ways by
conversation analysis, it seemed more useful to investigate communication between human
beings 'through' the computer. This particular mode of communication is introduced because
it is generally available for human user consumption and is used by some sectors of the
computer-using community. Moreover, it has its own peculiar emergent dynamics and
characteristics - shown in pilot observations and recordings - and the disruptions caused by
a lack of resources or the strange circumstances highlight routine features of interactivity,
since the disturbances and breakdowns to the normal flow require local mutual adjustments
on the part of the participants in order to achieve 'sense'.
In parallel, an investigation of copresent collaboration is developed. The motivation for this
step that is documented in Chapter 6 is to draw upon two contrasting communicative
activities: the visual-based virtual CMC dialogue and the copresent dialogue over the
workspace. Because technology, representational devices and artifacts are an integral part
of our everyday practical life and work, an understanding of talk not just as conversation but
endogenous to practical activities is essential. Talk takes place in the context of other
activities and practices, and is organised in and through those activities as an integral part
of them. In addition, as will be argued in Chapter 6, the primacy of the model of copresent
conversation for the design of dialogue artifacts and spaces must be challenged, and this
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challenge requires us to understand how interaction, dialogue and embodied activity shape
each other.
For various reasons the study was conducted in an experimental context that diverges from
the primary work in conversation analysis. Participants were instructed in a simple task
requiring everyday practical reasoning in order to plan routes with the help of maps. For
successful orientation, the participants had to cooperate through dialogue. In order to gain
access to some of the work in achieving dialogue and the task, a technique for the elicitation
of collaborative activity - not only verbal reports - was used. Also known as 'constructive
interaction', the technique requires that two co-participants collaborate in an activity they
could both do on their own. In the course of engaging in the activity they display, in their
actions and talk, interesting accounts of their own and the other's behaviour, which is
available to an observer or analyst as well. Specifically, two subjects are required to
communicate through the modality with two other subjects, and thus each pair display
accounts in their talk of the sense of the dialogue in progress between the pairs. In addition,
the study investigates whether CA methods can be applied to an unusual communicative
activity. Techniques of observation and description had to be developed, including video and
audio recording and a type of transcription that would record the participant's 'observable'
practices, making them available for repeated inspection. Features of vocal, gestural, gaze
and CMC activity were transcribed using a set of notation conventions derived from CA, but
a quite different and complex record structure was used in which streams of conduct are
rendered in relation to the CMC activity. As the modality has features that resemble the
human-computer environment, transfer of interactional analytic methods to that domain is a
possibility entertained in Chapter 6.
4.2 Related Research
Before describing in detail the principles and procedures used in the study, a survey of related
research is necessary. This will be grouped under headings that reflect the different aspects
of the study: modalities of participation and interaction and their effects on communication:
similar studies of computer-mediated communication: constructive interaction techniques:
instruction and task-oriented activities: maps as representational resources, and
route-finding.
4.2.1 Modality
The term 'modality' or 'mode' when applied to communication is a description of the
constraints, conventions and resources that participants have at their disposal and use to
construct their communicative activity. This is different from the concept of 'medium' which
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is traditionally used to describe the qualities of the expression of communication, eg. speech.
The modalities of writing and talking have long since been recognised as distinctly different
modalities of communicative activity, but the range of distinctive modalities besides these
two and how they are achieved has only been of recent interest. Several studies of modalities
similar to the CMC used in the study have been reported. Reflections on the relative power
of writing and talking have been the preoccupation of generations but this surveywill only go
back as far as studies of modalities that relate to computer-mediated communication.
Chapanis et al (1972,1977) report a broad psychological study of problem solving among
subjects communicating through a restricted modality in order to solve the set problem. The
modalities studied were a simple Teletype interchange, handwriting, voice, and face-to-face.
Statistical measures of time to complete a problem, number of words used, etc. were the
basis for conclusions about the gross effects of the modality on behaviour and language.
Also, conclusions were made about the relative performance of the modalities for solving the
tasks. Chapanis (1981) adds other modalities: the telepen shared graphic screen for drawing
and writing, and the video link. Also, the influence of technology on communication practices
was now explicitly recognised in the statement about discovering "how interactive human
communication is affected by the machine devices and systems through which people
converse." (p. 66) However, in all the studies only simple records or reduced scripts of the
communicative problem solving activity through the modality were kept. Only the products
of a communicative activity were used as evidence, so the circumstantial production of that
activity is lost. For example, only the Teletype output was kept, or a word-based script of the
telephone dialogue was transcribed much like a text of an interview for a magazine article.
Similar practices have been shown in Chapter 3 with respect to Grosz & Sidner's empirical
methodology.
Burke (1982) reports a similar study that looks at face-to-face, telephone, audio-letter, and
handwritten message modalities used by subjects to cooperatively solve a problem. He takes
a more promising 'constructive-interactional perspective' in which communication is an
interactional process of coordination organised by communication intentions. However, the
theory is weakened by the lack of attention to the empirical details, a reliance on intention,
and the quantitative statistical analysis of coded transcripts. In spite of this, he does note an
interesting phenomenon also documented later in this thesis, namely 'self-transcription'. That
is, participants in the handwriting mode must render their thoughts and construct a
communicative message using graphic symbols. This is in some ways a similar activity to
what the transcriptionist is engaged in when rendering the speech of conversants. Grosz
(1977) also reports experiments involving restricted modalities conducted as part of a
research project. Grosz & Sidner's task dialogue example discussed in Chapter 2 was drawn
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from this corpus of Grosz's, and the chapter described the odd restricted modalities in order
to demonstrate the weakness of their data. Basically, the dialogue between the apprentice
and the expert was really mediated through another 'message-passing' human intermediary,
so they did not have a common modality: the apprentice communicated using the telephone
modality and the expert using the Teletype modality. Additionally, for some dialogues the
participants had limited mutual visual access because the expert could request snap-shot
pictures of the problem-solving space.
Cohen (1984) brings together the two strands of work that focus on task-oriented dialogue
and modalities to look at the pragmatics of reference. The modalities reported to have been
empirically collected are the non-interactive written and audiotape, and the interactive
face-to-face, telephone and keyboard, though the work reported in the paper concentrates
on the latter two. However, the exact nature of the keyboard mode is ambiguous: the
comment that "simultaneous typing was possible and did occur" and the "subjects were
informed that their typing would not appear simultaneously on either terminal" obscures what
is going on. The analysis invokesa traditional plan-based speech act approach to generating
the coded acts - basically requests and informs - that have strict theoretical definitions.
Unfortunately Cohen does not consider the full circumstances of communication to be
important for his concerns, so he only records a 'script' - a residue of what was typed - of the
keyboard interaction, and transcribes simply the utterances or 'word and sentence speech'
of the telephone dialogues. There are a number of insightful comments though. He warns
that the results and theory from this particular experiment should not be generalised to human
talk and discourse for the following reasons:
* The task studied means that only physically present objects are talked about.
* The telephone and keyboard modalities do not accurately reflect all natural
language communication between a person and a machine.
* It is difficult to transfer results from conversation between humans to HCI
interface - for example, indirection may not be common in future
speech-language systems as it is in human talk.
He notes in conclusion that, although most corpora in computational linguistics have been of
dialogues conducted in keyboard modalities, his experiments demonstrate that keyboard
communication is distinctly different in structure from telephone and written communication.
"We should thus bewary about theories' and techniques' coverage if they are to [be] extended
to other modalities of communication." (p. 123)
Oviatt & Cohen (1989), looking closely at the differences between spoken communication
and written modalities, renew Cohen's warning about which models of dialogue are
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appropriate for the design of computer dialogue systems. Spoken dialogue is delivered more
rapidly, tends to be less planned, less concise, less complex, less well integrated
syntactically, fewer abstract ideas, shorter and less varied vocabulary, more pauses and
disfluencies, more hedges, quantifiers and function words, more self-reference and
pronouns, more requests for confirmation, more repetition, more noun phrase reductions with
repeated reference, more indirection, a more fine-grained decomposition of requests, and
more metacomments (Oviatt 1988, p. 44). Also, an important distinction among speech
modalities is interactivity. By noting the differences that manifest themselves because of the
interactive nature of most speech they argue that spoken monologue should be taken as the
model for building the next stage of speech dialogue artifacts. This is a commendable effort
to refocus design on the problems envisaged because of interactive circumstances but diverts
attention to the speaker and the abstract formulation of speech that has been argued against
in Chapters 2 and 3.
Ail of the empirical studies of modalities of communication have focused on the traditional
notion of communication between the participants, ie. they regard adequate data to be a
sedimented script or record of certain aspects that the analysts interpret as being
communicatively relevant and available to both participants. So, parcels of words and
decontextualised message units are the basic units of communication that must be
documented, if at all. The study in this thesis aims to show that this focus loses the situated
character of production and interpretation and leads to a weak and one-sided view of
interaction and dialogue. For example, an interesting study is reported in Suchman (1988)
that concerns face-to-face whiteboard practice - a large white board on which people can
write and draw with coloured pens - in research settings. Unlike the modalities described
above, the whiteboard is not a distinctive 'talk' modality but an extra, parallel, optional space
for writing and drawing relevant to the scientific activity in progress. However, this study is
relevant as ethnomethodological techniques are used. Audio-visual recordings are made of
work on a whiteboard and the analysis focuses on The organisation of activities that produce
marks on the whiteboard and gave them their significance, and the function of the marks in
the structure of the activity." (p. 318) In this case, Suchman has the distinct advantage of
being able to analyse the talk that emerged directly from the joint work of the participants on
the whiteboard. Thus the abstract 'script' or record of the joint activity on the whiteboard -




No studies of the same computer-mediated communication1 modality using a similar method
to that reported here have been found. But studies of different aspects of similar synchronous
modalities are available. The closest is that of Daly et al (1989), who report an experimental
investigation of communication between two subjects using a similar modality to strike up a
casual conversation. Another study, Kiesler et al (1985), has investigated affect, from a
social-psychological perspective, in a similar modality comparing it with face-to-face
communication in an experimental setting. This study is rather different from others in that
quantitative measures are taken of subjective affect and expressive behaviour in order to test
the hypothesis that restricted modalities depersonalise communication. Again, as in the last
section, only scripts of the computer-mediated dialogue were retained for inspection, and
additionally theywere reformatted to make them indistinguishable from the verbal transcripts
of the face-to-face talk so that they could be used in a further "unbiased" coding stage. Also,
Kennedy et al (1988) report an experimental study of a simulated expert system that uses a
similar but more restricted modality for communications between the subject and the
simulator.
Studies have also been made of asynchronous modalities like electronic mail, which is in
prolific use in the academic community. Black et al (1983) note the interesting phenomenon
of multiple threads of topic in electronic mail that is similar in nature to the double dialogues
in the CMC modality analysed in Chapter 5. For instance, regularly in the exchange of
electronic mail messages participants develop multiple topics in the same message that are
available for responding to in the reply, ie. much like letter correspondence. A brief look at
scripts of authentic dialogues between users and operators of a synchronous CMC showed
that such a phenomenon is not routine in more interactive real-time dialogues, though the
development of multiple topics over a period of time is normal. This point does, however,
indicate the need to rethink the common assumption of strict adjacency in dialogue: that is,
the idea that participants construct dialogue as a linear stream in which a turn sequentially
implies only one adjacent response and only addresses one adjacent aspect of the prior
dialogue.
The only study taking a conversation analytic perspective on the nature of computer-mediated
dialogue is that reported in COSMOS (1988) - a report of a project on asynchronous message
1 Bannon (1986) contains a discussion of the different forms of computer-mediated
communication.
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passing systems, eg. for computer conferencing. The concept of adjacency in CA and an
analysis of the temporal dynamics of message transmission, reception and response are
used to demonstrate the faults with a speech act model, and the peculiar properties of
electronic mail that lead to breakdown.
4.2.3 Constructive Interaction: An Analyst's Resource
The methodology for the audio-visual study reported in the thesis uses the accounting
practices of talk as an analytic resource for locating just how communication is achieved in
the modality. Two people constructively collaborate on achieving intelligible communication
through the computer with another person and thus display to each other in their talk and
activities the sense of the ongoing dialogue. The method closest to that used here is found
in Miyake (1986) who used 'constructive interaction' (a method of eliciting talk between
participants collaborating on a task) to locate how people come to understand a complex
physical device, eg. a sewing machine. Audio-visual techniques were used to record two
subjects talking in activity. O'Malley et al (1985), drawing on Miyake's work, also recommend
it for evaluation in human-computer interaction.
Daly et al (1989) report an experimental psychological study of cognition in
computer-mediated communication dialogues between strangers. They used a protocol
generation technique in which subjects talk aloud while engaged in their activity. (See
Ericsson & Simon (1984) on verbal reports as data in psychological research.) Video and
audio recordings were made because they recognised the importance for the analysis of
placing a given comment in relation to the ongoing dialogue activity. However, the method
is subject to the objections that the participants' reflective comments on their activities
prompted by the experimenter bear no necessary relation to the internal accountability of the
activities (nor tacit internal processes), and the presence of the experimenter is an external
interference. Moreover, the achievement of communication in and through the modality is
taken for granted, whereas in this thesis the achievement is made the object of study.
The work of Suchman has already been described in Chapter 3, but her empirical
methodology has not been explained. Let us consider the following example of her approach
to understanding the use of intelligent artifacts such as expert systems. She studied people
using a photocopier help system in which a rule-based 'expert-system' with a simple textual
and graphic screen display was triggered by certain physical actions of the user or machine.
The initial aim was to find out why naive users found the help system confusing, when it
seemed quite straightforward to the designers. Videos were made of pairs of first-time users
using the photocopier to complete some tasks predesigned on the basis of earlier pilot
studies. A corpus of four sessions each lasting one and a half to two hours was collected
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arid transcribed, to show the differential access that the machine and the user have to the
circumstances of interaction. By using two users, 'constructive interaction' protocols are
generated that expose some of the work done in order to complete the tasks set by using the
interface. Video technology was used to capture some of the bodily work of collaboration
and device use. Suchman's research is one of the first to apply the insights of
ethnomethodology and CA to the interface.
4.2.4 Task Dialogues and Instruction
Because of the experimental context of the study some motivation was needed for
participants to engage in dialogue through the computer. A task was chosen that required
participants to cooperatively construct a shared route through a city using a map as a
resource. Task-oriented dialogues have been the focus for a number of investigations. In
Chapanis (1972,1977), subjects had to solve one of two problems. One was a geographical
orientation problem involving cooperation in finding an address given that a map had been
given to one participant and a telephone number book to the other. The other was an
equipment assembly problem in which one participant is given the parts to be assembled and
the other the instructions; togethertheymust cooperatively communicate in order to construct
the object. Deutsch (1974) and Grosz (1977) report the work around the SRI project on the
toolkit workstation that looked at task-oriented dialogues. The task under study - the toy water
pump assembly - became a standard for many future studies, such as Burke (1982) and
Cohen (1984). In Burke(1982), the participants had again to cooperate in constructing the
toy water pump, but the problem-solving tasks were variations on a theme: a single subject
with no instructions; two subjects collaborating with no instructions; two subjects with only
assembly-sequence cues; two subjects with only spatial cues.
Not mentioned so far is Bateman's work on discourse resources for achieving mutual
intelligibility in a game (Bateman 1986). It is based on the maze game reported in Anderson
(1983) and Anderson & Garrod (1987). The design of the computer-generated game was
such that cooperation and mutual orientation were essential for the successful completion of
the game. Participants were in separate rooms with only an audio link with which to
communicate about what moves to make in the game. The display was designed such that
information necessary for moving in the maze was only available from the other subject, but
with an added twist - a move would effect the possibilities for the other to move. Audio
recordings were made and game states automatically recorded by the computer. The main
relevance of his work is to look at linguistic form and discourse functions in the achievement
and management of a 'world-in-common' for all practical purposes.
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4.2.5 Maps and Direction-Giving
Because it was decided that representational maps were to be used as the interpretative
resource for constructing a shared planned route, the work of ethnomethodologists on such
practical matters should be noted. Psathas has studied direction maps and direction-giving
in a variety of settings. The earliest paper, Psathas & Kozloff (1974), looked at the structure
of directions in telephone dialogues given in order that the caller could get to the other's
location. They are interested in what the basic elements of directions are that give them their
sense, ie. how are they seen to be adequate. The work in Psathas (1986a, 1986b) continues
looking at telephone directions, but this time, in terms of their sequential organisation. His
main finding is that the sequential nature of talk is a resource for organising the sequence of
operations seen as describing movement to a destination, ie. directions to a place are a local
interactive achievement through talk. His interest in these papers is in how possible
relationships in space and time can be interpreted from the interaction, rather than the
correspondence between the relationships described and those in the 'real world'. In a
slightly different vein, similarto Suchman (1988), Psathas (1979) analyses graphic direction
maps written for an absent other so that they may find their way to a particular place familiar
to the author - namely, home. Here, the question is: how do the practically organised set of
features produce the sensible quality of their being 'maps' for locating a place? The emphasis
is on the direction map as a potentially usable map, not in how it is used to actually get to the
place. They can be examined "to discover the methods of practical reasoning which their
users depend upon to make what they say understandable." (ibid, p. 203) In the study here,
participants must construct sensible routes through a city with only a graphic representation
of that city. Because the participants have different maps, discrepancies in their details
expose the maps as contingent representations of a physical city space that require local and
interactional interpretation. However, an investigation of how the sense of the maps is locally
achieved is not the focus of the thesis.
4.3 Principles
The work is part of a program of work undertaken... to explore the possibility of
achieving a naturalistic observational discipline that could deal with the details
of social action(s) rigourously, empirically, and formally.... Our analysis has
sought to explicate the ways in which the materials (records of natural
conversations) are produced by members in orderly ways that exhibit their
orderliness and have their orderliness appreciated and used, and have that
appreciation displayed and treated as the basis for subsequent action.
(Schegloff & Sacks 1973, p. 289)
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As the thesis reports an interactional perspective on computer mediation, models and
artifacts, derived from conversation analysis, and as CA takes a primarily naturalistic
empirical stance, this section will describe the principles underlying the empirical study
conducted. Before this can be done, however, it must be noted that even though there are
a range of procedures available from CA and ethnography, it has not as yet been established
whether principles of the study of everyday human talk may transfer generally and
successfully to the study of machine-based transformations of dialogue activity2. One
principle of work in ethnomethodology is to investigate the intrinsic taken-for-granted
character of a practice, but Heritage (1984, p. 302) notes that "there are scarcely any
straightforward methodological pathways which presently inform the descriptive enterprise."
Since there are no stock methods which will apply to an investigation of a particular activity,
the study - finding out how intelligible dialogue was achieved as a practical accomplishment
by those engaged - borrowed some basic principles from the study of conversational talk,
but also developed methods appropriate for the task in hand that deviated from CA practice.
First of all let us look at the similarities to and differences from standard CA practice.
Livingston (1987, p. 10) has stated that ethnomethodology is interested in instances of
naturally organised everyday activities, ie. that "the activities under investigation are ordinary,
that they are organised, and that organisation is natural in the sense that it is part and parcel
of the activity itself." This perspective has distinctively defined the field and focused its
research to exclusive domains that are penetrable without flouting this principle. In particular,
CA has mainly studied everyday casual conversation in marked contrast to other fields
studying language use. Heritage & Atkinson (1984, pp. 2-5) illustrate what the empirical
stance entails by considering the traditional alternatives. These include the use of interviews
and questionnaires in order to discover the participants' views of the conduct they have been
engaged in. Such interviews and questionnaires are excluded, because they bear no
accurate relation to actual conduct. Participation in an interaction by an experimenter, who
may take notes, is also excluded as a means of gaining access to the interpretative practices
of a group. To gain records or evidence of language use CA particularly excludes
introspection and made up examples. Also excluded is apparently unbiased coding by the
analyst or by a paid coder using pre-established coding schemes, because the latter may
exclude interpretations that may develop during analysis and the schemes are almost
impossible to apply consistently. All of the above are excluded from the study here so as to
2 Nor has it been established up to now whether this is also the case for analysing user's activity
in and through dialogue artifacts.
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analyse the natural history of observable phenomena by a competent member researcher:
this is a foundational principle of CA research.
One further consequence of the principle is that experimental settings are considered
inappropriate when the aim is to investigate without bias naturally occurring conduct in real
practical settings. However, an experimental setting is used in the empirical study in the
sense that the task is constructed and subjects are elicited to take part. The aim of the study
is to explore the issues that arise in the course of researching modalities of communication,
when it is difficult to study 'natural' use of that modality. What it means is that one has to be
very cautious about using the methodology and claims of CAor ethnomethodology, especially
as they have always been very careful about the authority and generality of their claims in
relation to their 'objects' of study. But, Garfinkel (1967) reports studies of the normative
nature of human conduct that use experimental methods to elicit evidence for the
documentary methods, eg. subjects were required to take part in an advisory encounter in
which only 'yes' or 'no' answers were given to the subjects' requests for advice. In addition,
a protocol generation technique was used to elicit the subject's interpretative orientation to
the advisor's responses. Also, Suchman's study of the situated use of a plan-based
photocopy help system was carried out in an experimental context. Observations led to the
design of a set of tasks to be carried out by pairs of subjects as if theywere naturally occurring
(Suchman 1987).
It may have been possible to investigate computer-mediated facilities, eg. electronic mail or
the same CMC, in everyday practice. But co-participant protocols, which give some analytic
access to the chronic process of production of the interaction or interchange, are not usually
an integral part of the everyday performance. Also, for the CMC studied, it would be difficult
to access the temporal flow of communication without disturbing the setting and interaction.
For example, to trace and record the physical events in the interface that are significant for
the participants or forthe machine requires tampering with the resident equipment or software
that may effect the operation of the equipment or damage it. Equally, to video the encounter,
if it is appropriate to use such a technique at all, may be impossible because of distributed,
non-localised, and unpredictable engagements3. Instead the study developed as a sort of
uncontrolled investigation in which specific objectives were not designed so that as many
3 The study is rather different from one that might intend to video telephone users in their
separate locations to determine if their actions 'off stage' were immediately relevant to their
mutual conversation on the telephone. Here the conduct 'off stage' from the CMC is rich and
crucial for the achievement of dialogue in the CMC modality. It is not immediately relevant as
such to the mutual dialogue, but it displays the work of constructing and interpreting the
developing dialogue for that party.
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lines of interest were kept open. Different types of modality data were collected and as much
of the events recorded as possible in order to extract or 'find' interesting material during the
transcription and analysis. Also, after clarification of the task instructions the experimenter
did not tamper or interfere with the setting.
The study excludes from its methodology most of what CA regards as problematic in the
study of human social conduct, but does take an experimental perspective in order to examine
closely the activities of communication in the CMC. Of course experimental effects were
apparent. This was shown in the subject's orientation to environmental events: ignoring of
telephone ringing, noticeboard distraction, and noticing of camera. However, the same is
true for recording of naturally occurring events, eg. Heath (1986, p. 11-13) presents an
analysis of a patient's orientation to the camera.
Another principle is to found an analysis on 'emic' data, ie. phenomena, resources,
understandings, etc. that are an implicit part of the participant's 'work' in producing the
conduct. That is, they are not only an insider's interpretation or recollection after the event,
but endogenous to the conduct being investigated4. To expose some of the work done by
participants in interpreting and making sense of the interaction in the CMC, a method of
protocol generation is supported. The generation of verbal accounts is clearly an integral
part of some settings - where the need for talk in the setting is essential for the achievement
of the circumstantial work. However, in this case not only is the setting artificial in two senses
- being neither a 'real' issue nor necessarily a 'real' task that would be routinely accomplished
in the ways outlined - but in addition the number of participants is determined by the purposes
of the experiment. Basically, two co-participants do the work of the solitary communicator.
This situation is not normal, but on the other hand it is not untypical, as people sometimes
do this in real situations of use. This method has two aims: the talk of coparticipants reveals
constitutive practices as they work on the task in and through the CMC modality: and the
collaborative activity of the coparticipants reveals rich and complex dimensions of interactivity
in copresent problem-solving.
One essential source of 'emic' data, an analyst's resource, that has informed CA work and
is still available in this modality is the displays of adjacent interpretation both in the CMC and
coparticipants talk:
...just as a second speaker's analysis and treatment of the prior is available to
the first speaker, so it is also available to overhearers of the talk, including social
scientists. The latter may thus proceed to analyse turns at talk, together with
4 Within linguistics research the concept of 'emic' data is contrasted with 'etic' data that denotes
the extrinsic analyst's constructions that are not available to the participants in that conduct.
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the analyses and treatments of them that are produced by the parties to the talk,
and employ methodologies that fully take account of these analyses and
treatments. Students of talk are thus provided with a considerable advantage
that is unavailable to analysts of isolated sentences or other 'text'materials that
cannot be analysed without hypothesizing or speculating about the possible
ways in which utterances, sentences, or texts might be interpreted. (Heritage &
Atkinson 1984, p. 9)
However, there is a bias in using this resource that excludes consideration of the displays
that a piece of talk activity gets while in progress. Goodwin & Goodwin (1987, p. 4) argue
that "the treatment that a bit of talk gets in a next utterance may be quite different from the
way in which itwas a heard and dealt with as itwas spoken." This is a demonstrably pervasive
phenomenon in the CMC because of the extended temporal development of turns that allows
treatment of the 'talk' in progress. Also, this point will be taken up in Chapter 6 concerning
the achievement of simultaneous actions and concurrent activities.
Another principle that is crucial to the descriptive enterprise is that the details of interaction
cannot be disregarded or taken for granted; an analyst must have an open mind (Heritage
1989). In the study, multiple and interleaved streams of conduct are relevant in simultaneous
and reciprocal activities, eg. vocal talk, body and gesture, artifact use, and map reading. In
order to capture the 'visible' accountability of these activities, and the routine process of
monitored production, audio-visual recording technologies were used. Thus, 'observable'
events are made available for detailed examination and review. This method is preferable
to note-taking or participant observation because of the limitations of memory and the
constraints of watching and documenting multiple activities in real-time, even with multiple
observers. However, recording does pose its own problems. For example, the presence of
camera and associated technology is not to be disregarded as an effect on the participants'
conduct. However, for ethical reasons the apparatus and the intentions of the experimenter
were disclosed as subjects were informed of the purpose of the experiment and the reasons
for and future uses of the recording.
A perspective on the copresent interaction of co-participants emerged from the transcription
of details found in a strip of conduct. However, as mentioned above, rendering is not as
straightforward as it may seem, especially when investigating a new activity. Decisions need
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to be made about the means of representation that do justice to the phenomena. The CMC
has important characteristics similar to those in conversational activity, eg. pseudo-speech
stream, thus methods can be derived from those used in the study of conversation, though
the relationship between the work in the modality and copresent activity is problematic5. The
transcriptions were not made in the form of an abstract script of the inscriptions produced in
the modality, but were under continuous and increasingly detailed development in order to
be faithful to what was accountably 'real' for the co-participants and participants.
Predominantly, the CA transcription notation is used for talk, so the principle of impressionistic
rendering is adopted (Jefferson 1989). Additionally, a system for notating gaze and gesture
is developed similar to that described in Heath (1986) and Goodwin (1981). Other aspects
of the notation and records were developed independently in the context of rendering this
particular activity, eg. notating the screen activity, and the graphic notation of simultaneous
activities based around the temporal evolution of computer-mediated communication. The
data corpus itself is unfinished; it is not coded but open for retranscription or reinterpretation
because a record of transcription is not definitive. The analysis proceeded through inductive
cycles of transcription, analysis and retranscription according to the emergence of interesting
phenomena that needed closer inspection.
It is relevant at this point to note just what the status of the data is in the analysis. Sharrock
& Anderson (1986) argue that the data is not the representations but the common-sense
understandings and interpretative practices of people, and thus "objectifications in the form
of tapes, etc. are useful in enabling us to become aware of and to articulate assumptions,
thoughtless interpretative practices and so on." (p. 111) Because of this, Carter & Anderson
(1989) warn of the unreflective analysis of audio-visual recordings that regards the detail of
the recording as revealing the same order in the actual phenomena. It needs to be shown
that the features identified from audio-visual analysis are relevant to the conduct, and that
5 For other types of modalities or HCI in general, how orientable events or actions should be
represented and how relationships between them should be made explicit is not at all clear,
and has almost no precedent in research investigations. It will be necessary to also include
machine states or design motivations/descriptions. However, it is much harder to claim that
the activity of the user with the machine makes available a display of interpretations when
much of the user's actions are not involved in the mutual construction of intelligibility, but in
solitary, silent, reflective activity.
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the situated work is actually evidenced in such a record rather than created as an artifact of
method. This will be undertaken in Chapter 5 with respect to the study reported here.
4.4 Procedures
In orderto collect data, the experimental context had to be designed in terms of its geography,
tasks, subjects and conduct of the study6. The decisions taken will be described with respect
to the principles stated in the last section.
4.4.1 Physical Layout
The physical geography of the experiment revolves around the limits and constraints of the
technology involved. These restrictions are at present quite a handicap, so much so that
naturalistic studies in real everyday environments, like workplaces, are an impossibility
without interfering with the technology in use and incurring difficulties with remote and
synchronous recording. The experiment was conducted in two large adjacent rooms that
allowed the recording of synchronous and remote events. The recording equipment and the
technician, who monitored the recordings, were located in one room behind a screen so as
not to be visible to the subjects. The subjects in each room were positioned in relation to the
artifacts and each other as in Figure 4-1.
They were seated and both were able to see the map and screen at the same time. A black
and white video camera was located in each room in such a position as to record the
participant's activities from the front, face on (See Figure 4-2.). Special lighting was used in
order to obtain good contrast in the final video image. Eye gaze, body posture and gesture
were all visible, but the exact location of a pointing gesture or gaze could not be determined
from just visual inspection. Stand microphones were placed close - but unobtrusively - to the
subjects in order to record onto the video tape the speech and noise relevant for the activity
engaged in.
A complex recording set-up was developed in order to capture those details felt to be relevant
for a full analysis. Two video recorders, two time-stamp generators and a split-screen mixer
6 Additional modalities that were also recorded but not used in the final analysis had the
following set-ups. For the telephone mode, two participants were in the same room, separated
by a screen without visual contact and they were audio-recorded. For the copresent mode,
two people were sitting together, working on their own maps which are mutually visible, and
they were recorded in video and audio. For the keyboard interchange mode, two terminals are
linked using a standard facility that allows strict alternation of turns in which the participants are
allowed complete control of their turn and the point of transfer of the floor to the other.
Machine logging or trapping of temporal events was used.
-98-
FIGURE 4-1 - A plan of the physical setup of the study
Coparticipants
X Camera location To computer linking to
other terminal
were required in order to record the details of the conduct so that the synchrony of events in
time could be recovered from the video and audio recordings. The images from the two
cameras were recorded on two separate video recorders. From one room - call this the
subroom - the camera image was recorded onto a VHS recorder in mono audio; in the other
room - the mainroom - the image was recorded on a U-MATIC recorder using a mixer to
merge the camera image with an image taken from one of the monitors, which is identical for
both terminals. The mixer can merge the two images into a resulting image that displays
them side by side such that the visual and verbal activities of that group can be seen
synchronously with the ongoing dialogue displayed on the monitor. In order to synchronise
with the activities of the other room, two extra details needed to be undertaken. First, the
U-MATIC records in stereo, so the audio from the subroom is also recorded in synchrony
with the audio track of the mainroom, as well as being recorded on the VHS. Second, in
order to demonstrate synchrony of the two video tracks, two synchronised time-stamps were
used to mark a clock time on both video tracks. Both of these complications were made
necessary because the mixer could not merge three images into one video image. This
meant that the process of transcription to be described later in this section was complex and
time-consuming.
Dialogue is established through the standard PHONE facility, a computer-mediated
communication modality, on the VMS computer system that allows two remote users to
communicate by typing at their keyboard. The Acorn BBC microcomputer was used to
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simulate a normal terminal format for the VMS system. It has a standard layout of QWERTY
keys, with some extra function keys7, eg. a delete button plus others that were not explained
to the subjects. Two virtual terminals that simulate the terminals required to use the computer
were connected to the departmental mainframe VAX machine and the PHONE facility was
FIGURE 4-2 - Sketch of video
picture from [M5:8'13"]
PARTICIPANT D
run in order to create a computer-mediated link between them. The characters typed by each
user appear in their personal, visually separate windows instantly on both terminals, and both
can type simultaneously. Thus, the users have no imposed turn-taking system - the floor has
to be managed locally in and through the interaction itself. The diagram in Figure 4-3
illustrates the basic layout as it appears to the participants in this study.
This example illustrates the appearance of the visual communicative space from the
perspective of the participants. It is taken from the later part of one experiment at a particular
7 One participant who was familiar with the BBC microcomputer keyboard did use one of its
special functions in the course of the experiment.
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instant, viz. [M5: at 21'26"], and records exactly what appeared on the screen. There is no
analytic transcription8. The top half of the display screen is windowed for participants D and
M, and the bottom for J and A. The two windows are identical in function. Note, the screen
FIGURE 4-3 - Visual appearance of the screen in
the 'PHONE' CMC modality.
The windows are
virtual spaces for
typing, but they are
strictly allocated.
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screen boundary
had to be reduced to half its normal horizontal width because of the limitations of the recording
apparatus.
4.4.2 Task
The experiment ran as follows. Subjects were instructed that they were taking part in an
experiment involving one of several communication modalities and that they would be asked
8 Only the result of the participants' self-transcription when constructing practical typed
responses is displayed in deliberately faded text.
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to cooperate with the other party in completing a task. The basic aim of the artificial task was
for the parties to plan a route through a city using a copy of a published "city map". One party
is given a map which has some destinations that must be visited, and some routes already
marked that must be followed. This party is instructed to find a route that visits all the
destinations and follows all the routes, and to guide the otherto do the same. The other party
however has the starting point for their route construction but does not know what to do and
so the collaboration must start immediately for both to share a common start and a common
goal. The diagrams below outline the standard initial map configurations. The first in Figure
4-4 illustrates the visiting places and predetermined routes of one party; the second in Figure
4-5 illustrates the starting point for the other.
Participants have to cooperate to find a mutually satisfactory solution. The task for the
participants is to achieve mutual orientation through the map resources and have the same
route-plan for all practical purposes at the end. The designed problem is that the maps are
potentially ambiguous because they are different versions, and the contingency of the maps
as adequate representations emerges locally in the dialogue. See the examples in Figures
4-6 to 4-9. The task is not a naturally occurring one, it has been fabricated to draw upon the
everyday methods of human actors - it should be easy to accomplish and require no special
training - and to involve the participants in completing what is essentially a visual taskthrough
a modality with no visual contact. The task is an abstract one in that a generally available
and commonly used representational resource is being used to plan a potential set of actions
but the maps are not being used as resources for the physical traversal of a real city.
However, given the nature of representations, the maps are essentially inadequate for finding
the 'real' thing, ie. what is being represented. The sense in which the map is about a particular
city and its spatial and social featu res must be constructed from the visual and textual surface
of the map, and achieved in local and circumstantial agreement within the talk and the CMC
dialogue. The following examples in Figures 4-6 and 4-7 show the differences between the
two published maps around the starting point shown on map B. The examples in Figures
4-8 and 4-9 show the problem for the party using map B in locating Cherry Hinton Hall and
finding a route that parallels that on map A.
-102-
FIGURE 4-5 - Grid scale and markings on map B
Starting point rnarked on this maip (in red)
-103-
FIGURE 4-6 - A selected portion of map A



















Location of Marley Primary School that is
to be found on this map
Maps and plans have been chosen because they occur in many practical settings, and draw
upon practical reasoning in their interpretation and use. They are produced, whether abstract
or occasioned, to be recognisably about a 'shared world in common' through practical
reasoning. They are also used because they allow a concrete reference to the materials
used in achieving a task.
4.4.3 Subjects
The selection of subjects was not done on a standard rigourous experimental basis, however
some care was taken in filtering the subjects. The candidates for taking part where chosen
from three sources: graduates in the University, secretaries working within the University,
and others outside the University. This was done deliberately in order to locate potentially
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interesting types of users of the modality, eg. computer-literate graduates, secretaries skilled
in typing, and outsiders who felt they had neither of these skills. The requirements for taking
part were that the candidate was a native speaker of British English - the participants were
FIGURE 4-7 - A selected portion of map B
showing tthe starting destination.
mostly from Scotland and England. It was felt that a primary corpus of British English
speakers would engender conduct closer to the author's own experiences as a life-long
member of British society. Thirty three people took part in the experiments, of which three
had to be found at short notice because of absences. Subjects were assigned a slot in the
schedule. During the experiment, it emerged that some of the participants knew the city
represented on the map because they had stayed there for a period of time. This did not
affect the study, as there was no control placed over the prior knowledge of the participants.
4.4.4 How the Study Was Run
A form explaining the nature of the study and what would be required if they took part was
distributed to each candidate prior to the actual day. The form briefly said that the aim was
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FIGURE 4-8 - A selected portion of map
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to look at how people work together on a task, especially when they had to communicate in
different modes. The task would be simple, requiring no special training, and it would not be
a test. The possible modes they might be asked to use to complete the task were listed as:
keyboard which is like using a computer terminal; face-to-face which is like ordinary
conversation; and telephone which is like talking on the phone. They were also told that the
experiment would be recorded on video and audio tape so that a record of the events would
be available for study, and that confidentiality would be preserved.
Before the experiment the participants were divided into two sets A and B. Just before the
experiment was formally begun, the participants were given a sheet of instructions
appropriate to their assigned role and mode in the experiment. Irrespective of the mode
under study, the party in set A, who were in control of the destinations and fixed routes on
map A, were given the following instructions:
INSTRUCTIONS
You have a map or plan. The other person also has one,
though it may be slightly different from yours. Imagine
you are walking and that you may have to use the map in
the real world. The other person has a start point
marked for a route to begin at. The other person has only
been told the above, but not the instructions below, and
therefore doesn't know what to do. You will have to
explain, and work this out together.
On your map is a pre-drawn route (in pink) that must be
followed, and some destinations (in red) that must be
visited at some point. You have to work out with the
other person how to follow the predrawn routes and visit
the destinations. The aim is for both parties to have a
route marked on their maps so that if they had to use the
map in the real world then they would both follow the same
route. The start point for this route is marked on the
other person's map. From the start point you must trace a
route (in pink) that visits all the destinations and
follows all the marked routes, and then returns to the
start point. The other person should do the same and you
should both agree as best as possible.
A time of half an hour will be allowed. Don't worry if
you finish early or don't complete the route in the time
available. It is not a race or a test. Just act as
naturally as possible !!
The other party in set B were in control of the start point, but did not know what to do on map
B at this point. Their instructions were as follows:
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INSTRUCTIONS
You have a map or plan. The other person also has one,
though it may be slightly different from yours. Imagine
you are walking and that you may have to use the map in
the real world. There is a start point for a route marked
on your map (in red). If you have to mark a route then
use the pink marker pen. The other person has been given
extra instructions and will explain what you have to do.
It will require a lot of cooperation. A time of half an
hour will be allowed. Don't worry if you finish early or
don't complete the route in the time available. It is not
a race or a test. Just act as naturally as possible !!
With respect to the mode that both parties were to use to complete the task cooperatively,
one of the following instructions was given:
INSTRUCTIONS
1) face-to-face: You are in collaboration with the other
person. You are responsible for the route on your map,
but you can look at the other person's map and route if
you want.
2) verbal: You cannot see the other person's map, but you
can talk as much as you want. It is as if you are on the
telephone.
3) keyboard phone: You cannot see or hear the other person
but you can communicate by typing to them through the
terminal keyboard. Use only the normal typewriter keys on
the keyboard. The special keys to delete characters and
move down a line will be demonstrated before the
experiment begins. What you type will appear on one half
of the screen and what the other person types will appear
on the other half. You can both type simultaneously. If
there are two of you working together on one map then you
can talk to each other as normal and use the terminal
link. How you do this is up to you.
In the coparticipant 'constructive interaction' experiments, the seating arrangement was
decided at the time by themselves. The seating meant that certain tasks and roles would be
necessary for that person. After a reading of the instructions, problems and questions were
resolved until they were happy to continue. The experiment was started after the recording
equipment was ready, and continued without interruption until the task was completed, or
else terminated by the experimenter because the time had run out. The only person present
during the experiment was a recording technician in one of the rooms. The equipment and
the technician were hidden by a screen from the participants.
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4.5 Results
In summary, an empirical investigation of the achievement of dialogue in a synchronous,
computer-mediated modality called keyboard PHONE (KP) makes up one half of the
empirical data corpus. In the communication modality KP, participants could communicate
with each other in different rooms by typing at their terminal as if in a shared visual space.
The computer-mediated modality was the only means for the participants to communicate
and cooperatively complete the task. Also, a short empirical investigation of co-present
collaboration and the local, contingent coordination of concurrency and reciprocity in the flow
of conduct was carried out in parallel. This second strand emerged as a relevant direction
during the CA style interaction analysis of the first half of the corpus9, and is reported in
Chapter 6.
The next sections will describe how relevant features of the conduct were made available as
data, given that the construction of inscriptions by participants is not reconstructable from a
script or residue of those inscriptions, and moment by moment copresent activity of
coparticipants is not simply available to a present observer. The whole procedure will be
grossly simplified as follows. First, an audio/visual recording was carried out, that made some
aspects of the conduct available for future inspection using electronic technology, including
a trace of computer-mediated events. Then, the recording was examined and transcribed
from audio-visual records to the graphic medium using a notation convention. The notation
convention is a set of graphic symbols for representing relevant features. The conduct was
made visible as a graphic record, ie. a readable representation of some features of the
recorded events. Decisions that were made about this procedure will now be examined.
4.5.1 Data Collection
A fundamental principle discussed in Section 4.3was that some means of capturing the visual
and audio features of the conduct is necessary. Audio-visual recording was used so that
9 In addition, small studies of copresent, telephone and keyboard interchange modalities were
conducted but these are not analysed in this thesis. For copresence, the parties were in
face-to-face contact and could look at each other's maps. For the speech telephone, the
parties could only speak to each other. For the keyboard interchange, the parties were linked
by a computer-mediated restricted 'flip-flop' modality that allowed only a strict alternation of
turns, in which turn allocation was under the current speaker's control.
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relevant 'visible' aspects of the conduct could be viewed and reviewed as many times as
required. Additionally, the event is available for inspection by others, and so the lived-work
of analysis can be repeated by others. Two main things to record were: the communication
between the parties in the CMC modality; and the activities involving the chronic process of
monitored production and interpretation by the coparticipants. The set-up as described in
Section 4.4.1 resulted in two separate video records of different aspects of the cooperative
activity being recorded. Later, the video sound was transferred to audio tapes to aid close
repeated listening. The following key will help in identifying a particular example from the
corpus10.
KEY for referencing experimental events:
1 +1 Number of coparticipants,
?-? Number of participants in each party across modality,
KP Virtual dialogue space, keyboard PHONE,
C Copresent collaborating coparticipants.
The reference code found in the data fragments is based on the codes M1 - M10 that identify
the separate experiments making up the corpus.
4.5.2 Transcription and Record Development
A video or audio recording is traditionally rendered into an interpreted symbolic form using a
graphic notation system. This process should not replace the original transient recording that
must be watched or heard, but by rendering the conduct strange and unfamiliar it does help
us to reveal the interpretative practices, etc. that we take for granted in finding the sense of
everyday conduct that we see and hear. Procedures for doing this have evolved during my
experiences with transcribing in the interests of analysis, and are largely drawn from Gail
Jefferson's CA conventions, as described in Jefferson (1983), which are adopted by many
other practitioners. Some aspects are different, particularly the occasional representation of
prosody and stress, which is borrowed from linguistic work on prosody. The record style
used for graphically presenting the primary transcription, the record from which others are
derived, is complex and will be described below. The linear turn-based record style of CA is
also used but it will only be illustrated towards the end of the chapter. An explanation of the
10 The statistics are: for (1+1 )C, 11 units or 91 mins were transcribed out of 300 mins; for (2-2)KP
four units of 39 mins were transcribed out of 110 mins; for (2-1 )KP three units of 13 mins were
transcribed out of 80 mins; for (1-1 )KP one unit of 25 mins was transcribed out of 25 mins.
The statistics for the amount of data in the corpus is stated in terms of amount of time and
units, eg. a unit is one complete session. Note that transcribing (2-2)KP involves ten streams
of synchronised activity and takes approximately 'times 100' to transcribe properly.
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notation conventions now follows in three sections: audio, keyboard, and the body. Appendix
A gives a list of all the notation conventions and a brief explanation.
First, the audio stream is transcribed in the's' stream on the graphic record, which includes
speech and other relevant noises in the local environment. Speech sound is represented in
standard orthography, though some pseudo-phonetic representation is given if relevant. On
the turn-based records speech conduct is in the HELVETICA FONT. Intonation has been
recorded if clear, but has not been if the notation does not allow adequate description of the
speech. In this case verbal comments come after the speech fragment indicating quality.
Four types of contour are recognised: falling intonation (.), rising (?), continuing or
indeterminate (,) and exclamatory (I). Unfortunately, the development of an accurate
prosodic notation system suitable for interactional analysis has not proceeded very far. Also
the following features are transcribed: extensions of sound (:), cutoffs (-), loudness (CAPS)
and softness (°), mouth clicks (.t) and audible breath characteristics (.h, etc). A quotation or
reading voice is noted ({...}) as this is common in the coparticipants talk about the dialogue
in the CMC. Temporal measures of an absence of activity are given to the nearest 0.5 second
except for micropauses '(•)' of less than 0.2 seconds. In other cases, they are simply marked
as short or longer pauses of no specific length, eg. (pause) or (longerpause). Additionally,
the spacing between items in the stream relative to the pacing of other activity indicates the
approximate length of the inactivity. Difficulties in speech transcription, ie. doubts over the
identity of the speaker, or over the recognition of speech or sound are marked in parentheses.
If a speaker stops and immediately a distinctively different utterance or speaker continues,
then this is marked using '=' at the disjuncture on the turn-based records. Onset of
overlapping speech is traditionally marked using '//' or '[' and this occurs when data is
presented in the traditional turn-based way. However, in the records developed specifically
for this study overlap is intrinsic in the graphic representation of streams of simultaneous
conduct. Records are to be read with time proceeding horizontally with multiple streams of
conduct sandwiched so that vertical alignment with other streams on the graphic record
means simultaneity in time. Thus for the coparticipants any speech conduct by them
rendered in the two horizontal streams that is in vertical alignment on the graphic record is
in overlap, ie. they are saying something at the same time. This will be illustrated when a
reading of a fragment is demonstrated.
Second, activity in and through the physical keyboard and screen in the achievement of
dialogue in the CMC must be transcribed. Figure 4-3 in Section 4.4.1 illustrates the screen
display. All operations on the keyboard that produce characters or relevant effects on the
display are recorded in the 'k' stream. On the turn-based records the keyboard activity is
distinguished from speech and bodily activity by using the courier font. Key presses
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produce characters on both displays almost simultaneously so recording of the screen activity
needs only an indication of author and not a distinction between time of transmission and
arrival. Characters appearing on the screen are written down in their symbolic form, as well
as attempts to generate a character ([ ]), to erase characters (within'//' and deleted in reverse
FIGURE 4-10 - A sketch of the video image from [M5:1 '48"].
order to typing) by pressing the delete key, and to move the cursor out of the implicit linear
horizontal progression of next places to type and around the display. In addition, the space
bar effects the spacing of letters into perceivable word groups (•) and the return key creates
new work space (®).
Third, non-verbal or bodily activity is an integral part of the embodied collaborative activity.
The sketch in Figure 4-10 illustrates that gesture and gaze are potentially relevant in this
collaboration and for locating the organisation of activities that gives meaning to the
inscriptions in the CMC. This sort of activity is represented in the record in the 'g' stream.
Any appearance of a symbol read from left to right implies a new observable phenomena, or
a change from an action or activity currently operative.
Eye gaze is distributed in general between the map (m) and the screen (s) for both
participants. Mutual gaze (e) occurs extremely infrequently, though this does not imply
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inattention. Gaze that is not to the usual domains of activity is either explicitly indicated or
marked as neutral space (0). Attention to gaze is made available through peripheral vision
and bodily orientations are continually displayed in the video recordings. The coparticipant
who types also pays much attention to the space of the keyboard (k). (See Sudnow (1978)
for a fascinating ethnomethodological investigation into learning jazz piano playing focusing
on the hands and the keyboard.) Because gaze generally continues at the same place for a
period of time it is only marked with a symbol once, at its acme. That is, when a person's
gaze moves to an object or in a particular direction the moment it reaches a stable position
it is notated; it can be assumed that after that moment it remains there until the occurrence
of another gaze symbol. A gaze movement that does not stabilise or is interrupted is marked
in parentheses.
Gesture is more complex. Participants commonly point at the map and the screen and
gesture in particularways towards either location or in neutral space. The onset of a gesture
is marked by'((' and the closure, if it can be determined, by'))'. Standard symbols have been
developed to represent the acme - point of maximum energy - of a general form of gesture
to be found in the corpus, eg. pointing at the map or screen, gesturing to the map, screen or
neutral space. Descriptions of the place or movement of the gesture can be described in
square parentheses ([...]). Because of the possibility of left/right hand simultaneity and
sequencing, prefixing an 'L' or 'R' to the symbol indicates the hand doing the gesture. A
single vertical arrow (i) indicates a sharp point or jab to the map, and a double barred
horizontal arrow (==>) indicates inscribing activity on the map surface. Incomplete gestures
are enclosed in parentheses, and small movements are within
The graphic records themselves, on which the notation symbols are juxtaposed, were
specially designed to graphically render details relevant for the study. The transcription
records are organised to represent conduct as a linear temporal stream that traces
simultaneous actions, placed on the record in relation to the keyboard activity that is the
party's only mutual reference point. Both the parties' dialogue and coparticipant speech and
non-vocal actions are recorded using linear channels that are graphic records of the
transcriptions of particular types of events, eg. speech, gaze, gesture, keyboard/terminal
actions. Important temporally simultaneous events are recorded through vertical
cross-channel alignment. There are some differences between the linear multilayered
representation of the temporal stream of conduct and the traditional records adopted by most
work in CA and discourse analysis. In CA the turn-based records are oriented around the
notion of the 'floor' - coordination of speaking - so as to display the temporal evolution of the
focused activity of speaking that is being represented. Some research in CA is keen to
represent simultaneity, and non-speech actions are annotated in parallel with a
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speaker-segmented, linear speech record. In DA a standard orthographic 'interchange'
record of the speech stream is used in which overlap is written out because of an interest in
the 'words'. Because of the complexity of the records some illustrations of how to read them
will be given.
In Example B1, which can be found in Appendix B, only two participants 'face' each other
across the modality, A and J. Normally only the wider band (k) that records the CMC events
is notated, but in this case, and unintentionally, the gaze of one of the participants was
recorded on video and is also transcribed in band g. The temporal flow of the activity runs
from left to right. Notations of important time intervals, like pauses, are marked between
vertical bars. The notation conventions are in Appendix A. This example begins at the start
of the experiment so that neither have had any communication through the modality yet. After
a short period A begins to type the message "can you tell me the starting point ?" and presses
return, thus a new line is begun. During this activity, A deletes two characters, "he", and gaze
is directed to both the keyboard and the screen. After pressing return A gazes at the screen.
After a short while J responds with "i am at Marley Primary school". A continues to gaze at
the screen for 6 seconds after the last visible change to the window by J, except for a brief
glance to the map during the typing of "school". The dialogue continues but we will look at
different example.
Example B2, which can be found in Appendix B, represents the relevant features of two pairs
of co-participants collaborating on their textual map surface, and communicating with the
other pair in and through the CMC modality. Unlike most CA transcription records there are
5 horizontal bars in the (2-2)KP record, and they are collected together in a bundle that
represents the following simultaneous features. The middle bar 'k' represents the shared
communicative space mediated through the keyboard. All other activities by the
coparticipants are mapped out in relation to this shared stream - one coparticipant pair above,
the other below. Above and below the middle bar are two pairs of bands that notate the
speech's' in one, and bodily activity 'g' in the other of each co-participant pair. All five bars
represent the flow of time from right to left in a visual way. A slice through the five bars
represents a moment in time, by which synchronies and concurrences can be mapped across
modalities and participants.
A reading of this example will follow. At time 2'16" in the record, K is looking at the map
surface and G is looking at the keyboard as K's pointing gesture on the map surface reaches
onset. K then says: "a region=i mean this has got regions on", and towards the end of this
utterance K produces several rhythmic jabs on the map surface. Also, G looks to the screen,
then the map, and after K's utterance G replies with "right" and looks to the keyboard. Next
she explicates a possible candidate for the next inscription by saying, "so i'll put region,", and
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immediately starts typing the construction "Reg" so as to communicate with the other pair.
At time 2'16", the other party, E and R, are looking for signs of activity on the screen. E looks
to the keyboard and attempts to type but nothing visible shows on the screen. E indicates
trouble with the utterance, "o- oh-", but then resolves the problem and finds the appropriate
keys to type "Cavendish". At this moment both parties communicating through the CMC are
constructing contributions in overlap, but at this point neither party displays any recognition
of this. It only becomes significant to G when she glances to the screen and then says "hang
on we got some more what's this?" attracting K's gaze to the screen. The other party carries
on: participant E initiates an elicitation sequence with the simple tagged utterance "avenue
was it?" and then starts to type "Aven" as R confirms with "yeah".
The reading of a (2-1 )KP example is practically the same as for (2-2)KP but simpler. One
side of the modality has only one participant so the record structure has only one stream of
keyboard activity and one stream of gaze for that person, but the other streams are the same
as for (2-2)KP. In the next example, which can be seen in Figure 4-11, the more familiar
turn-based record is used. This style appears frequently in Chapter 5 and is used when
possible to simplify the presentation of examples. However, the simplification is only
performed when it does not misrepresent the conduct in ways that are pointed out in the next
chapter, eg. by misleadingly presenting items in the record as if they were simultaneously
perceived by all parties. The record interleaves both the keyboard activity of both parties and
the speech activity of coparticipants, as well as bodily activity. It is to be read from left to
FIGURE 4-11 - [M5: 20'04"-20'22"]
D: continue along the footpath along to ®
-> CHERRY HINTON ROAD
D&M: ((Both look to screen))
((M reads a new contribution by other party, "STOP !!!!!!!!!!!"))
M: {stop} (.) ur::.
(pause)
-> D: ®®OK
right and from top to bottom on the assumption that it renders conduct from the perspective
of one party or participant as a linear stream occurring through time in the same order as on
the page. Thus D types the contribution, "continue along the footpath along to " and types
RETURN thus starting a new line on the screen. Then D continues with, "CHERRY HINTON
ROAD", whereupon both look to the screen. M reads what the other party has typed, which
has not been recognised by either D or M so far, and says "stop" in a characteristic quotation
voice. Note that the activities of the other party during this fragment are not documented in
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the record. He pauses, says "ur::", and after a pause, types two RETURNS and "OK".
Overlaps between different activities are indicated when relevant in the same way as for talk.
4.6 Summary
This chapter has described the details of the investigative audio-visual study of a
computer-mediated dialogue modality. After the brief overview in the introduction a survey
of related research was given. The study was contrasted with other research on modalities,
computer-mediated communication, constructive interaction techniques, task dialogues and
map direction-giving. In particular it was found that many studies lack attention to the
empirical details of dialogue conduct and use coding and statistical techniques for the
analysis. For example, only products such as scripts or codings of the activity in the
modalities studied were used in the analysis. This is in marked contrast to the principles of
the study here that are borrowed from the naturalistic investigation of conversation. An
experimental setting is used only because of the nature of the CMC being studied. The
constructive interaction technique generates accounts of the activities as they are engaged
in: both the constitutive practices dialogue in the CMC and the collaborative work of the
coprarticipants. Another principle is that audio-visual recordings and transcription techniques
must be used in order to remain faithful to the participant's perspective. The procedures of
the study and the transcription techniques, the first stage in the analysis of the results, were
then described in depth. Audio-visual recordings were essential in order to capture the
fleeting simultaneity of the party's dialogue and talk, as was a complex graphic rendering of
the vocal, gaze, gesture and CMC activity.
In Chapter 5, the full analysis will deal with the interactive achievement of dialogue in the
CMC. Participants only have a restricted range of resources for achieving sense compared
to everyday copresent talk, and yet they have an open floor of possible mutual participation
in which each has the physical opportunity to construct action at any time. The analysis will
document details of how monitoring and participation are locally achieved that give the
inscriptions in the CMC their sense as dialogue. These demonstrations will serve both to
highlight the problems and limitations of current computer models of dialogue and point a
way forward for understanding the resources and environments required for richer
human-computer interaction. Chapter 6 analyses a complex fragment of the collaborative
work of the participants in achieving the task, paying particular attention to the possibilities
for sophisticated interactive dialogue artifacts.
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Chapter 5
THE SITUATED INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF
COMMUNICATION IN A VIRTUAL DIALOGUE
SPACE (VDS).
And what is the use ofa book, thought Alice, withoutpictures orconversations?
(Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland)
The pieces are readable, take on a sense, only when assembled; in isolation,
a puzzle piece means nothing - just an impossible question, an opaque
challenge. (Perec 1987/70, p. xv)
5.1 Introduction
From the arguments in earlier chapters and the empirical methodology described in the last
chapter detailed analyses of instances of dialogue 'through' machines will be presented in
this chapter. The main aim is to show that interaction is a constitutive domain of dialogue
and cannot be taken for granted or ignored in computer models. In particular the analyses
demonstrate that communication is interactively constructed in and through a virtual dialogue
space (VDS), which is a simulated graphic space in which participants can coordinate their
activities as dialogue, that is virtual because the computer supports the image of a visual
workspace mutually accessible to both parties who are spatially-distanced.
There are three main activities of interest in the study. First, there is the cooperative work of
achieving an adequate mutual route construction. Second, the situated, chronic process of
production of the inscriptions in the VDSwhich is distanced from the other coparticipant. The
inscriptions are worked on and worked over to produce abstract contributions intended for
an audience. Third, there is the interactive engagement in dialogue by the parties. Normally
in writing the second activity assumes primary significance when engaging in dialogic
correspondence. Texts are produced which have a durable character and become separated
from the saturated contexts of production and the projects of those who created them. In talk
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the third is primary; the second does not exist as participants are engaged in contexts of
copresence. If inscriptions are produced, then they are joint situated products in a way that
texts written by absent others are not. Their sense is bound and embedded in the activities
from which they arose. The constituting activities that give inscriptions their sense are also
to be found in Grosz & Sidner's (1986) dialogue example set-up but they are unfortunately
disregarded in their analyses. For instance, the mediator between the expert and apprentice
is doing interesting and relevant work to locate a contribution from the apprentice's speech
and type it to the expert, and vice versa. In the VDS, all three activities are interwoven.
However, a tension is present between the demands of the second and third activities. This
is a divergence from the copresent situation in that many routine resources for mutual activity
are unavailable. This results in particular problems for the coordination and interpretation of
their dialogic activities. Parties are contingently resolving the relevance of contributions, eg.
sequential misplacements occur, as they engage in multiple and simultaneous activities.
Visible traces are available as records of the conduct, however, the record of the participant's
dialogue is not embedded in copresent activity, eg. a jointly constructed diagram on a piece
of paper in front of two people talking. It emerges within the context of two activities having
competing claims on attention.
Before the main analyses an extended discussion considers what methods are to be used
to recoverthe situatedworkthat gives the inscriptions in the VDS their sense as constributions
to a developing dialogue. Unfortunately the screen residue is only an abstract sediment of
some of the events that occurred and turn-based renderings are misrepresentative, so
complex renderings of audio-visual recordings of constructive interaction are motivated. The
analyses investigate how parties construct their actions through the technology available,
how they visually and temporally monitor their own and other's production, how participation
is locally organised, how contributions are relevant to each other, and how new orders of
participation emerge in dialogue. The main finding from the analyses is that the participants
in the VDS do use similar resources to those found in conversational talk, such as sequence
or repetition, but fragmentation of the basic features into emergent organisations is routine.
For example, participants do construct their participation in similar ways to the turn-taking in
conversation though the particular constraints of the modality result in a diffusion of the notion
of 'turn' and the emergence of parallel dialogue activities that cannot be accounted for by the
rule 'one speaker at a time'. The structures found in the VDS are unusual yet motivated by
the situated, mutual work of constituting intelligibility out of the materials and resources that
are appropriate at the time. In this chapterthe embedding of inscriptions in situated practices
essential for their interpretation will be illustrated as part of the situated embodied
achievement of dialogue in the VDS. The importance of the context of interaction as
constraint and resource, eg. the permanance-transience properties of the medium, cannot
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be overemphasized. In conclusion to this chapter, the relevance of the study to computer
models will be discussed, which will lead into the next chapter which considers interactivity
and dialogue artifacts.
5.2 Recovering Practice
This section will illustrate a number of issues that will be developed in this chapter. It will
suggest how to investigate and recover the practice that empirically weak interchange
models of dialogue such as Grosz & Sidner (1986) have taken for granted and missed. The
recovery will be accompanied by the development of an alternative method of rendering
details of conduct that gives access to the situated work of achieving intelligible dialogue out
of the materials of the VDS itself. A motivation for the 'constructive interaction' technique is
given. Lastly, some phenomena of the virtual dialogue space will be illustrated that are
analysed in depth in later sections.
5.2.1 Towards an Adequate Rendering
In order to reveal the empirical problems with Grosz & Sidner's account it will be rewarding
to take a close look at how an abstract conception of dialogue misses the situated details
that are demonstrably real for the participants in the dialogue itself. The crucial questions
for any account are just what is 'the real stuff' of dialogue and how it can be represented in
some way so as to be talked about. Unfortunately, the situated production of dialogue is
usually ignored in favour of a textual or dramatic 'interchange' model that supposedly
represents the 'real substantive content'. In many computer theories of dialogue, including
Grosz & Sidner (1986) and Reichman (1985), this model is implicit in how the claims of the
theory are illustrated.
Let us examine some examples from the study that will clarify what is lost in the process of
rendering data according to the interchange model. First, an example of what the participants
in the dialogue actually see while engaged in dialogue is given in Figure 5-1. This example
shows the visual appearance of a sedimented screen display at a particular instant in the
cou rse of the dialogue activity, ie. over a period of time the contributions thatwere constructed
on the fly in the VDS come to be layered on the display much like the geological formation
of sedimented rock strata. Both parties could see this visual display screen at the same time
and in the same form. It is the textual surface on which coparticipants construct and interpret
contributions. It can be treated by the parties as a living surface of ongoing work, or it can
be just a record or residue of events that occurred during the course of engaging in dialogue
through the modality. However, the screen display is not an accurate document for the
purposes of analysis because the significance of items or objects in the display is only to be
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found in the dialogic practices that engendered them, and this is why audio-visual methods





















THIS IS ANOTHER DESTINATION
continue along the footpath along to
CHERRY HINTON ROAD
OK
OK, return to CHERRY HINTON ROAD




The footpath is not marked on our
map - STOP INTERRUPTING
Do we turn off to the right
before Cherry Hinton Hall?
x:
The next line typed by J will appear here.
The window will scroll upwards so that the
line beginning, "we do will disappear.
of analysis were used here. There is a simple temporal history recoverable in this example,
ie. events higher up in the windows occurred before those below them, but it is not quite true
that the display contains a sediment of all the events that have taken place, as there are some
events missing from the record. Reconstruction by the analyst of what actually happened,
eg. the sequential organisation of 'turns', could be attempted from the screen residue by
drawing on the findings of previous analyses and commonsense. A story could be
constructed, much in the vein of Garfinkel's 'et cetera' clause experiments that demonstrated
the indefiniteness of accounting procedures (Garfinkel 1967). But problems will occur, for
example, a repair initiator by D in response to line J2 is not recorded at this later time because
it was almost immediately deleted. Also there are lost lines, eg. sequentially relevant lines
to those of the other party are missing from the display before D1 because of D's policy of
double spacing 'turns' or responses. It is interesting to note that the coparticipants face a
-120-
similar, though practical, problem when they sometimes refer back to the display to recall or
try and reconstruct a past event that is relevant once again. However, the display is more
meaningful to the participants in situ because they have been a part of the process of
constructing meaning of which the display is but a residue. This illustrates the much forgotten
fact that remembering is not completely a mental process, but is distributed across people,
artifacts, and the world. Recall and memory is as much 'out there' as 'in the head', eg. in this
case, the configuration of the display is essential to the participant's remembering of what
happened. Also, aspects of the production of contributions, ie. their performance, that may
have been relevant to the evolution of the dialogue are not implicitly represented in the screen
documents themselves. For example, the pace of typing and hesitations during the
construction of inscriptions as contributions to the dialogue are orientable performance
characteristics that are not recoverable from the record. Recipients can shift orientation to
different activities if a hesitation occurs in the construction of the current contribution. Also,
the speed of typing can vary from slow to fast, and there is the keyboard repeat mode in
which a character is repeated very fast on a single line. In one instance, an exclamation
character is reproduced portraying a sense of urgency in order to stop the other party
interrupting a construction.
In order to remedy the problems for the analyst who might rely on the emergent record of
inscriptions carried out in the course of dialogue activity, a simple rendering in traditional
turn-based script form may appear at first to be the answer. Example 1 illustrates, in a
particular way, the dialogue sequence leading to the display state in the prior example, eg.
[M5: at 21'26"]. D is typing for the pair D and M, and J is typing for the both J and A. Basically,
this example is an abstract serial record, ie. the lines on the page can be read as turns in
discrete chronological time and they are labelled linearly down the page. The bracketed
codes refer to the original place of the contribution on the screen display in Figure 5-1. In
addition there is some attention to chronological temporal simultaneity, ie. recording of the
clock timewhen an 'overlap' of two responses occurs. Unfortunately, this form of transcription
misrepresents the participants' 'reality' in the VDS because they are not in co-presence as
in conversation. Mutual monitoring by 'speakers' and 'hearers' is not a routine
accomplishment in this case, ie. contributions are not mutually monitored because of a lack
of resources and thus the transmission and reception of entities in the VDS becomes relevant.
This means that the relevance or significance of contributions for the participants is not
recoverable from this new record because alternative interpretation strips cannot be
represented in this rendering. For example, some turns are never noticed, eg. on line 5 the
echo repair initiating response "ANG?" is never noticed by the other party; some are not
noticed until later, eg. on line 2 the mistyped construction "Ang" is not 'received' until after
responding in lines 3 and 4 to the prior contribution in line 1. Also, lines 10 and 15 are not
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noticed until after the end of the recipient's current turn construction. Turns are quickly
deleted and removed from the record: line 5 does not exist in the record because itwas typed
and almost immediately erased by D. It becomes an incidental comment for those attending
to its production. Contributions are edited in progress, eg. in line 3, "east" replaces "right",
line 5 was erased by D before typing line 7, and note that lines 3 and 4 do not appear on the
screen display because theywere scrolled off the display by D's double spacing of responses.
Thus an abstract serial record of the chronological events misses the situated work of
constructing contributions and misrepresents the relevances of contributions to the
participants in the evolving dialogue.
Because conversation analysis (CA) has dealt with focused encounters between two or more
participants, the rendering methods have developed to cope with a temporally singular locus
of mutual activity. Participants are actively engaged in achieving conversation as
accountably having one speaker at a time and one floor of speaking. Thus a transcript can
EXAMPLE 1 - [M5: 19'04"-21'26"]
A simple 'turn-based' transcription that is misleading.
1 (Jl) J we do have Cherry Hinton Hall
2 (J2) J Ang
3 D 'The nusery is to the east
4 of cherry hinton hall.
5 D ANG ?
6 (J3) J OK
7 (Dl) D THIS IS ANOTHER DESTINATION
8 (D3) continue along the footpath
9 (D4) along to CHERRY HINTON ROAD
10 (J4) J 'STOP ' ii I it t II I I I I I I I I I
11 (D6) D OK
12 (J5) J The footpath is not marked on our
13 <J6) map -
14 (D8) D [OK, return to CHERRY HINTON ROAD]
15 (J 6) J 'STOP INTERRUPTING
16 (J7) J Do we turn off to the right
17 (J8) before Cherry Hinton Hall?
be read as a stream of speech conduct mutually attended to by parties ratified as speakers
and listeners. Gesture and gaze are notated around this singular locus and in conversation
it is argued that interactants are
viewed as simultaneously engaged in fine-grained real-time coordination of
speaking turns tracked predominately in terms of surface structural features.
(Heritage 1989, p. 26)
But, the transcript example above cannot be read in this way. In the virtual dialogue space,
mutuality begins to break down and the notions of speaker and hearer are not so relevant,
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ie. the parties in the VDS do not attend to each other alternately as speakers holding a floor
of mutual attention. How and why this occurs is dealt with empirically in later sections. This
poses a problem for computer models of dialogue in that the integrity of the concepts of
speaker and hearer are assumed in the dialogue script examples used to illustrate the model.
For Grosz & Sidner (1986) it is even more of a problem because the notions of speaker and
hearer cannot be applied to the apparent contributors to a mediated dialogue in which the
expert does not hear the apprentice nor the apprentice speak to the expert, ie. the apprentice
speaks and hears while the expert types and reads, both mediated by a human translating
between the mediums.
So, a rendering that allows alternative interpretative strips to be recovered is needed, and
this can be done by notating more than just a 'turn-based' chronology of screen events.
Continuing with the same data fragment as before would have illustrated the argument for
the same case, but this is not done because of the length of the final record that would be
required to cover the whole fragment [M5:19'04"-21'26"]. instead, aspects relevant for how
they are addressed by the participants themselves are notated in Example B1 given in
Appendix B. However, this example is too simple for the purposes of this analysis.
Participants do demonstrate orientations to each other in their contributions - in fact, that is
the only way they can display understandings - and thus to the analyst, but because of the
restricted modality a number of questions about the situated practice of constructing and
interpreting contributions is unavailable to the analyst if one to one participation is studied.
What happens when overlaps occur? Why do particular observable dynamics or behaviours
occur? Also, how do the participants interpret the other's conduct? What chronic processes
of monitored production are involved in constructing a response? These are questions that
have no easy answers if normal observation is relied on because the resources for the analyst
found in observation of the conduct are much restricted by the modality. Of course, conceptual
theorising could take over at this point, but a different and more acceptable way out is adopted
in Example B2 in Appendix B.
'Constructive interaction'1 involves the use of coparticipants engaged in the collaborative
work of what one participant did before. Audio-visual techniques are required that are
described in Chapter 4. A special transcription method is used that critically renders the
embodiedwork of the coparticipants in addition to the temporal development and simultaneity
of activities. From a record of these things the analyst can isolate the situated practices that
1 The technique called 'constructive interaction', described earlier and motivated here and in
Chapter 4, is implicitly drawn upon in the analyses of the prior examples. Some of the
analyses could not have been made without this method.
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give sense to the inscriptions as contributions produced and interpreted in the peculiar
circumstances of an evolving dialogue. An advantage can be gained by using a restricted
modality. The modality allows the use of the constructive interaction technique because two
people can collaborate on the dialogue without too much distortion to the VDS itself. This is
not naturally available in normal conversation. For example, imagine constructing an
experiment with a pair of subjects acting conjointly and trying to do the job of one person in
a conversation, so that a display is engendered of the collaborative and observable work
done by the pair in achieving conversation with another person. This is not a suitable strategy
because of the unavoidable disturbance to the natural character of the conversation, eg. the
mutuality of conversation would be radically altered while the coparticipants worked out what
to say to the other person. But, for restricted modalities involving spatial or temporal distance
and for ordinarily solitary activities it is a useful strategy for effecting talk of and about the
activity, ie. the coparticipants talk about and thus display the sense of what they are doing.
In the example, the chronic process of monitored construction of a response in the modality
is now available as a resource for the analyst; but not for the other party. Thus we can explain
why the fragment "Reg" appeared in the dialogue space because the collaborative work done
to construct the response is demonstrated in the talk of the coparticipants. Owing to the
visibility of contribution construction, G noticed the other's simultaneous response and
attended to it, thus leaving a half-constructed 'overlapped' response, viz. "Reg". Through
G's talk, body and gaze in coordination with displaying accountable actions to the
coparticipant K, G's orientation to three sets of activities is visible. The first is the mutual
work of constructing the sense of a next contribution. Then the shift to the second, with "right"
and a gaze movement to the keyboard, which is to realise that sense as a contribution in the
VDS through the keyboard. The potential development of the inscription "Reg" is explicated
by their mutual work and G's utterance "so i'll put region". Finally, the third is attention to the
dialogue itself, with "hang on" and gaze directed to the screen, as a shared space of
understandings. This example illustrates the tension between the chronic process of the
production of 'messages' or contributions and the mutual engagement in dialogue itself.
Participants G and K are collaboratively engaged in finding a reasonable response. G is also
actively engaged in constructing their next contribution to the developing dialogue. But G
notices a potential contribution by the others, and thus their own contribution becomes
suspended by the relevance of attending to the sense of the "more" that has now been
noticed.
The temporal development or performance of a contribution is publicly available as a trace
in the VDS, but the coparticipants' talk and activities of looking, searching and planning are
not available for inspection by the other party. So, there is a drastic reduction in the mutual
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access of participants to each other's circumstances and activities. In addition, the
performance of contributions can be treated as a transient event with an observable course,
or as a permanent record or inscription. Because of this property, parallel activities by the
parties are possible and emerge that must be coordinated with the activity of engaging in
dialogue. However, it is not possible to engage in parallel activities and treat the other's
contribution as a transient performance. Thus in the example both pairs of coparticipants
are engaged in parallel activities but after K notices the construction of a possible contribution
by E and R then, and only then, the visible performance becomes relevant as a
contribution-in-progress to be addressed.
Example B3 in Appendix B shows the full complexity of the transcription notation adopted in
the investigation. It illustrates the inaccessibility to the other party of the situated work of
coparticipants. J and R are collaboratively engaged in resolving just what it is they are talking
about that bears on the construction of a next contribution in the dialogue. However, this
activity is unavailable to the other participants. Mutual access is restricted to the point where
mutuality is problematic. Participants can observe some events, that are routinely available
in copresence, and other events are completely unobservable. For example, the routine
monitoring of contributions is possible but the continual, precise attention to each other's
contributions in transient moments of production characteristic of copresence has been lost2.
Speaking and listening are contingently achieved in talk, but in this virtual dialogue space
they are practically unattainable given the skills and resources available3.
The modality of the dialogue example in Grosz & Sidner (1986) was designed to be restrictive.
The presumption is that the resulting dialogue will in essence be the same as everyday talk
but without the interruptions and overlaps that litter that activity. Thus implicit in their
methodology is the assumption that the circumstantial details of dialogue activity are not
relevant to the work of intention recognition and coordination that they claim underlies and
gives dialogue its coherence. This has been shown theoretically in Chapter 2 and empirically
above not to be the case. Moreover, the intelligibility of the represented dialogue is taken for
granted as is the reading of the representation. However, there is a mismatch. The
intelligibility is to be understood in terms of a reading that relies on an inapplicable model,
2 An orientation to turns would be guaranteed by the use of an explicit set of signalling rules by
the participants or that are built into the computer-mediation system itself. This is how legal
courts operate to organise a routine order of examination, but it is not how conversation works.
Also, it may be possible for competent touch typists to achieve a semblance of mutual
engagement, lodging them in shared space of dialogue by embodied attention to a single locus
of evolving interactive engagement.
3 They may be unattainable but then they are not a goal of the activity, nor does it result in a
degradation of the quality of dialogue.
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viz. the interchange model. The activity engaged in was no doubt intelligible for the
participants, but the representational record must be justified as adequately rendering the
details attended to by the participants themselves. The achievement of that intelligibility must
itself be explicated and an initial step towards an adequate explication is to choose carefully
the features that are important to transcribe. This section demonstrates what those features
are in this case and what is misleading if they are not documented. Empirical methodologies
for computer models can irrevocably miss the situated practices that give observable details
their sense and rely on a biased reading of the reified record 'as if like conversation'.
It has been demonstrated in this section that careful attention must be paid to the practices
of participants in constituting the sense of inscriptions in the VDS. Computer models of
dialogue have not regarded the interactive circumstances as relevant to an underlying
account of the organisation and procedures of dialogue. The interesting issue in this chapter
is how the participants construct the dialogue with social-historical conventions, like
conversational structures or practices, and in situ with emergent resources and
circumstances, like adjacency in time and nearness in space. These are demonstrably
endogenous to conduct and a constitutive domain of dialogue. They are unavoidable, useful,
and essential.
5.3 Interactivity and Dialogue
Given the phenomena located in the last section that are unaccounted for, and as resources
for situated action are replaced by an elaborate model, some concepts will be developed to
form the basis for the analysis in the remainder of the chapter.
Ideas about interactivity are usually implicit within a theory or way of talking, because the
meaning of the word is so obvious, yet diffuse and with many applications. It depends on
the activity in question, both physical and social: reading a book, walking down a street, using
a computer, or talking to someone. A person may inter-act within the physical world in terms
of action-reaction events, or interact with another in terms of meaningful action by both
parties. Typically, with a computer system this means allowing the user to participate in the
computational process: with an interchange dialogue system instead of written text material
a user can interrupt the unit of, say, 'explanation' at explicit points, ie. an explanation is not
given as a monolithic whole, but in segments tailored to the user's behaviour and to dialogic
interchanges in ways that are predesigned. However, and this is the crucial point brought
out in this and the next chapter, the participatory dialogue itself is not interactive, ie. the
organisation of participation is not interactively constructed by the participants themselves
so that it may be impossible to collaboratively construct, interrupt or influence another's
participation in the dialogue activity in situ.
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Interaction can refer to the provision of an active role in the construction of intelligibility or
action in an activity that is normally taken to be solitary and passive. For example, in fiction
stories a reader interprets the story in a passive role in which it is not possible to change or
influence the textual material on which the interpretation is founded. But in interactive fiction,
a willing reader can actively influence the ordering and the substance of the material of the
story itself that is normally considered to be static, eg. change the character or plot
developments. It is acknowledged that computers may support a more active role for the
user, thus participation of a person is sought for artistic, pragmatic, and efficacious reasons.
However, in these cases the sense of interaction as mutual and reciprocal action by more
than one active person is not to be found. The thesis is specifically interested in
communicative interaction in which coordination and shared understanding is achieved by
more than one participant, for example in dialogue.
A beginning can be made in the outline of an approach to this notion of interactivity by
considering Goffman's system requirements of interaction, from Goffman (1981). These are
theoretically descriptive and formulated in the manner of communication theory. For
example, one requirement is that there exists a two-way capability for transceiving adequate
and clear messages. Also, there must be backchannel capabilities for reception feedback,
and contact, close-down, and turnover signals for turn-taking. But, this approach is much
too close to communication theory. See Wilson et al (1984) who compare signal theory with
the local opportunity theory in the study of conversation. Also, there is a similarity between
the emphasis on coordination and recognition of markers and signals, and the coordination
and recognition of communicative intent in computermodels such as Grosz & Sidner (1986),
eg. "we find that participants in explicit interchanges tend to alternate, or take turns, in
engaging in explicit actions. This implies that a set of signals or markers will be needed by
which turns are marked as beginning and ending, and by which the expectations of the
participants as to who is to take up the next turn is indicated." (Kendon 1988, p. 33). We
need to have a closer look at the local processes of interaction, and what better place to look
than the detailed empirical work of CA on speech exchange systems.
5.3.1 Participation and Local Management
In the analysis of the achievement of dialogue it was recommended in Chapter 3 that dialogue
be considered as a set of practices in which participants are mutually engaged in coordinating
their communicative actions and achieving shared understanding. In order to explicate some
of the details of the dialogue space, perspectives on interaction from the point of view of the
coordination of actions will be outlined here because participants must coordinate their
participation within the physical possibilities of reciprocal action. The question must be
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asked: How does participation get organised in interaction within contexts of reduced
copresence?
In the creation, negotiation and management of shared meaning, doings by actors are
systematically relevant to each other. However, the coordination of actions and their
boundaries may be determined by external forces or from within the interaction itself using
the materials available at hand. An example of external force is the modality that makes it
physically impossible for one actor to take a turn until the current turn holder has explicitly
allocated the next 'speaker' by a conventional signal. Also, turn-taking may be institutionally
provided for, external to the local circumstances of the interaction, eg. the 'over' convention
for signalling the end of the turn in citizen-band radio operation. But, determination from
within the interaction is operative in telephone conversations, for example, in which an 'open
floor' of participation is possible so that actions and their boundaries must be locally achieved.
How is the possibility of simultaneous action significant for interaction and the participants?
By organising actions contingently and locally, act descriptions and boundaries can be
mutually constituted in situ under the pressures of interaction. The 'open' possibility of action
means that participants acting at particular times have added significance in coordinating and
achieving mutual intelligibility. For example, in interchange dialogue in which the current
'speaker' always allocates the next 'speaker', explicit linguistic work must be done in the
explicitly allocated next turn to repair the sense of or display interpretation of the current
contribution. The work of close mutual coordination of turn boundaries in conversation is a
rich resource for constituting the intelligibility of talk. For instance, a turn transition at a
possible completion point can display to the prior speaker that the recipient has understood
something of the sense of the turn by responding at that particular point, or a head nod by a
recipient during the construction of a turn can influence the trajectory of the turn. But in
interchange dialogue this work is undone and the current 'speaker' must construct a complete
turn without help, ie. completeness is not competed over nor mutually coordinated.
A fundamental order of participation is to be found in speech exchange systems. CA
explicates the local management and organisation of the opportunity to speak so that
'one-floor' of participation is maintained with one speaker speaking at any one time. Here
are the important concepts derived from CA studies described in Chapter 3. Similar ideas
can be found in Laurel (1986) with respect to active-role technology. First, the participation
of those taking part must be organised in some fashion. Mutual and simultaneous actions
must be coordinated; they are not random events in a meaningless world. An opportunity
for action is socially or physically organised and constrained, and in opportunities there are
possibilities which can also be socially or physically constrained. For example,
opportunities to participate are organised at transition relevance places in the construction
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of a turn-at-talk while adjacency pairs sequentially implicate a space of possible responses.
Interaction has a describable grain size, ie. the patterns of enabling opportunity for action.
For example, the interchange model common in computer models of dialogue like Grosz &
Sidner's (1986) has a large grain size of interaction because a participant can only act at
explicit junctures granted by the current speaker. Significance is the potential effect on the
whole interaction, ie. the dynamics of activity4. Dynamics are those orders and patterns of
activity that emerge in interaction. They are not contained or represented within the
individuals concerned but are properties which arise in and shape the subsequent course of
the dialogue, either unwittingly or as accountable features of that dialogue. For example, a
dynamic of turn-taking is that accountably one speaker speaks at a time. Also, an emergent
dynamic of topical talk is that because of the linear stream of talk and the orientation to
adjacency then topics can unwittingly get dropped, they pile up, and consequently, if it
becomes relevant, they are harder to pick up again as they get further behind as one of many
topics that could be reintroduced. What is important in contingent and practical interaction
is that action must be organised locally and mutually within the emerging dynamics of the
interaction. For example, interruption has to be achieved, coordinated, managed and 'pulled
off collaboratively. Even disagreement, nonsense, or chaos have to be coordinated and
make sense.
5.3.2 The Interactional Context: Constraint and Resource
Focused human interaction is organised within contexts of copresence. Copresence is
anchored in the perceptual and communicative modalities of the body. It is a continual
embodied achievement of a shared physical and temporal space of mutual monitoring in
which participants are "close enough to be perceived in whatever they are doing, including
the experiencing of others, and close enough to be perceived in this sensing of being
perceived." (Goffman 1963, p. 17). Thus, "actual conversation is always 'situated', always
comes out of, and is part of, some real sets of circumstances of its participants" (Sacks et al,
1978, p. 10). Context is a cover term for the relevancies in interaction drawn upon to
construct the interaction that
includes the physical environment of interaction but is not something merely 'in
which' interaction occurs. Aspects of context, including the temporal order of
4 Note that opportunity, possibility, and significance come to hand post hoc or in breakdown and
rationalisation. They are analytic terms. Normally and routinely, a space of possibility and
opportunity in practical action or 'going on' is not explicitly addressed in every case so that
opportunities for action are encountered in the course of activity, not explored mentally or 'in
the abstract'.
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gestures and talk, are routinely drawn upon by actors in constituting
communication. (Giddens 1984, p. 71)
The contextofinteraction is in some degree shapedandorganisedas an integral
part of that interaction as a communicative encounter. The reflexivemonitoring
of conduct in interaction involves the routine drawing upon of physical, social
and temporal context in the sustaining of accountability; but the drawing upon
ofcontext at the same time recreates these elements as contextual relevances.
(Giddens 1979, p. 83-4)
The reproduction of interactional context forms physical and social constraints on action from
the circumstances of time-space to normative sanctions. In addition, an interactional
event is an event endogenous and emergent to the interaction that is used as a resource by
the participants, eg. internal pace or rhythm constituted through the interaction. But, it is
important to see constraint and resource as figure and ground, ie. they are different
perspectives on the same phenomena. Understanding constraint and resource can help a
lot in explaining certain dynamics, eg. what might be understood as a constraint of eye gaze
monitoring of signing activity in the sign language conversation of the deaf is also exploited
as a positive resource for managing turn allocation because signers can avoid mutual gaze
so as to keep a turn, for example.
To illustrate the importance of constraint and resource, take the physical writing pen and
paper versus the computer mouse and window technology common on personal computers.
It is common for users, working in a multiple window workspace and having to coordinate the
current visual workspace with the placement of current activity, to act in the wrong window,
eg. a user typing a memo in a programming window. Why does mis-windowing occur? A
simple explanation is that in writing on multiple sheets of paper, the actual physical writing
process is very much a constraint on the activities of writing on a particular sheet, ie. the
sheet and pen must be in contact through the bodily activity of writing. This is also a resource
for the coordination of the writing activity with the next action's placement, so it is not easy
to write on the wrong sheet given that the bodily actions of writing are so closely connected
with the decision to write on a particular page. However, the removal of the bodily constraints,
through using a keyboard that distances the writing process from the graphic medium, means
that it becomes easy to misplace a set of keystrokes. The mouse now serves as the 'middle
man' between the graphic medium and the activity so a user can easily forget where the
typing will appear given the absence of a constraint tying 'inscribing' activity to graphic
material. Reichman (1986) tries to explain the misplacement of actions by users in window
systems through the metaphor of conversational embedding of context spaces in her model
of dialogue. It is claimed that a user is engaged in dialogue with the interface and windows
can be thought of as dialogue context spaces. Movements between them need to be explicitly
signalled with mouse clicks which are comparable to markers like "anyway" in conversation.
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Thus, a misplaced action is due to the user forgetting to change context spaces in the dialogue
between the user and machine. Unfortunately, this explanation confuses conversational
resources with action resources. Instead, the user is engaged in an activity in and through
the interface. The interface provides resources for interleaving multiple activities, just as if
at a workbench or desktop5. So, this example shows that what are constraints from one
viewpoint are necessarily resources from another, and it is easy to misapply the 'dialogue
partner' metaphor. To return to communicative activity, the focus on correctness has led to
a similar one-sided view of certain phenomena and this is apparent in the view that self-repair
in conversation, eg. hesitation, cutoffs, are signs in the speech stream of disfluency or a lack
of competence or control. It is hard to sustain this view when the findings of conversation
analysis are taken into account where it has been shown that these performance features of
speech are positive resources for eliciting mutual gaze in face-to-face conversation (Goodwin
1981).
5.4 Analysis of the Virtual Dialogue Space
An interactional analysis of the achievement of the virtual dialogue space is undertaken next.
The virtual dialogue space in the study is a computer-generated visual display space onwhich
spatially distant parties can produce distinctive graphic objects as if both were copresent and
typing on a physical sheet of paper in front of them. A participant can type graphic symbols
within the constraints of the technology and conventions for spatial presentation that will
appear simultaneously on both monitors in their separate locations. They can do this both
at the same time in their respective windows or graphic spaces, ie. they cannot operate on
the same visual space but on adjacent ones. The sense of this being a shared space for
dialogue is a social achievement, ie. the relevance of visual elements to each other as
contributions in a developing dialogue in the virtual space must be achieved continually by
the participants.
Before presenting analyses of the VDS in this case it will be compared with some other similar
systems that are available. The VDS is quite different from 'asynchronous' modalities, for
example electronic mail. Variants of this popular modality are designed for temporally and
spatially distanced correspondence. Participation is organised around the computer-based
interchange of discrete textual documents over comparatively long periods among multiple
participants. Because of the extremely restricted access to mutual circumstances, the
5 That circumstances are an essential resource for solitary activity using artifacts has recently
been acknowledged by some psychologists and designers, eg. Norman(1988).
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significance of time is ambiguous. COSMOS (1988) have argued that because of the
asynchronies between times of creation, transmission, receipt, and response, a sender
cannot find the sense of time passing without anything happening significant because it is
unclear whetherthe recipient has received the message, received it but has forgottento reply
or is in the process of replying, received it and doesn't want to reply, etc.. These properties
effect the communication that is possible and are fundamental to the nature of asynchronous
computer-mediated communication.
Many 'synchronous' computer-mediated modalities are available similar to that in the study,
but with slightly different characteristics and varying degrees of mutual access. For example,
the STARLINK system allows that each user can construct a message in isolation. It is then
explicitly transmitted to the other participant, whereupon it is received as a complete
message. When it is sent, the message interrupts the other participant's message
construction, and then allows that person to continue with the now interrupted message. So,
there is an asynchrony between the creation and transmission of messages, but receipt is
almost guaranteed because of the intrusive appearance for the other party. Participants can
organise their actions as interchanges of turns - sequential message passing - or they can
exploit the interruptive character of the modality. The latter case results in a slightly disturbed
sequence structure and the possibility for a party to redesign the contribution on the basis of
the interrupting contribution. The possibilities for the interrupted participant revolve around
the constraints of the modality. The message can be completed as planned and transmitted;
the message is abandoned and a new message constructed; the message is aligned to the
accommodate the interruption, and sent; or the message is completed and new material,
explicitly orienting to the interruption, is worked on, and both are sent. Because of the
asynchrony between creation and transmission and the interruptive character of message
transmission it is likely that time can be spent addressing more than one issue and
interruptions lead to new topics being addressed. Thus, multiple topic threads are possible
in this modality. This modality is like a form of electronic mail correspondence, but the
process of construction is regularly interruptable by the transmission of messages by another
party.
Another interesting modality in everyday use is the TDD telephone aid for the hearing
impaired. It is similar to WRITE, which is a simple synchronous communication modality
available on multiuser computer facilities. Both parties are spatially distanced, but they can
use telephone network to communicate. One party dials the other and after an appropriate
summons signal the other party responds. Both use a keyboard plus visual display interface
to communicate by typed messages. The keyboard is a standard QWERTY, and the display
is 40 characters long and scrolls from right to left - as you type, characters file along from
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right to left and disappear off the display at the far left. In its most basic everyday use,
participants alternate turns at typing a message, which appear on both displays
simultaneously. There are facilities for recording a dialogue and replaying it, and for printing
a hard copy. Also, a user can compose and edit a message prior to the actual call and send
it at high speed during the call, thus reducing cost. A set of conventions is used for controlling
turn taking as the display can be accessed by both participants at any time, ie. it is a simple
shared visual space. Without conventions, garbled messages would be produced because
the participants would inter-mix their individually coherent words made up of typed symbols
resulting in a stream of unintelligible nonsense. The conventions and associations between
particular symbol forms and possible interpretations are given below - they are thought of as
strict rules to follow, as reported by a user.
GA - short for "go ahead".
Q-like shape - short for "question".
GA OR SK - short for "go ahead or stop keying".
SK - "stop keying".
SKSK - termination.
The conventionalisation of conversational resources is apparent in the provision of explicit
means of managing the turn-taking. Turns are current 'speaker' controlled and are
transferred at explicit points. Also, "GA OR SK" provides a pre-closing resource. An example
of a sample dialogue from the manual is given below:
DAD: GOOD AFTERNOON JOHN HERE GA
SUE: HI DAD SUE HERE PLS CAN I STAY AT THE
LIBRARY TIL 5 Q GA
DAD: THATS FINE THX FOR LETTING ME KNOW SEE
U THEN BYE NOW GA OR SK
SUE: BYE DAD SKSK
The VDS in this study is interesting in that it allows for simultaneous construction of
contributions to the dialogue and also monitoring of that construction that is unavailable in
simpler modalities. Creation and transmission are not asynchronous, and receipt is not
necessarily asynchronous. The monitoring is disembodied and only available through the
visual space of the dialogue activity because participants are not copresent.
Before embarking on the analysis of the VDS, a word of warning given the brief descriptions
above of the more restricted modalities. One cannot simply conflate the properties identified
in studies of restricted settings of dialogue to get a full understanding of the holistic nature of
copresent talk. Activity in copresence offers emergent resources for engaging in that activity
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that are dropped out of accounts of the properties of restricted modalities. For example, the
creation, transmission and reception of messages are not simply the components of
copresent talk that are undertaken synchronously. The participants' mutually observable
actions are not just constructions that happen to be created, transmitted and received at the
same time. This way of thinking means that a mutual process is reduced to a manipulation
of a product from speakerto hearer, but speaking and listening in copresent talk is a continual
routine accomplishment within the circumstances of copresence. In restricted modalities of
presence, features emerge as distinctive phases with identifiable social or physical
constraints, eg. the asynchronies in electronic mail emerge as explicit non-features - an
unachievable and unaddressable synchrony - that are fundamental to the nature of the
modality. These features should not be reified as explicit features of copresent talk nor as
the only components of that activity.
In contrast to the modalities described above, the VDS is an 'open-floor' of possible,
synchronously monitorable action, ie. a participant has no physical restriction on opportunities
for acting. But the relevance of actions as contributions in a developing focused interaction
is a skilled achievement, so in this special modality the construction of intelligible contributions
to the evolving interaction must be achieved socially in the local contexts and circumstances
of their conduct. Because of the peculiar and particular properties of this modality, new
organisations emerge through the participants' sense making practices partly borrowed from
talk. The study will particularly focus on the following topics:
* The appearance of the virtual space to the participants and the possibilities
and opportunities for action in that space given its circumstantial constraints.
Because of the peculiarities of this space, features of text and speech are
present and differentially orientable to.
* The visual and temporal monitoring of the construction of contributions.
* The weak mutual access that participants have to circumstances of situated
action, and thus the emergence of parallel activities.
* The local management of participation in the virtual dialogue space with an
'open-floor' of opportunities. Complications and breakdown arise in the
interaction as the participants manage their activities through the circumstantial
resources. For example, the use of turn taking resources in managing
participation is considerably weakened in this modality. Because of the physical
properties of the graphic space, the coordination of communicative actions is
much looser. For example, the 'single-floor' - or arena of communicative action -
is not such a valuable commodity as in talk, because the graphic trace releases
the participants from continuous mutual monitoring.
-134-
* The relevance of contributions to a developing dialogue. Adjacency and
sequence are still valuable resources for constructing and interpreting
contributions.
* Particular phenomena emerge in the activity. For example, the phenomenon
of 'double dialogues' is found in fast dialogue, where the temporal singular
stream of adjacent actions found in talk is not so routine. Some notion of
adjacency is still applicable, but, because of the graphic trace of prior actions
and the lack of mutual monitoring, two chains of dialogue can develop. Both are
currently under construction by the participants, but at different times, and
adjacency in each chain is still an important interpretative resource.
5.4.1 Constructing Action
This section will explicate how the participants worked in and through the technology for
constructing contributions. The virtual dialogue space is a textual surface on which they can
create and edit visual symbols within the space granted by the graphic display and keyboard
input technology. The technology is designed with certain general goals and has specific
behaviours, however, the user can discover, play, and abuse it in the course of their activities.
Thus a technical description of performance characteristics does not give an understanding
of how the technology came to be used in particular ways. The technology is easy to use as
such but its routine use relies on certain skills and practical experience. We will find in this
section that the technology becomes a constraint and a resource for constructing and
interpreting contributions.
The VDS is designed to allow two spatially remote participants to communicate through a
mutually accessible visual work screen on which typed characters are displayed. The
communication link is engineered to be usable by people, and no instructions are given except
a brief manual entry. The design is such that a naive computer user should be able to
communicate using the link provided they can use a keyboard and observe the screen.
Because of the possibility for simultaneous typing, participation must be socially managed.
This is much more versatile than other interchange modalities.
The VDS (see Figure 5-1 in Section 5.2.1) is a visual space containing two separate graphic
spaces which are 8 characters deep by 39 characters wide. Participants can press buttons
on the keyboard and the appropriate character will be displayed, immediately upon key
pressure, in the appropriate window on both monitors. The small screen width encourages
short, quick responses. Activity in the window is managed through the keyboard and the
observable opportunities provided by the display. Placement of contributions is restricted to
the locus of cursor movement as participants type. Appropriate key presses will produce
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visible characters in the current cursor position whereupon the cursorwill move one place to
the right. Only the RETURN key can influence this trajectory by moving the cursor down one
line and to the beginning of that new line. Thus the contributions must be constructed as a
linear string of characters stacked from left to right. Planning ahead may help but the activity
is fundamentally prone to unforeseeable problems. This leads to recovery practices that
attempt to salvage or repair constructions and interpretations which emerge in the course of
constructing. The cursor and the lowest positioned line in the window are resources for
determining the state of the dialogue activity, eg. what the last contribution was, where to
type the next character, where an expected contribution by the other participant will appear.
The ownership of a window could be routinely discovered during the developing dialogue by
inspecting the spaces for identifying textual items, or by typing and observing the location of
the new characters. When a participant types the characters appear in their allocated window
and the cursor remains in the next possible character slot in that same window. Only if the
other participant starts typing do characters appear in the otherwindow and the cursor remain
in that window. However, for coparticipants H and L in Example 2 below, the relation between
the current cursor position and the allocation of windows becomes problematic. They have
just started and are unfamiliar with the VDS. The other participant has typed "hello" and both
H and L recognise this greeting contribution and that a response is expected. But towards
the end of the suggestion of a possible candidate for a response "type in hello \ba:ck perhaps",
L notices that they are not in the right place for giving a response "i thought we were up
there?". The expectation revealed by this fragment is that their window for responding is the
upper one and that the cursor position indicates the next typing place. The cursor is in the
lower window and thus they are not in the right place and access to what they see as their
window is now a problem for them. This is reasonable as the normal operation of the cursor
during typing is in the next positioned slot for a character on the right in that same window,
ie. in this case, the other party's. Rather than discovering the automatic operation of the
cursor, ie. it 'jumps' to the correct window upon typing, they attempt to resolve the 'problem'
based on their first assumption. H suggests a way out of the dilemma. The cursor is wrongly
positioned and they must explicitly move it themselves. "Use the cursor" focuses on the
availability of the cursor to be manipulated as a spatial object in the graphic display. Normally,
the allocation of windows and access to those windows is not a problem, though the
significance of items in them is problematic.
A standard QWERTY keyboard is used. Characters appear at the current cursor position by
pressing the appropriate key. Some key presses do not give a visual character - they are
impotent for the practical purposes of the activity. The full range of alphabetic characters
and punctuation symbols are available. A range of other characters are available but were
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not used. In addition, the keyboard can perform many operations on the display and the
computer system itself on which the VDS is running. The DELETE key moves the cursor
back to the left one place and blanks out the character in that position. Characters on previous
EXAMPLE 2 - [M9: 15"-20"]
H: well we could type in={hello}
L: [{hello}
H: right- write-type in hello \ba:ck perhaps.
-> L: 'i thought we were up there?=
(( Ps ))
H: =well jus- use the cursor.
lines cannot be deleted. This is discovered by some participants. The RETURN key moves
the cursor down one line and to the beginning of that new line on the left of the screen. One
set of special keys to the right side of the keyboard are used by one participant. These are
line editing keys that allow a user to modify an already constructed line. For example, one
experienced user of the keyboard-monitor technology used it to redo a contribution as
requiring a relevant response (see Example 3). A and D construct a question: "Are you
marking the route too?", then a contribution by the other party is found to be immediately
relevant to the cooperative activity of route construction. This contribution, "STOP, we are
lost", is not a reply to the question and D displays the absence of a response using the
technology available at hand. D moves the cursor to the line containing the question "Are
you marking the route, too?". That line has now been entered in the record and thus is
available for inspection, so D uses the arrow cursor manipulation keys to reconstruct the
same line "Are you marking the route too?" at the expected place where a current contribution
could be constructed, ie. it appears again on the bottom line of the window underneath the
original. Thus D accomplishes a reformulation of the prior question "Are you marking the
route too?" by repeating it, and thus displays it as a question still to be answered that was
not addressed by the intervening contribution "STOP, we are lost" by the other party.
Some key presses can perform operations that are not explicitly visible but are revealed in
the course of the activity. In Example 4, L appears to lock the keyboard while constructing
EXAMPLE 3 - [M5: 10'9" - 10T9"]
[_9'_55';J
D: Are • you • marking • the • route too •? ®
J: [] [] [] n S top, • we • are • lost
k
D: ®® T T T [Are • you • marking • the ■ route • too?] ®
J:® W e • have*no*cement*works
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a contribution. There are also many keys or key combinations that can have a function but
they have no visible effect in the VDS. In Example 5, E has just mistyped and disturbed the
construction of a contribution. The coparticipant suggests that E just type the contribution
again and E reinitiates keyboard activity. But afterthree key presses no visible effect is found.
E exclaims "o- oh-" as the inadequacy of the action is revealed.
The characters typed by participants are semi-permanent as inscriptions on the display. A
participant can press keys in order to construct a line full of characters, but before reaching
the end of the screen display, the RETURN key must be pressed in order to start a new line.
For each press of the RETURN key the lines above move up one, the one that is currently
EXAMPLE 4 - [M9: 48"-55"]





((looks to the screen, but no characters))
->• H: oh (.)
((looks to keyboard and back to screen))
"can't type"
L: We need to...
top and the oldest is removed from the display, and the cursor appears at the beginning of a
fresh line at the bottom of the window. This is called scrolling. Thus a string of characters
is entered on the display that becomes unchangeable, but still visible, when the RETURN
key is pressed, so the participants have some visible record or trace of what happened in the
prior dialogue. The extent of this trace is not defined temporally as having a fixed time limit
before erasure of an item, though it does have a bounded history, but an emergent dynamic
of the situated use of the window mechanism.




R: JUs- (.) <jus' do it again. (.)
type cavendish again.
E: ((types but nothing appears on screen))
-> ((finds a problem with keyboard activity)) o- oh ((tries again))
E: Cavendish ...
In Example 6, participants use the display as a resource for remembering the name of a
street. D and M are engaged in locating a major road, called Hills road, that will help them
locate the starting point on the street named Blinco Grove. They find the major road and D
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reorientates them to the main task by saying "so we're looking for \blinco street." Just after
the production of the main noun D shifts gaze to the screen followed by M. Just a few
contributions ago the street name was stated and is thus visible in the record of inscriptions
on the display. That adequate confirmation is found on the screen for D's remembering of
the name is displayed in D's repeat of the name and by coparticipant M's "ok" as they both
reorient to a search on the map surface. However, though agreement is temporarily reached
over the street name it is in fact incorrect. The confusion is discussed a little later.
Through the process of communication, using the resources and constraints of this modality
to constitute the significance of communicative action, a window on prior dialogue arises.
The display contains particular sedimented records of what went on, but many significant
features of the interaction are unrecoverable simply by inspection. Also, many features are
only recoverable by the participants if they noted and can remember enough to reconstruct
EXAMPLE 6 - [M5: 4'10"-4'20"]








-» D: so we're looking for \blinco// street.
-» ((looks to screen))
M: ((looks to screen))
D: \blinco//street.
((looks to map))
D: ((D looks to screen, then both to the map))
->• M: "ok."
what happened. The characteristics of the keyboard and display thus constrain the
construction of communicative actions. Also, the technology provides resources for
developing or repairing the dialogue in situated ways. For example, the RETURN key
commits a participant to an entry on the window record because it cannot be edited. However,
the key itself also provides the means to remove the entry from the record. In the extract in
Example 7, D constructs a contribution, "We have to guide" which is disattended while they
attend to the other party's construction. It is then restarted by D and entered on the record
by the return key but it is still incomplete.
The in-progress contribution has now been entered on the record as two lines making "We
have to guide you round certain". Up until this point M has been orienting to, eg. out-louding,
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the simultaneous ongoing construction of the other party. D begins to construct again on the
current line which is immediately below that of the unfinished contribution. This could be a
completer, eg. "places", or a response to the other party's contribution made relevant by M.
EXAMPLE 7 - [M5: 23"-58"]
D: We have to guide
((D and M attend to other party's construction))
D: you round certain ®
P
D: ok
D: ((deletes the 'p' and tries to delete other lines above))
-> D: Ij'll have to get rid of that
D: We have the...
After one character, "p", D looks to the screen and says "ok". This and his next actions
acknowledge the immediate relevance of responding to the other party's construction. He
deletes the letter and attempts to delete further characters. But the next possible character
to be deleted is on the previous line if the trajectory of the cursor is retraced. That D wanted
to delete the troublesome unfinished contribution is made clear by the use of several presses
of the RETURN key itself, that gave rise to the problem, to remove the offending line and all
other lines from the record. D comments, "i'll have to get rid of that", during this activity, and
then proceeds to construct the appropriate response on the fresh display. Thus D has
managed to skilfully extricate them from responsibility for a possibly ambiguous construction
that could be taken as a completer of the half-finished construction or a valid response that
leaves a half-constructed contribution expectably requiring completion later. This analysis
illustrates that the RETURN key is not just for entering significant and intelligible items onto
the record as a by product of starting on the next activity, but can also delete entries from the
record that may be troublesome, misleading or superfluous.
Thus the operations provided by the interface are both constraints and resources for
constructing dialogue. Functionality can be designed but also it can emerge in the situated
practices of those trying to construct intelligible actions from the materials at hand, and the
significance of an operation is only to be found in the situated circumstances of its use. The
technology provides a means of manipulating the space that both creates possibilities and
opportunities for action in the activity and its use is shaped by the demands of that evolving
activity. Another situated use of the operations provided by the interface is as follows in
Example 8. The RETURN key is used to differentiate the types of contributions. Also, capital
letters are used to highlight words and phrases. Single lines are placed between ongoing
constructions that must be split over more than one line. But when a new contribution is
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started two lines are placed between the prior and current, eg. when D responds to the
EXAMPLE 8 - [M5: 20'04"-20'22"]
D: continue along the footpath along to ®
-> CHERRY HINTON ROAD
D&M: ((Both look to screen))
((M reads a new contribution by other party, "STOP I!!!!!!!!!!"))
M: {stop} (.) ur::.
(pause)
->• D: ®®OK
directive "STOP I!!!!!!!" with "OK". The screen display extract in Figure 5-1 in Section 5.2.1
also illustrates this usage. Note that D constructs contributions so that capitals differentiate
the location noun phrases from the rest of the syntactic construction.
The coparticipants must construct tangible contributions from their situated work. A
communicative response or act must be constructed by typing characters, and that requires
producing an intelligible verbal string. Most constructions are mutually worked and agreed
EXAMPLE 9 - [M8: 3'02"-3'23"]
K and G think they have found the starting point.
G: ok i'll put urn, ((looks to screen))
south ((points to screen and K looks)) south west of brookfields district,
((both look to map))
((K points loudly))
K: yeah
G: yes ((looks to screen)) right ((looks to keyboard))
-» located i'll put right? ((looks to screen))
K: ok.=
-> G: =®school located®
upon. However, the resulting constructions are not simple reductions of speech. The
coparticipants' talk about constructions does not specify their exact typed form but requires
work to be made relevant in the immediate dialogue circumstances. Agreement can be
reached over a possible current contribution, yet the final form is different (besides the
contingencies of the other party's actions). The next fragment in Example 9 illustrates this.
The typist G orients to the construction of a contribution given that they appear to have found
the starting point. After a brief digression, that confirms the location, G suggests a possible
informing contribution "located" for discussion and agreement. K agrees and G immediately
starts the construction. However, G types "school located".
In the chronic process of production of action, simple errors are made or new problems arise
that require a change in the current string. For instance, there is an orientation to correct
spelling, for the sake of correctness or in case of ambiguity where correctness is necessary.
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The DELETE key can remove from the screen items in the current line, but cannot remove
items that have already been entered and are visible on the semi-permanent record, ie. in a
fairly recent period of time. The use of DELETE key to remove items is illustrated in Example






10. J types "Hiils", notices the spelling mistake, tuts, and repairs by deleting back to the first
"i" and typing "lis". The other party recognise this activity as repair initiation and thus now
see the original form as a mistake and laugh. The correct form is recognised immediately
after the retyping as "Hills road". Note that the repair activity is monitored by J's coparticipant.
S looks to the screen just before the typo-error and looks away only after the correct form
has been typed.
A different example of situated self-editing is to be found in the following extract in Example
11. J is just finishing a contribution when he makes a mistake and exclaims "shit". The
location should have been "Blinco Grove" but J types a letter Y instead of an 'r'. D attempts
to delete the typo-error but mistypes a RETURN, exclaiming "ah fuck". Now the error is
undeletable using the DELETE key. However, J types the street-type again and this is
oriented to much like a restart that self-repairs in conversation. The problem with the
typo-error is also demonstrated by the recipient party. They try to construct an interpretation
of "Gt", eg. "gt-" or "great". The contingent construction of a repair item on the next line by J
is successfully found to be a replacement of the item "Gt", and not the beginning of a new
contribution. It has already been shown that reading the sedimented record is problematic
for an analyst. It must also be so that it is not clear from the record what happened for the
participants themselves at a later time. In an earlier example (Example 6) the display was










J: H i i I s • //• s I i//1 I s • R o a d •
J: .T
S: ( ) t'the left of






example the remembered noun phrase was misread from the display as "Blinco St". This is
understandable because "Gt" does look a little like "St" at a glance. Thus the recovery of old
and apparently already known information by inspecting records at the present time is a








M: (blinco great) (uhh) grove
s D: {on, blinco,} blinco gt- grove
D:
k J: • o n • B 1 i n c o • G t dt) Grove
J: shit b- ah fuck (.hh)
s R: ur grove that was grove
J: - - - s k s k s k s
g R:(m) s m
contingent practice.
From the physical and temporal engagement in constructing intelligible contributions as
actions in a dialogue, and interaction between the parties, arises the particular characteristics
of this modality. The structure of the communicative encounter emerges by the local work
of both parties in situ. For the participants windows are continually available for constructing
contributions-in-progress, and for editing and deleting them. Contributions are constructed
and found within the achieved order of the visual space. Intelligible dialogue must be
constructed within the evolving range of opportunities and possibilities provided for by the
VDS in the moment of construction. But the mutual achievement of the intelligibility of the
inscriptions as dialogue contributions requires explanation.
5.4.2 Visual and Temporal Monitoring
This section will look at the perceptual modalities which participants can draw upon in
constructing their communicative actions or monitoring those of the other party in the
dialogue. Reflexive monitoring has already been mentioned to some extent in the last
section, eg. keyboard typing and reflexive monitoring of the graphic window. Monitoring of
each other's communicative actions is the main topic of this section.
Participants have very limited access to the activities of the other party. There is no bodily
or spatial copresence. The participants only have mutual access to the graphic space on the
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monitor, where communicative action takes place. Because contributions are constructed
visibly on both monitors, some elements of the chronic process of production of
communicative action is available for monitoring, eg. a recipient can monitor the trace of the
typing process of the producer. The only resources for monitoring the activities of the other
party are to be found in activity because there is no background of observable inactivity, eg.
a landscape in which actions are produced. Participants can be engaged in communicative
activity when typing, but periods of no-typing leave the other party with no perceptual
evidence of what else the other party could be engaged in.
Example 12 illustrates a weakness of other-monitoring. During the simultaneous contribution
EXAMPLE 12 - [M5: 1'20"-1'52"]
D: Is the A1303 in the top left hand corner
-> J: ^Our starting point is
((D and M notice the uncompleted construction by J.))




-> D: go on !
(pause)
J: yes
D: yes good that means
constructions, D addresses the construction by J, and thus moves to a more mutual focus
that makes the uncompleted construction relevant. M reads the construction into the talk
demonstrating its incompletion with an extension of the terminal syllable, and after a long
pause, a quizzical "what?". After another long pause, D orients to the noticeably absent
completion by the other party. There is no possible means of monitoring the reasons for the
inactivity, so D initiates repair with "go on !" It is not possible for participants in the VDS to
address the activities engaged in outside of the VDS by the other party; they only see the
absence of the expected VDS, or else read of an activity reported later in the dialogue. There
is also a similar problem on the telephone. A participant can notice a period of absence of
speech activity when expected, but it is sometimes difficult to ascribe just what is the reason
or cause of the inattention. The soundscape then becomes important not as a place to speak
but as a 'window' on a possible world of sounds explaining what is happening at the other
end, eg. difficult breathing, other voices, etc..
The physical characteristics of transience and permanence of a medium are important in this
case. Speech and the signs in sign language conversation are transient, though they can
be recorded and reviewed, whereas texts are generally permanent and imply a distance
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between producer and recipient. Because of this property, the systematic synchronous
coordination of production and recipiency is not necessary. If the graphic display was
transient, as on a graphics-decay terminal, or the production was transient, as in rapidly
decaying free hand writing on a graphics-decay terminal, then synchronicity would be
essential.
Let us consider for a moment the differences between talking and writing. Interactional
events emerge in transient dialogue and other monitoring leads to local construction of
transient conduct, where the reflexive production of action has transient characteristics that
are significant. This is not the case in writing texts because the editing, physical writing
process, etc. are part of the chronic process of production of that text, but are not available
to the reader except of traces in the sedimented product or cultural object. But, in
communicative interaction, the processes of production are integral to the action, eg. the
temporal dimension in the flow of speech conduct, and also to the coordination of actions in
interaction, eg. pausing has differential significance for turn-taking in conversation. Equally,
the process of production can be 'interrupted' which is unlikely or impossible in writing.
Therefore, the process is contingent and subject to occasional recipient design. Monitoring
of the other participant's actions may lead to editing, or drastic abandoning, of the current
string because of problems arising through re-interpretation or other-initiation of repair.
As a small digression, Example 13 is an interesting illustration of recipient activities in which
a dialogue contribution and the coparticipant's route construction do merge successfully so
that the two activities of constructing contributions and engaging in mutual dialogue are not
EXAMPLE 13 - [M5: 6'50"-7']
J has is just finishing typing the contribution "what is the first destination?"
and M and D are working on the map surface.








M: <So we want to head ((D looks to screen)) up to here. ((M points on map))
D: 'ok,
-+ D: what is the first
((D looks back to map and M moves closer to map surface, repointing))
destination.
-» M: 'the first one seems
to be this hospital, but without the name.
D: 'ok '.h 'okay
((D looks to keyboard and starts typing "go north"))
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at odds.. Initially D and M are both working together on the map surface in order to construct
an appropriate overall route. M suggests the first place to head to given their global plan,
"So we want to head up to here", but D looks towards the screen whereupon he finds and
reads a new contribution by the other party. However, M is still working on the map planning
a route to the first destination. The out-louding by D is interpreted by M as a relevant question
by D in their mutual activity. Thus the other party's question smoothly finds a relevant place
in their parallel activities. Rather than coparticipants finding the other party's contributions
as disruptions or digressions to their current activity, in this example the contribution is read
into their activity at an exactly appropriate point.
Because of the permanence of the medium and the possibility of the other party monitoring
the process of production, there is a tension between the talk-like process management of
the interaction and the writing-like chronic process of monitored production without reception
monitoring. That is, contribution construction is a process subject to the pressures of
interaction and its construction as a communicative product. There is a tension for the
'producer' and 'recipient' between the differential pressures of monitored and unmonitored
production, eg. between the close monitoring of transient production and the distanced 'when
I am ready' interpretation of already produced communication, where its significance as a
prior is reconstructed from the display. This means that the participant's conduct may best
be described as forming a continuum between orienting towards producing a stream of
communicative action to be monitored and a string of characters to be read at some near
future point.
The VDS can lie awkwardly at points between these two because participants can address
contributions as 'nows' or return to them or find them later as 'priors'. That is, a contribution
can be produced as a complete unit to be received in a future time, or it can be constructed
in monitored presence as one in progress. It serves as both constraint and resource. This
is important for interactive artifacts where the physical characteristics can be creatively
designed and may lead to new or troublesome dynamics.
5.4.3 Weak Mutual Monitoring
There is no systematic means of achieving mutual monitoring in the VDS. A participant
cannot sense ormonitor the monitoring by another participant. Performance of a construction
can be oriented to by a recipient as shown in Examples 10,11 and 12, but construction cannot
systematically display orientation to that monitoring - thus copresence is difficult to achieve.
For example, a producer has very few resources for monitoring recipiency during production,
except through the assumption that no typing activity by the other party implies recipiency.
If a recipient is typing then this indicates that the other party is probably not monitoring
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concurrently. There is thus an asymmetry in producer and recipient monitoring, and so
'speaker' and 'listener' synchronicity is difficult. This means that reception can only be ratified
in the next 'response', ratherthan routinely achieved through the coordination of synchronicity
essential with a transient medium such as speech. In telephone conversation there are no
resources external to talk itself, mutual monitoring is a routine achievement inwhich recipient
inattention becomes explicitly evident because of the transient speech and fine coordination
of speaking and listening, eg. monitorable with backchannels and the rhythm and pace of
turn-taking.
Production and reception can be distanced because of the permanence of the graphic
medium. This is not possible in everyday talk, where speaking and hearing must be
coordinated synchronously. Other monitoring of current production of actions is possible,
but in contrast to conversation, mutual monitoring is not found in the data. But if expert users
of the keyboard - touch typists - could monitor two visual spaces of production, then there
could be a systematic orientation to a 'floor' of action involving speakerhood and some mutual
monitoring. Maybe this could also be achieved through the provision of background
monitoring, that would allow speaker monitoring of recipiency. This is the only thing that
stops the speaker's linear production of a response moving towards a serial stream of
speaker/listener conduct, where the ongoing process of conduct is a resource for the parties.
Will this lead to a different organisation of interaction with expert use? That is, if the
participants can monitor each other's typing and type at the same time, then the concept of
an economy becomes important. So, the parties could organise their participation in a similar
mannerto transient conversation, based around 'one speaker/no gap', or based on optimising
production time but limiting local sensitivity. This hypothesis could not be tested further using
the corpus here.
There are many parallel or simultaneous activities during the course of the dialogue because
of the characteristics of the medium - permanence - and temporal duration of construction,
and the further lack of mutual monitoring. Parties can address an activity relevant to the
dialogue or task while dialogue contributions in view, or other activities out of view, are being
constructed. These parallel activities are normally consecutively ordered activities, by
necessity in copresent talk, but are now carried out simultaneously. Simultaneous activities
usually need to be coordinated in copresence as not having a claim on all parties' focused
attention and need continual routine monitoring, but in the VDS parties can engage in
activities that are unobservable to the other party.
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5.4.4 Local Management of Participation
The previous section explicated how participants construct their actions and can monitortheir
own and others constructions in the VDS. This section will address the management of
participation in the dialogue which forms the basis for the achievement of the relevance of
those constructions as contributions to a developing dialogue.
It has been shown that participants are engaged in constructing symbol strings in and through
the technology available. By monitoring the construction of these strings participants are
engaged in achieving a virtual dialogue space in which constructions are built and interpreted
as communicative contributions. Symbol strings in the space of the shared screen are
systematically relevant as contributions by each party. But, because of the permanence
characteristic of the medium and the lack of mutual monitoring, participation in the dialogue
is not organised like normal everyday speech exchange. Normal focused talk in copresence
or on the telephone is demonstrably organised on the basis of the turn-taking systematics
discussed in Chapter 3. The local management of the turn-taking is such as to orientate to
there being one speaker, no gap, and one floor of speaking6. However, in the VDS this is
demonstrably not the case because there is a much weaker orientation without a focused
'floor' of opportunity in which participants constitute themselves as speakers who allocate
and construct 'turns', and as listeners.
Participants must find sense in each other's constructions as addressing aspects of prior or
current constructions and this requires they organise their participation in some way. It is
physically possible for them to type at any and the same time, so there is no guaranteed
physical or institutional constraint that supplies a strict external ordering on the constructions,
eg. strict alternation of turns at typing. Instead, they must locally construct their participation
such that the construction of strings of characters are significant as intelligible contributions
in a dialogue. Participants do orientate occasionally to the allocation of 'turns' but the nature
of the VDS radically transforms the organisation of participation. Rather, participants are
orienting to the construction and interpretation of 'contributions' to the dialogue. The carefully
coordinated activities of 'speaking' and 'listening' are not necessarily primary activities in the
VDS because there is weak mutual monitoring, and thus, mutual ratification of speaking and
listening is problematic. Consequently, participants display orientation to the 'producer' and
6 Levinson (1983, p. 301) mentions evidence for the physiological and auditory possibility for
simultaneous speech in Miller (1963). There does not seem to be any compelling constraint
such that spoken conversation could not be organised otherwise, eg. involving simultaneous
speech.
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continue round to the A1134,
or Loog Rd., and turn left.
OK ?
do you mean alnog the footpath
(longpause)




i have no robinson way on my map
'we want to get to the 6th form
college (pause) on LONG RD
(pause)
is that Perse School for boys?
to get there I have to cut across (pause)
its opposite
the park or es
sedler taylor rd
else go a lnog way
round
(pause)
ok I see the college now, do I




there is a Rd marked on my map
(pause)
so that you will not actually
need to cut acroos





J: does it go past.. .
'recipient' of contributions. Note, it is not that participants forget about turn-taking and
disintegrate into random participation without order. It must be remembered that participation
is a continual, routine achievement constituted out of the materials at hand. So, if new
circumstances and contexts arise then participation will no doubt change accordingly, and in
this case it does. A comparison between conversation and the VDS will be given next. It is
based loosely around the observable phenomena of turn-taking in conversation described in
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Sacks et al (1978) and using analyses of the VDS from the corpus. It shows that many
phenomena to be observed in conversation can often occur in the VDS, eg. that speaker
change recurs is the same, but also that they can be markedly different from each other, eg.
that there is overwhemingly one speaker at a time in conversation is more relaxed in the VDS,
and the no-gap transitions between speakers are not common in the VDS unlike everyday
conversation.
1. Speaker change recurs, or, at least occurs (in conversation).
This is the same for the VDS. Example 14 shows an extended simplified example of a VDS
dialogue. It is clearthat participants A and J do recurrently contribute to the evolving dialogue
and at first glance it seems quite like turn-based speech dialogue. It was chosen because it
is quite similar though we will shall see that this is not the case in general. Examples of the
beginnings of the disintegration of turn-taking can be found in this example. Ambiguous
completion is shown at point 1 in which A answers "yes" to a prior by J and there is a pause.
A continues at approximately the same time as J starts a turn and two competing analyses
of that pause are displayed, eg. A orients to the pause as a gap occurring in the construction
of an as yet uncompleted construction whereas J orients to the pause as a transition
relevance point in the dialogue at which J can self-select. Thus the completion of that
contribution by A adding to "yes" is empirically ambiguous. Also, early self-selects are to be
found at points 2, 3, and 4. For example, at point 4, J 'interrupts' A's construction "so that
you will not actually". J has apparently self-selected before an adequate transition point. The
overlap that consequently ensues is resolved after four words by A dropping out. The
extended overlap that occurs at point 3 is unusual in its pattern and that it is not attended to
by either party dropping out. We shall see later that these two phenomena are mainly
responsible for the emergence of quite different organisations of dialogue such as 'double
dialogues'.
Two other examples of talk-based dialogue will be given in order to compare with the VDS.
The first, Example 15, is an extract from the task conducted in the telephone modality and
the second, Example 16, is an extract from the task conducted while participants were
copresent or face-to-face. In the telephone modality participation was organised much like
conversation. For example, long pauses are rare, overlap is brief, turn order is not fixed, and
current turns address just prior turns in sequence. Also, the copresent modality is similar
though misleadingly so because the participants were mutually engaged in coordinating
non-verbal as well as verbal activities. Thus, the pauses are not signs of inactivity, just
absences of talk activity. This is shown in the second extract, Example 16, where in the
second pause J looks to W's map and W looks to J's map. The construction of the route is













and go straight down there,
yeah?
and at the end of there (.) it goes straight on with, (.) what i assume is
a foo:tpath or something,





it's a- (.) well no it must be a private road inside, (1.0) thee grounds.
Oh. (.) the Government offices.
' ah :::: '
(1.0)
R: yes. (.) you just go (.) straight on as if you, as if Shaftesbury road
was extended,
C: right, so, going back towards the railway track.
R: that's right.
C: yeah.
R: an:d'um, (1.0) keep going straight on=the road curves round,
items in their talk. A problematic referent, eg. they do not have the same one or it does not
exist for one of them, is thrown up by their competing noun phrases "church lane" and "church
end". J glosses the name by adding "or something" and pursues agreement with "yeah".
But, both recognise a problem that requires them to check each other's map and this is what
happens in the pause marked on the transcript record. Agreementwith evidence is displayed
in the next turn when J confirms an adequate understanding with "ok. right." The copresent
example also leads into the complexity of talk and body coordination and relevance to the
practical activities. This will be raised again in Chapter 6.
2. Overwhelmingly, one party talks at a time (in conversation).
Participants do sometimes orient to a 'floor' of participation in the VDS, but this is not highly
valued. There are examples of explicit orientation in the coparticipants' talk and in the VDS
itself to one party at a time. Some will be given below to show that the phenomena does
exist to some extent. However, as we shall see later this 'rule' is continually undermined and
simultaneous party talk is common.
In Example 17, M displays to her coparticipant that the other party has a right to a 'turn' which
must be respected. They are waiting for a reply from the other party when D starts a new
construction. This almost immediately overlaps with the onset of the other party's
construction. M notices this and tells coparticipant D to "HANG ON hang on they're replying".
M thus demonstrates in the talk an orientation to a 'correct' ordering of participation which D
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EXAMPLE 16 - [M1: 4'25"-5'00"]




W: an' onto church lane?
J: church end, or something=yeah.
-> (pause)





yea:h, that's=what is it ( ) that's, (.) that, (.)
cutting, (.) round there. (.) right.
(pause)
W: ok. yeah. Back, Back south again.
(pause)
an'then cuttin' back up north, ta church end t'the roundabout.
J: right, yeah.
W: ok.
J: a:nd then (swing)
W: 'an'then a big loop, (pause) round t'the south.
(pause)
J: (n'thats) is that coming onto:,
W: (think) it's a roundabout ( )
has flouted. But D answers by claiming that contributions to the dialogue can be
simultaneously constructed. M responds with "oh" indicating a change of state (Heritage
1984b). However, M is not convinced because a little later in the following dialogue in
EXAMPLE 17 - [M5: 22"-30"]
D: We have to
Others: 'w e
-> M: HANG ON hang on they're replying.
-> D: 'oh it's alright th' they can go together.
M: "oh0
Example 18 she sanctions M again. They both are monitoring the construction of a
contribution by the other party when D displays a shift towards also constructing. M claims
that this is inappropriate, "wait wait (pause) let them", as they should be allowed to finish the
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EXAMPLE 18 - [M5: 31 "-40"]
The other party is typing a construction. D and M are both monitoring.
D: yeah ((moves towards keyboard and gaze to keyboard))




-> D: no 'cause ((points at screen)) i type ( )
M: 'oh right ok
construction uninterrupted7. D challenges this claim by arguing and providing evidence
through talk and gesture that indicates the separation of the dialogue space into allocated
windows that simultaneous typing is possible. M responds to this much more affirmatively
and from then on the orientation to 'one party at a time' is undermined. In the first example,
D does not continue the overlapping construction, but in the second he does which does not
lead to any problems later except that J must accommodate the construction to the sense of
the other party's simultaneous developing construction.
Another illustration of sanctioning, first off stage, ie. not in the VDS, and then explicitly in the
VDS, is given in Example 19. The second explicit sanction leads temporarily to a return to
'one party, one floor'. These demonstrate that the notion of 'interruption' of a 'turn-at-typing'
exists for some of the participants. J has just finished a projectably complete contribution,
ending with "Cherry Hinton Hall" and continues with "Ang". But, D responds to the prior
EXAMPLE 19 - [M5: 19'16"-19'36"]
J: ...Cherry Hinton Hall
Ang
D: 'The nusery is to the east of cherry hinton hall.
-> J: i wish this guy wouldn't interrupt when i'm typing ( finished) ((laugh))
contribution thus unintentionally overlapping with J's 'continuing' construction, ie. in effect,
they have both self-allocated and thus for J, "Ang" is a continuation, but for D the item does
not exist yet. J makes a mistake and so looks up to the screen, notices the overlap and halts.
At the completion of D's competing construction J mentions the incident to his coparticipant
thus revealing his interpretation that the other party interrupted him.
7 Note that M's sanctioning of D's moves towards simultaneous construction are not claims that
it is a physical impossibility, ie. that one at a time turn-taking is a property of the system.
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A little later, J explicitly sanctions the other party with the contribution, "STOP
INTERRUPTING" (see Example 20). J has apparently finished a projectably complete
contribution ending "on ourmap". He pauses and then usesato demonstrate continuation.
However, that pause is enough for D to self-select and thus competitive onset arises in which
D legitimately responds but J can only find it as an interruption. The importance of a single
EXAMPLE 20 - [M5: 20'54"-21'05"]




D: [OK, return to CHERRY]
► J: 'right come on .THH ( me) STOP interrupting (me )
D: HINTON ROAS
> J: [STOP INTERRUPTING1
J: Do we turn off...
focused 'floor' for J is demonstrated in the dramatic response that J gives in order to wrest
the 'turn' back from the other party.
In Example 21, which illustrates orientation to some sort of 'floor' of participation, one party
is interpreting the absence of a completion of a construction, while the other party find a
completer based on the material already in play on the screen. J reads the construction as
incomplete, ie. with an extended terminal syllable, and after a long pause suggests an ending.
But, M is concerned about a problematic item mentioned in the prior dialogue. J does not
respond and M poses a possible contribution dealing with that problematic item. J now claims
that such a contribution is not immediately relevant at this point and would "put them off". J
displays that it is the other party's 'turn' and they are in the middle of constructing a
contribution. M doesn't continue with the suggestion, and they play 'wait and see'8. J
constructs some other possible interpretations of the reasons for the absence of the other
party's dialogue activity. Finally, the other party respond with a completer. This example is
also interesting from the point of view of the other party as they attempt to find an ending for
their construction. Rather than abandon it they work on finishing from the materials already
in play. The incomplete construction has been entered on the VDS record and now an
appropriate noun phrase must be found. S and R continually invoke the incomplete material
as requiring an ending by typically repeating fragments of it in a quotation voice with terminal
syllable extension. The possibility of repairing the material already in play is not entertained
8 Later, this query arises again and this time is instigated in the VDS.
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EXAMPLE 21 - [M10: 11'48"-12'10"]
Others: ...which goes past the®
J arid M try to interpret and predict the completion of this construction.
J:
(longpause)
{which goes past thee:}
(longpause)
J: "railway line"?
M: 'shall we query this jetty thing.
(° can't see that jetty")
(pause)
(we just say we can't see a jetty on our map.)
-> J: urn: (.) i think that will just- (.) put them off.
(longpause)
J: (i wonder what they're trying to do)
(longpause)
J: trying to decide what the footpath goes past.
(longpause)
others: ((finally complete the construction with "cement works"))
The others, S and R, are engaged in finding a completer for the initial construction above.
-* S: {which goes past the:} (.) water (.) is it=
R: =<cement works.
S: cement works.
-> R: {past thee-}
(pause)
R: what's this stuff here.
-> S: follow the footpath () {which goes PAST: THEE:}
R: past the jetty.
(pause)
-> S: {past,} (pause) hang on that might take them that way
y'see towards where it says jetty,
R: 'oh yes (that's right.)
-* S: {which goes past the:}
R: that goes straight on. (.) i s'pose.
S: {that goes,}
-> ((S tries to remove the half completed construction, but it cannot be undone.))
R: no.
S: o'i can't bahck uph ((laugh)) .hh
-> R: {past the cement works} if you see that then ( )=
S: ={past the} cement works.
((S types "cement works"))
at this point. Unfortunately, an apposite ending is difficult to find and R suggests an
alternative requiring the editing of some of the original material, eg. That goes straight on"
instead of "which goes past the". S repeats the initial That goes" in quotation voice and tries
to delete the characters from the VDS but finds that it is not possible to go "bahck uph" with
the DELETE key. To resolve the problem, R suggests an ending The cement works" that S
-155-
carries out. The possible trajectory of the incomplete construction is continually shaped by
the syntactic and semantic material of the just prior contribution construction and the medium.
The VDS record is a pervasive surface on which contributions must be constructed within
the evolving circumstances of prior work on that surface.
3. Occurrences of more than one speaker at a time are common, but brief (in
conversation).
Participants do orient sometimes to a speaker, but commonly they are constructing at the
same time. Constructions of contributions by both parties do occur at the same time and for
quite a long period that are non-competitive, ie. they are not brief overlaps nor competing for
mutual attention.
4. Transitions from one turn to a next with no gap and no overlap between them
are common (in conversation).
This is not true. Gaps are long when orienting to 'turns', from one to twenty seconds.
Otherwise, constructions are regularly overlapped when the notion of a valued 'turn' of the
floor is undermined. However, there are examples of closely monitored rapid or briefly
overlapped transitions. In Example 22, the recipient's activity is closely coordinated with the
other party's construction of a contribution. Both coparticipants are reading the current
production by the other party. This means that they can coordinate their response in relation




to the other party's contribution construction immediately they find an appropriate place to
do so. In this case, a slight overlap occurs because of the projectability of "on the right" as
complete enough for their purposes. The other party's construction confirms the success of
locating a destination - M responds "yes" and D simultaneously replies with "BINGO!" in the
VDS. Note that this is before the clear completion of the construction because it is misspelt
and then transformed from a possible statement into a specific question after D's reply.
17'07" j
M:(s)
D:(s) k s m
M: {on the,} yes.
D: {on, the, right,}
D: CD ® BINGO!®®
J: 0 n • t h e • r i g h t t ?
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.h well we found the road but we can't no
(( laugh ))
D













Example 23 is similar to the previous but illustrates selt-selection in the other party's
construction that also collaboratively completes the construction simultaneously. M and D
are closely monitoring the ongoing construction "youve found the" when M suggests a
possible response projecting from the material so far. The contribution continues
simultaneously with "school" and M responds "no" to her coparticipant. The item "school"
now predicts and completes non-syntactically her own speech itself, eg. 'we found the road
but we can't... school'. Note that the talk is embedded in the visual and temporal
circumstances of looking at the display - her coparticipant could not understand the talk
without interpreting it in sequential relation to the characters appearing and as a commentary
on those characters as a contribution. The construction continues with "or just" and M
predicts what the completing noun phrase will be but only indicates this by commenting "yes".
Her coparticipant immediately looks to the keyboard and starts the completion with the same
initial shape as the other party before the noun phrase is distinguishable. A successful
completion is achieved which both completes the construction in progress with an identical
and timely shape and also answers the question put by the other party in the process. This
sort of self-selection is not always so smooth and will shall see that early self-selection is one
reason why turn-taking similar to conversation becomes unstable and a new order of
participation emerges in the VDS.
5. Turn order is not fixed, but varies (in conversation).
-157-















we have to guide ((D and M attend to other party's construction))
'we have a starting point on a ®
map of Cambridge, England ®
'you round certain ®
P
ok.
((D deletes 'p' and scrolls window clean))
Do you
'we have the same map"
((D and M are now unsure of their statement))
have a similar map]
' ( (D deletes 'the same map'))
oh. ((M has noticed the other party's contribution))
((D types 'a'))
{do you have a similar} (.) Put (.) Put (.)
' ((D deletes 'We have a'))
we don't know (pause) probably
We think so
This is the same in the VDS, but more regular than conversation because of the problem
solving task. It has been observed that casual personal use of the VDS is more similar to
conversational talk in its distribution of turns.
6. Turn size is not fixed, but varies (in conversation).
This is the same in the VDS because a particular phenomenon is the contingent construction
of a turn, that is, a turn may be altered or abandoned or continued in a new trajectory because
of the bursts of monitoring of the display for evidence of new actions, eg. a new chunk, or a
contribution under construction, by the other party could lead to a revision of the current
contribution.
EXAMPLE 25 - [M5: 12'30"-12'56"]




D: okay. ((D and M both look to map))
others: ((Others continue with 'however we have got to'))
M: <right, so they should be able to get onto coldhams, lane.
D: 'Canyousee 'coldhams lane,
((both look to screen and notice other party's construction))
((D types and deletes 'c'))
{we have got,}
M: '{however we have got to,}
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Example 24 nicely illustrates the interactive construction of a contribution because of the
monitoring of the other party's 'competing' construction. D starts almost simultaneously with
the other party and types "We have to guide". D and M then attend to the other ongoing
construction. After a while, in other party mid-construction, D continues on from the hung
construction with "you round certain p". However, D abandons it in order to address the now
complete turn by the other party. After constructing an appropriate response, "We have the
same map", again in overlap with the other party, they have doubts and so some of it is pruned
in order to continue. But, at this point M notices and reads the other's construction "Do you
have a similar map". This fits in with D's revised proposed statement, but their next actions
show that as the proposal stands it is not really addressing the question. Ratherthan continue
with the incomplete edited turn, it is abandoned as suggested by M with "Put (.) we don't
know", and an appropriate answer to the question is constructed. Therefore this example
illustrates that contribution size is subject to local contingencies.
The empirical ambiguity of contribution completion points for the recipients is shown in
Example 25. J responds to the turn construction, "Obviously you map is more detailed", with
the exclamation "BLAST!". However, the other party had not finished the contribution
because they continue with Than ours". The comment by J can then by re-interpreted not as
a post-turn contribution but as a sort of backchannel to the main contribution in progress.
Now, D and M both recognise Than ours" as a continuation that leads to a new completion
point. D and M orient to the map, but the other party continues unnoticed with more, "however
we have got to". At the same time, D and M decide on an appropriate contribution and D
types the letter "c", the first letter of their proposed contribution. At this point, the other party's
continuation is discovered, D abandons the proposed construction, and they wait for the final
completion. The ambiguity of completion points is another reason for the slide from
EXAMPLE 26 - [M8: 4'02"-4'40"]
G: Directions to follow
(pause)
Left (pause) Blinco Grove ®
((both look to map))
E : o . k. ®
((K looks to screen))
K: okay.
((K looks to map and G to screen))
K: right urn:
((G looks to map))
so it's (.) left
-> E: how fsr? ((K and G do not notice))
-*■ G: Then left...
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turn-based dialogue into simultaneous and parallel contributions discussed in the section on
'double dialogues'.
7. Relative distribution of turns is not specified in advance (in conversation).
This is the same.
8. Number of parties can change (in conversation).
No, the parties are always two in number in the study, though this does not have to be so in
any VDS. Multiparty computer-mediated communication is feasible though the
synchronisation of multiple contributions in visual space is difficult.
9. Turn allocation techniques are obviously used (in conversation).
They are sometimes used. But Example 26 illustrates how the weak mutual monitoring
characteristic of the VDS leads to unratified allocation. G first displays with a metacomment
"Directions to follow" what is going to happen next and thus what they are engaged in doing
and why there might be a delay to the other party. The route construction is then given as
"Left Blinco Grove". After looking at the map K returns to the screen to find an affirmative
response "o.k." by the other party. This is also recognised by G who looks to the screen.
They then return to the map to construct the next direction sequence. Meanwhile the other
party continues with a contribution "how fsr?". This goes unnoticed as G and K construct
their next contribution. Thus both parties have self-allocated in an ambiguous
post-completion position, but they are both unratified. Unratified allocation would be a
constraint if the medium of communication was transient, because, in simple terms,
coordination of production and reception is essential. However, the graphic properties of this
modality eliminate this constraint. This means that communicative activity in the VDS tends
to frequently engender simultaneous or 'overlapping' contributions that are unratified by the
other party.
10. Various 'turn-constructional units' are employed (in conversation).
Constructions are not given as such but they have projectable characteristics as complete
contributions. This leads to early self-selection and the loss of 'turn' orientation because of
the unratified allocation.
11. Repair mechanisms for dealing with turn-taking errors and violations
obviously are available for use (in conversation).
There are several of the typical repair mechanisms to be found in talk. For example, there
are self-editing repairs, eg. repair of misspelling or turn misplacement by deleting or scrolling
(using the DELETE or RETURN key). Also, there are some other-initiated repairs, eg.
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expectable turn allocation take-up if a turn is missing in a 'reasonable' time ("go on !"), or
echo-question repair of sequentially strange contributions ("ANG?"). But, many that are
operative in repairing troubles in conversational talk are unavailable because errors or
violations of turn-taking systematics transform the organisation of participation itself. For
instance, self-selecting in overlap is a violation of the turn-taking systematics but in the VDS
it is not resolved by the participants. It is demonstrably not problematic on many occasions
and is thus a regular phenomena to be explained.
Let us return to some general observations about the VDS with respect to a systematics of
EXAMPLE 27 - [M8: 4'24"-5'50"]
E : o . k .
((K and G attend to their next construction and not to the screen))
-* E: how fsr?=
G: =Then left A1307 mark Homerton Teachers Col
((K and G both look to the screen))
(longpause)
-> G: oh wait a minute (.) ok, how?




-> K: '{how far.}
-> G: how far! (.) right.= ((G and then K look to map))
K: =oh.
(pause)
-» K: .hh if they've got- ((K looks to screen)) um-
((K looks to map, G to screen))
((K looks to screen))
G: let's see if they've picked this up.
(longpause)
K: ((looks to map, back to screen and then to map again))
to
Others: what
((G starts to read aloud, K looks to screen))
Others: road is it on?
K&D: ((both return to the map))
turn-taking. In talk turn-taking there are two hypothesized components. First, a speaker is
given a turn-constructional unit. Second, next turns are allocated in situ according to two
principles: the current speaker selects next speaker or allocation by self-selection. The
systematics is a description of structural resources that analysably inform the contingent
accomplishment of participation in situ. But in the VDS the lack of a routine synchronisation
of monitoring leads to the disintegration of the systematics and the 'turn' as an achievable
phenomena. This causes problems for the coordination of sequential interpretations routinely
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achieved in talk. But this does not result in the disintegration of the dialogue itself because
there does emerge a different organisation of dialogue, namely 'double dialogues', that will
be discussed later.
For example, an apparently completed construction can become a troublesome item when
the recipient interprets it some time later because of delayed monitoring (see Example 27).
After an apparently terminal "o.k." by the other party, K and G attend to the design of their
next construction. Meanwhile the other party continue with "how fsr?". After they have typed
their construction, "Then left A1307 mark Homerton Teachers Col", K and G both look to the
screen. K notices first the unratified contribution and they both proceed to resolve this
sequentially ambiguous item. For the other party it was produced adjacent to the prior
direction instruction by K and G which was "Left Blinco Grove"; to resolve the extent of the
distance to proceed along that road (not the A1307). The just completed response by K and
G resolves this problem and so is an appropriate answer to their query. But, for K and G it
poses a distinctive problem. Unwittingly it now appears sequentially out of turn and it is not
clearwhat interpretation should be entertained. For example, it could be that the contribution
is to be understood in relation to the immediately prior as they find it, which is "mark Homerton
Teachers Col". Thus the item shows that the destination has not been found and clarification
is required. Equally, the item could be placed as requesting elaboration of the distance to
travel when following the direction instruction "then left A1307" before the completer "mark
Homerton Teachers Col" was typed. But K finally appears to relegate it as an old item not
relevant to their immediate route construction dialogue when she says "let's see if they've
picked this up". But G is still visibly puzzled by the item. The other party respond with "what
road is it on?" and this indirectly resolves their dilemma.
In writing letters, a turn at 'communicating' is oriented to by the participants in the
correspondence itself, eg. a writer can indicate that a letter can be out of turn having crossed
in the post, a letter can be noticeably absent or late, and a letter can refer to prior letters
(Mulkay 1986). So, the concept of a 'turn' is found in the participants' displays and
orientations to their own participation organised through the physical constraints of
production, reception, monitoring, etc. The notion of 'turn' is a contingent property of the
interaction, being worked on within multiple constraints. In general, participants cannot just
act at any time in interaction, there must be physical or social resources for managing the
sense of actions being in relation to others.
However, in the VDS the participants can save time and produce overlapping responses that
weaken the analytic notion of 'turn'. Participant's tend to produce responses within their own
time of monitoring - a response is due when a string has been interpreted as relevant
contribution by the other party. However, coparticipants do orient to the appropriate time for
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a response with respect to the other party, and thus adjacency is still a resource. The routine
allocation techniques are weakened in the VDS and the shared floor reduces to parallel
activities where parties can attend to a contribution after its projection or two streams of
EXAMPLE 28 - [M9: 3'42"-4'05"]
J: at the
((Success of earlier step becomes problematic in their talk))
((J deletes 'at the'))
-> Others: where
J: 'youve found the®
S: (they're) typing something.
J: school or just he road?®
Others: [ju st the road}®
-> S: where just-
J: the road. (.) ok.
S: just the road, ok.
participation that are simultaneously interleaved. It is possible, as has been shown above,
for a temporary return to an orientation to a 'floor' to occur.
So, participation in the VDS is a continual and contingent issue for the participants. They
are borrowing the normal, everyday practices of conversational interaction in order to
constitute the significance of and interpret actions. Participants find the string of characters
appearing throughout the session sensical. To them, turns are constructed in front of their
very eyes and become sedimented in the semi-permanent graphic window. Alternatively,
new responses can be recovered from the graphic window after they have been produced
by recognising changes that have not been seen before. The boundaries of actions and the
continual classification of priors are locally constituted; maybe with multiple and changing
interpretations. For example, in several data fragments there is evidence that prior or
abandoned characters, in the process of constituting communicative actions, are interpreted
as part of the current communicative action. Let us look at Example 28. Both parties are
engaged in simultaneous turn construction. One party stops after "where", but J continues.
A little later her coparticipant S notices the initial typing by the other party and comments
They're typing something". Towards the end of J's construction the other party collaboratively
overlap and S initially reads their contribution as "where just". This is because in the VDS
the abandoned construction and the next that is relevant at this point are on the same line
with no punctuating marker. Thus the boundaries of communicative contributions is
empirically problematic for participants in this case.
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5.4.5 Contributions in a Dialogue: Conditional Relevance
In talk, turn-taking establishes a seriality to participation on which an adjacency assumption
can be built. A current turn by one party is expectably oriented to in the next turn by the other
party and that turn will be interpreted as such unless otherwise provided for. But in the VDS
there is no mutual ratification of a 'turn' at typing and unratified allocation occurs frequently.
The instability of weakened allocation leads to the disintegration of the singular seriality of
dialogue, ie. there is no mutual floor and simultaneous construction is common. However,
some sense must be found in the characters displayed in the relevant window on the display,
or the absence of type that occurs, eg. it could be a machine error, or random typing by an
unknowing participant, or a reply to a question, or an unwarranted interruption. The issue
for the coparticipants is: What sense do the display changes have in terms of prior
communication and the practical activity? It is perfectly possible for the participants to type
continually or when they feel like it. This is also possible in talk, but does not happen. In
order for shared understanding to be achieved and maintained in multi-participant
communication and interaction, the relevance of actions to each other must be constituted
in some way. My actions must relate to yours in ways that are mutually intelligible. In the
VDS, the participants are continually achieving the sense of what an action is through its
placement with respect to prior actions by themselves and the other party as they construct
their participation.
EXAMPLE 29 - [M10: 11'14"-11'31"]




((S looks to map))
R: .h take the footpath: that goes past ( )
-► S: '< i don't know if they've seen that
((S and R look to screen))
((S looks to map)) yet=cause they havn't said anything.
-> R: "right", we could type it ((S looks back to screen)) in anyway.
(pause)
S: yes ok. erm: ((they both look to map))
R: 'urn,
R: take the footpath ...
Example 29 shows that adjacency is a resource for interpreting the dialogue but rather than
orient to an expectable adjacent response they continue on with further contributions.
Participants S and R construct a direction terminating with "a jetty". R works on the map
while S waits for a reply from the other party. Then R orients to a possible next activity, S
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EXAMPLE 30 - [M5: 3'05"-3'30"]
D: left or right side of map ?
(longpause)
D: ((looks to map))
-» o'come on (.) you've gotta be able to tell us that!
((looks to screen))
(longpause)
Others: Can you see the Government...
The other party, J and R, are working on a possible response while D and M wait.
D: left or right side of map?
R: light- side of the \map
J: 'right.
R: no it's not it's in the centre.
J: 'ohJ
J: .hhhh
R: 'ah but half
J: (hold on)
R: between,
J: if they've got...
-> J: how can we describe it much better
J: ((starts to type construction))
looks to the map, and thus mutually engaged, R launches into the next direction instruction.
S overlaps towards the end, "i don't know if they've seen that yet", claiming that another
contribution would be inappropriate at this point as no expectable sequentially adjacent
response indicating receipt has been found in the VDS by S since the contribution was
finished. They both inspect the screen for evidence and then R proposes that they can type
it in anyway. S inspects the screen again and after a pause agrees "yes ok". They proceed
to construct a follow up contribution.
In Example 30, the conditional relevance of contributions is displayed. D types the
contribution "left or right side of the map ?" and they wait for an appropriate answer in second
position to the question. After a while, D looks to the map and then exclaims "you've gotta
be able to tell us that!" This displays, for D, that the delay signifies that the other party is
having trouble answering, but not that they have misunderstood the first part of the pair.
Finally, they respond with a question which can be interpreted in sequential position as
building in some way on the second position slot, eg. that they aren't sure about the answer
and require more information. However, as has been shown above, this cannot be relied
upon given the weak mutual monitoring, eg. the other party may not have received the
contribution and so their construction should not be interpreted in adjacent position. The
analyst must inspect both parties activities to see how the contributions are to be interpreted
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EXAMPLE 31 - [M8: 3'38"-3'55"]
Others: school located ®
E: school located, right, so they've got that, mhm?
R: Tight' 'ok, "right."
((E and R wait for a long time))
E: ("and now what they gonna tell us.")
R: now they'll ask us another question presumably'cause,
(pause) they're the ones who have the instructions,
(longpause)





Others: Directions to follow
and what resources are required to do that. In this case, J and R have recognised the
question and find they cannot answer either way - "it's in the centre". After some more talk
J suggests they find an alternative that would "describe it much better" and thus places the
work of constructing a contribution in the larger activity of finding landmarks in order to locate
items on the map surface. Also, it is designed as a response to the just prior adjacent question
and is interpreted as such.
An illustration of orientation to what is expected next is given in Example 31. After receiving
a response that confirms the other party have got the starting point, E and R wait for a turn
continuation - they do not self-select - for about 10 seconds. Then, E says softly, "and now
what the- they gonna tell us". R responds with "now they'll ask us another question
presumably 'cause, they're the ones who have the instructions". E and R have a firm
conviction that it is the other party's turn, and do not initiate repair even when the period of
inactivity grows long and noticeable. In the end, the other party, who have been working on
a suitable route plan on which to base a response, do continue and thus resolve the initial
doubts about what they are doing.
The above examples all illustrate that adjacency is still a strong resource for interpreting items
or their absence in the VDS. However, regularly in the VDS contributions are not received,
mislaid or misplaced and the relevance of an item to the evolving dialogue has to be judged
much later, if at all. An example of a sequential misplacement trouble was mentioned in the
last section with respect to the fragment [M8:4'24"-5'50"]. In the next extract in Example 32,
many contributions are no longer adjacent upon receipt, but which were originally placed in
that temporally sequential position. Also, there are multiple conditional relevancies of which
some are oriented to in talk and others in the VDS. This example requires an examination
of the dialogue from the two different perspectives of the parties involved. The dialogue
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EXAMPLE 32 - [M5: 5'55"-6,25"]




Can you see Addensbrookes Hospital?
Not yet, we're working on it.
((D and M search for starting point))
We have a primary school at
roughly the right place. How do you
know what it's called ?
(pause)
Is it opposite baldock way ?
{are you blind?}
((laugh))
are you stupid !=
={can you see the station?}
can we see the station=No th- we've got the primary school.
J: Good, yes
D: Right, we have to guide...
From the point of view of J and R.
Can you see Addensbrookes Hospital?
Not yet, we're working on it.
^Are you blind?
Can you see the station?
We have a primary school at
roughly the right place.How do you
know what it is called ?
oh the name's on our map.
Is it opposite baldock way ?
yeahs, it's here.
Good, yes correct
Right, we have to guide...
marked on the examples represents the temporal order of receipt. First, from the perspective
of M and D, the other party asks a question to which they respond in adjacent next position
with "Not yet, we're working on it". They then search for the starting point on the map surface,
find it and respond with one statement and two questions in quick succession. Each of these
has some expectable response in next adjacent position. For example, the first could be
followed by an assessment or confirmation, the second by a full answer, and the third with a
yes or no. While waiting D finds a contribution "are you blind?" by the other party on the
display. This is treated jokingly and not responded to in the VDS. M then finds another
contribution "can you see the station?" which is also not responded to. Neither of these
anomalous contributions is routinely interpretable in adjacent position because of the lack of
mutual monitoring. Neither have they been designed with their misplacement in mind as it
is an emergent and unwitting property of the interaction. Finally, the other party respond, in
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the face of three possible nexts from D and M's point of view. The response "Good, yes" can
be interpreted as orienting to the first and third according to their expectable formats. D then
moves onto a next activity in the task.
From the alternative point of view of the other party, who are J and R, J asks the question:
"Can you see Addensbrookes Hospital?", and the others respond negatively. In the context
of the dialogue so far they have not been very successful so J asks jokingly: "Are you blind?".
To help the search, J then asks another question: "Can you see the station?" This treats the
previous contribution as minor and now superseded. D then apparently replies that they may
have found the starting point and asks a question indicating a problem with the name. It is
ambiguous as a reply because it is not clear in the VDS whether adjacent positioning is a
valid resource. Thus, it cannot be determined whether or not the question about the station
helped them find the starting point. In this case, it did not and is only found later in the other
party's activities. The question is answered verbally by R, and the next question is also
verbally confirmed. J then responds "Good, yes correct" simultaneously dealing with the first
and third statements and generally tackling the wave of sequentially implicative contributions
that may be operative.
5.4.6 Emergent Organisations: Double Dialogue
The phenomenon of 'double dialogue' is an interesting dynamic in this modality because of
its properties and the social resources methodically deployed in achieving sense. Basically,
a two threaded dialogue is achieved as follows. Normally, participants in speech
conversation achieve an accountable sequential adjacency through the operation of a
'turn-taking system' by which one person speaks at a time. Sequential adjacency is still
important in the VDS, however, parties do not necessarily need to monitor transient events
and so more than one person can 'speak' at the same time. Either party can produce a
contribution as a response to some contribution by the other party, while the other is doing
the same but to a different topic, because the contributions can be produced as complete
and 'to be read a little later'. Topics can be developed simultaneously and can intertwine in
a way that is not feasible in spoken or signed dialogue. Simple examples occur in the data
because of the type of task they are engaged in, but conversational uses of the modality have
been observed in which extended 'double dialogues' are maintained. A detailed illustration
of the maintenance of extended 'double dialogues' is not dealt with in this thesis. Examples
DD1 and DD2 will illustrate. Two topical threads, indicated by the letters 'a' and 'b' or 'c' and
'd', are maintained simultaneously. The numbering is incremental by turn within each thread
and time progresses from left to right. At least two types of onset are possible and are found
in the early stages of double dialogues in the corpus.
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One type of onset happens when there is an ambiguous completion as shown in Example
DD1. This could occurwhen A types '3aaa' for different reasons. After a pause, A continues
at the same time as B, but neither knows about the others onset and so they are not turn
competitive. This has been shown to occur in the analyses above, eg. Examples 14 and 26.
At the termination of their respective constructions, each attends to the other's completed
contribution and responds to it at the same time. And so it continues until one attends to the
in progress construction of the other rather than respond to the prior.
In Example DD2, a second type of onset is illustrated. During A's '3cccccc' construction, B
self-selects early and starts a contribution that is predicated on a certain completion trajectory
of the interrupted construction. This turns out to be incorrect and thus two topics are now
potentially operative. This has been documented in the analyses above, eg. in Examples 14
and 24. Upon completion, each party can address the other's topic simultaneously, as before.
A good example of the ambiguity of a contribution completion point that leads into the
beginnings of a double dialogue is given in Example 33. D asks a meta question about the
requirements of the task, but the other party indicates there is a problem: "Stop". They
elaborate that they are lost. D then recycles the meta question thus showing that it was not
answered and is still relevant, and also claiming that it is valid for them to raise such an issue
at this time, eg. they have a right to a contribution. However, the other party also claim a
right because they construct a further elaboration of their problem. Thus the contribution "we
are lost" is problematic in terms of providing material for each party to coordinate their next
EXAMPLE DD1 - Possible double dialogue onset: ambiguous completion
A: laaaaa 3aaa 4aaaaaa 2bbb 6aaaaaa 8aaa
B: 2aaaaa » lbbbbbb 5aaa 3bbbb 7aaaaa
actions. But the medium allows simultaneous typing and so both parties construct
contributions dealing with distinct topics. Immediately after completing the recycle, M finds
the other party's construction relevant. At this point the double dialogue unwinds prematurely
but if D and M had constructed a contribution in reply then it would have overlapped with the
next response by the others which answers the recycled meta question, with "Of course".
Thus two topics would be in simultaneous and alternate progress in the VDS. Instead D
attends to the screen and waits for a reply to the recycle which is forthcoming. Only then do
EXAMPLE DD2 - Possible double dialogue onset: early self selection
A: lccccc 3ccccccc 2ddddd 5ccccc 4dd 6dddddd
B: 2ccccc ldddd 4cccc 3ddddd 5dddd
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they construct a contribution addressing the problematic directions and missing cement
works.
The occurrence of double dialogues is not surprising given that parallel or simultaneous
activities by the parties engaged in the VDS are prevalent, eg. as documented in Examples
EXAMPLE 33 - [M5: 9'55"-10'25"]
D and M have just given a route direction.
D: Are you marking the route too?®
( (D looks to screen))
Others: Stop,
D: {STOhP!} ((M looks to screen))
Others: we are lost






-> Others: We have no cement works
-* D: 'Are you marking the route too?®
M: {we have no cement works?}
((M and D look to map))
((D looks back to screen))
Others: ®Of course
D: {of course.} ok. ((M looks to screen))
D: ®OK. From the ...
21 and 27. If each party can attend to divergent activities simultaneously, eg. both are looking
at their map at the same time, and if one party can attend to another activity, eg. looking at
the map, while one party constructs a contribution in the dialogue, then it could be possible
that both parties attend to their own dialogue constructions while disattending the other. That
is, one party can engage in the activity of constructing a contribution at one and the same
time as the other party are also engaging in constructing a contribution to a different topic
but to the same dialogue. Note, there is a difference between parallel and simultaneous
dialogues: parallel dialogues are simultaneous but are concerned with the same issue or
problem, so double dialogues are parallel. Another sort of parallel dialogue organisation
called 'byplay' occurs commonly in multi-party gatherings when hecklers conduct
simultaneous commentarieswith other recipients on the ongoing 'legal' talk that occupies the
floor (Goodwin, personal communication). Other forms of simultaneous dialogue activity are
emerging in the research literature but none have the property of focused intertwining of
topics simultaneously by only two parties.
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Unfortunately, the data in this study was not very good at showing extended double
dialogues9. A fast dialogue situation would encourage more highly developed examples.
There are many in conversational use of the modality and they were first observed in pilot
EXAMPLE DD3 - Digressions in conversational talk
A: leeeee 3eee 4eeee 2fffff 6eeeee
B: 2eeeee lffff 5eeeee 3fffff
studies and observations of conversational uses of the VDS by competent routine users. In
these cases, sequential adjacency is still a very important resource in achieving mutual
intelligibility. However, it is not a mutually monitored temporal adjacency as in spoken
conversation in contexts of copresence but a reconstructed adjacency from the perspective
of each participant that emerges in the dialogue itself. The participants contingently achieve
two threads of dialogue each with their own sequential development.
Is 'double dialogue' possible in speech? No, because of the real time coordination of speech
production and reception. Probably, the nearest example is for both participants to be
EXAMPLE DD4 - 'Theatre of the absurd' play dialogues
A: lggggg 2ggggg 3gggg 4g 5ggggg
B: lhhhhh 2hhhhh 3hhhh 4hhhh
alternating topics, but only one participant will be in phase with the other (see Example DD3).
This is quite a regular occurrence in copresent circumstances where several activities are
possible, one verbal and one physical. One activity may be treated as a digression or side
sequence. Occasionally participants do overlap a number of speech segments as they
complete their turn construction and allow the other party brief turns at talk. But these are
competitive non-attentive moments in problematic talk. Double dialogues are not competitive
nor problematic practices. Is 'double dialogue' possible in fictional dramatic dialogue plays?
You can have patterns where the participants ignore each other's content but appear to
interact by managing the turns in a normal conversational manner. In Example DD4 above
both A and B are not visibly paying attention to each other's topic, though they may be, but
are still managing to coordinate turns at not paying attention to what each other says.
9 It is not clear from the corpus whether or not the dynamics they were engaged in was a
necessary step towards competent double dialogue use.
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5.5 Summary and Relevance to Computer Models
This chapter has presented an analysis of the achievement of communication in the virtual
dialogue space, which is indeed a skilled contingent accomplishment by the participants
wrested from the circumstances and emergent dynamics of their mutual engagement. For
example, without routine mutual coordination the sequential placement of contributions
becomes problematic. Crucial features of the VDS are: the visual, temporal and spatial
qualities of the VDS in contrast to spoken talk; the permanence-transience qualities of the
medium; the dialogue distance between participants that allows them to treat the dialogue
not only as a mutual focus of attention but also at other times as a disengaged distributed
activity; and the emergence of new orders of participation. The VDS is a problematic yet
skilfully coordinated achievement that shows it is not possible to predict what organisations
will emerge in odd or particular circumstances.
Dialogue in the VDS routinely has quite a different organisation though it can only be
understood with reference to the organisation of conversational talk. The VDS has certain
characteristics which are in flux because of the weak mutual monitoring and permanence
characteristic of the medium, and thus the activity is not quite like talk or writing. However,
the dialogue does border on being similar to writing correspondence at times, and at these
points the reduced characteristics of interchange dialogue are evident. In the VDS the
constraints characteristic of interchange dialogue are lost. No longer is there a strict turn
boundary delimitation, nor a single focus of mutual dialogue activity. Because of the flux
between different participation orders, the complexity and crucial features of achieving that
participation are revealed. The analyses illustrate three gulfs or simplifications inherent in
the interchange model of dialogue.
1. (a) 'here is what you have been waiting for* - like wrapping up a message in
private and then handing it over. The in situ chronic work of producing a
message is not available as a performance. Only the residue or product can be
inspected and it is so designed by the participants. This is not an inherent
characteristic of the VDS, but can occur when participants are engaged in
parallel activities.
1. (b) 'take it or leave it' - like wrapping up a message in public, but without
recipient design. This is a less extreme form of (a). A contribution can be
performed with a recipient audience, but design of that performance cannot be
altered on the basis of attentiveness to the recipient's complementary actions.
This is a contingent characteristic of the VDS, but the trajectory of ongoing
contributions are regularly altered in response to the other party's constructions.
2. 'wait until I say' - like exchanging messages with the rule, "give me a
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message only when I have given you one". The current turn-holder is in full
control of turn allocation which can only be allocated on the explicit signal of that
person. This is not the case in the VDS because participants must locally
construct their participation.
In the restricted and non-everyday modality encountered, there is a rapid adaption and
development of resources and organisations. New circumstances and contingent emergent
problems lead to a tottering achievement of sense through borrowings and the documentary
method. Rather than the routine and transparent flow of conduct, special interactional jobs
need to be done. Some are recurrent and lead to sedimented forms of conduct and practices.
This finding supports Wynn's claims that there is "a locally meaningful and workable
background of practices that members of communities continually re-negotiate and
re-establish implicitly in the course of performing" (1979, p. 7) and that The discourse
supporting activities of natural conversation always address practical concerns." (1980, p.
89)
This chapter has shown that an empirical methodology can fruitfully examine the situated
practices of those involved in dialogue. With respect to computer models of dialogue, the
analyses have shown that interactivity is a constitutive domain of dialogue that cannot a priori
be ignored. Orders of interaction should not be dismissed from a theory nor taken for granted,
otherwise the simplifications pin-pointed above become the properties of dialogue implicitly
reproduced in computer models, like that of Grosz & Sidner (1986), and interesting
phenomena are thus excluded. For example, the situated achievement of dialogic presence
and monitoring, as well as the local management of participation in presence from the
materials at hand, have been taken for granted. Thus aspects of the performance of action,
the emergence of participation orders and the texture of interaction are ignored in the model
so that a set of constraints on interpretation are lost. In addition the data used in the empirical
justification of many models has not only lost a sense of interactive life, but also of temporal
life. That is, an authentic dialogue may have characteristics of the interchange model, but
the model renders it in abstract time. The danger is that the interchange model and its
underlying ideology are to be reified in the actual design and conception of dialogue systems
based on such models. The wealth of interactional resources that give priority to the visibility
and local achievement of action could be useful for systems which provide limited access to
already depleted circumstances and which over-represent and over-rationalise resulting in
unwieldy inferential mechanisms.
The next chapter will look at some of the interactional resources that may help the creation
of interesting novel artifacts. In addition, the methods used in the study are also applicable
to the evaluation and analysis of people's use of such artifacts. The first step required is a
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naturalistic analysis of routine human collaborative conduct with artifacts in a workspace.
The chapter will take a careful look at the coordination and intelligibility of multiple human
activities in contexts of copresence that interleave talk, body and artifacts. In combination
with the analyses explicated in this chapter, which are restricted in the manner of possible
artifact modalities a perspective on computer dialogue artifacts is presented. Providing for
interaction will yield a wealth of resources and positive constraints.
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Chapter 6
DESIGNING FOR INTERACTIVITY WITH DIALOGUE
ARTIFACTS
6.1 Introduction
The study reported in Chapters 4 and 5 has demonstrated that an empirical methodology
derived from conversation analysis (CA) can reveal the situated interactional work of
constituting dialogue 'through' machines. This adds to an understanding of how people
manage to coordinate and communicate in circumstances quite different from everyday talk.
In combination with Chapter 3 it points to a range of interactional phenomena that have been
taken for granted or ignored by computer models of dialogue. Also, the study exposes a
number of features that can help in the design of computer-mediated communication
systems. The modality is, however, quite similar to what could be expected in near future
computer system design which supports dialogue 'with' machines. What consequences do
the arguments of Chapter 3 and the study have for dialogue 'with' machines?
It is argued that an unnecessary restriction is placed on the design of systems supporting
dialogue 'with' machines if interactivity is ignored. Contemporary computer models of
dialogue contribute to the weak theoretical conception of just what dialogue is and how
machines and humans could engage in dialogue. Insight into human dialogue practices
demands that the interchange model be abandoned and the resources and dynamics of
interaction recovered. Given the reconceptualisation of dialogue argued for above, it is
necessary to examine carefully the situated and circumstantial coordination of action and
achievement of mutual intelligibility rather than reproduce specific human activities such as
everyday natural language conversation. It must be remembered that users ground and
sustain the metaphor of dialogue 'with' a machine and thus a shift to a human-centred
perspective that supports user's work and sense-making practices in their activities
conducted in and through the machine would be more appropriate. The activities of users
are also available for study, and the empirical methodology used in the investigation, eg. the
transcription methods, could be applied to evaluating and analysing dialogue artifact use.
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It is a claim of this thesis that designing for dialogic presence and interactivity will be one
major contributor to more appropriate dialogue artifacts. A priority must be to eliminate the
restrictions on dialogue interaction that come with the interchange model. But this does not
just mean that the user or system be given opportunities to influence the construction of an
activity, eg. the monolithic textual explanation found in manuals should be broken down in
computer help or advice systems and the user given opportunities to influence the
presentation of an explanation at the time it is required according to the user's needs. In
addition, it is argued in this thesis that the construction of dialogue contributions or
participation itself must be locally managed and subject to interactional pressures.
In order to gain some insight into what might be possible and the problems to be faced, a
fragment illustrating the complexity of human copresent interaction will be briefly analysed.
In Chapter 5 the analyses documented how participants contingently achieved dialogic
presence and coordinated monitoring, and thus how performance features and a texture of
interaction became important for constructing and interpreting action. How their participation
was locally organised out of the materials at hand resulting in a shift towards parallel activities
and emergent orders of participation, such as double dialogues, was discussed. Two more
features to those found in the empirical study are isolated here: the complementarity of
actions, and the embodied achievement of performance. The first is additional to reciprocal
action and adjacent interpretation and is found especially in sign language conversation and
copresent talk where actions by the same or more than one party are simultaneously
produced and display an orientation to the other's actions. The second is the perceptual
locus of the production of action connected with the body that is lost in the production of
cultural artifacts. For instance, the monitorable shift into and out of action that provide
resources for coordination of recipiency and action by other parties, eg. the body, gaze and
arm movements before the acme of a gesture.
From the empirical study and its findings a number of recommendations will be made. First,
because of the nature of dialogue artifacts, the sustaining of dialogue 'with' machines and
the emergent properties of dialogue in more interactive circumstances, the user's behaviour
must be channelled. The system's poor access to the resources of action can be alleviated
by guiding the user in predesigned ways. Second, interactivity should be a basic
consideration in the conception and design of dialogue artifacts. Artifacts should support
dialogic presence - a background of mutually accessible 'visible' communicative resources
and circumstances - and the performance of action which is a monitorable and observable
embodied accomplishment with emergent characteristics. These features will provide an
experiential texture for the coordination of simultaneous and parallel actions and activities.
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The recommendations of this chapter pose a challenge for design that could be incorporated
into traditional models, but a shift towards embodied systems active in real temporal-spatial
contexts is necessary. However, it is hard to make generalisations about how to design
computer environments supporting the metaphor of dialogue with a user because in human
conduct dialogic interaction is a contingent accomplishment on each occasion. Any
alteration in the normal circumstances and thus the resources of dialogue activity will result
in the unintuitive disintegration and transformation of that activity as the study reported in
Chapter 5 has shown can occur. In the VDS the notion of 'turn' and a mutual floor of speaking
in the construction of participation lost sense as participants conducted parallel activities and
moved towards a different order, viz. double dialogues. So, certain characteristic features
of human dialogue will be not be reproduced in the resulting dialogue 'with' the machine. It
is more than likely that in trying to achieve a semblance of dialogue presence by design, the
dynamics of the emergent local activity will neither be predictable nor stable. The feasibility
or appropriateness of these suggestions is of course an empirical issue that requires
extensive research, design and evaluation.
6.2 Consequences for Dialogue Artifacts
Practically, ingenious design combined with testing may do much to extend the
limits of useful machine behavior. Theoretically, understanding the limits of
machine behavior challenges our understanding of the resources of human
action. Just as the project of building intelligent artifacts has been enlisted in
the sen/ice of a theory of mind, the attempt to build interactive artifacts, taken
seriously, could contribute much to an account of situated human action and
shared understanding. (Suchman 1987, p. 189)
6.2.1 Conception
It has been shown that certain aspects of computational modelling of dialogue are
problematic, and that the adaption of conversation analytic methods to form an interactional
analytic methodology is suitable for the analysis of a virtual dialogue space. To return to the
issues raised in Chapter 3, what consequences do the last two chapters that analyse the
achievement of a VDS have for dialogue artifact conception, design and evaluation? A major
aim of Chapters 4 and 5 was to illustrate that dialogue interaction is more than just the
repeated exchange of dialogue objects between abstract entities, as dialogue artifacts have
tended to be conceived as supporting. Models are used as a theoretical platform on which
to design and conceive of practical systems that are intended to engage with a user in
'dialogue', and therefore the ideology can be instantiated in those systems. For example,
the following definitions by Edwards & Mason (1988) are indicative of the weak conceptions
of dialogue prevalent up to now in human-computer interaction (HCI) research. Dialogue is
defined as the Temporally limited interaction between two or more relatively autonomous
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entities through a sequence ot exchanged messages" (p. 140). Messages "can be thought
of as a collection of data of arbitrary length which passes uninterrupted from one dialogue
partner to another" (ibid).
However, the unity of a 'message' and the boundaries between them that are very clear for
the participants (and observer) in interchange dialogue systems becomes less precise in
dialogic circumstances approaching copresence. The 'interchange model', implicit in the
conception of dialogue that is pervasively present in computational models, ignores the
importance of interaction for the everyday achievement of intelligibility in dialogue. There are
two very good reasons for not using the interchange model. It produces dull artifacts with
strict action sequences requiring all dialogic work to be done within the explicit speaker-only
turns that make up the sequences. Also, there is an unavoidable deficit of important
constraints on interpretation. For example, the absence of activity in a locally organised
interaction can have a significance not possible in temporally abstract interchange dialogue.
This has been documented in conversation where different types of significance can be
attributed by the routine operation of the turn-taking systematics to an absence of speech
activity, eg. as a noticeable absence of a response, or a gap before a speaker continues, or
a lapse of turn-taking itself (Sacks et al 1978).
Edwards & Mason do acknowledge that "as human-computer dialogue approaches more
closely that of human-human dialogue, characterised, for example, by pauses, interruptions,
simultaneous speech and gesture, etc. the definition of message... will have to be
re-examined" (1988, p. 144). However, this raises two related issues. First, is human natural
language conversation to be taken as the model for conceiving of dialogue artifacts? Hayes
& Reddy (1983) claim that a more artificial style of communication is appropriate because
"sticking to human conversational conventions does not allow all the possibilities for
communication between a computer and its user to be exploited" (Hayes 1983, p. 229). But
they argue that this objection will disappear when speech systems can be integrated with
other modalities. I would like to argue that both of these opinions support a rather restricting
view of dialogue that elevates human spoken conversation as the ideal, superior form which
systems must ultimately be competent in as conversational partners. It is true that human
conduct and conversation is one very useful source for the creative design of some artifacts
that may have similar characteristics. Also, users may draw upon the resources of talk in
order to interpret and use the system. But the development of dialogue is a locally occasioned
accomplishment subject to practical contingencies which result in emergent orders of
interaction and dialogue.
The discourse supporting activities of natural conversation always address
practical concerns. If a new concern should arise because of new constraints
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— eg. that the interactant is a machine — these will be incorporated into the
ongoing details of communication. (Wynn 1980, p. 89)
Consequently, the simulation of human conversational behavior is not preferentially
supported here. The primary concern instead is with the nature of dialogue practice by which
mutual orientation and intelligibility are achieved and sustained in situ out of the materials
available. Besides everyday spoken conversation, there are other surprisingly different
human dialogic activities that can provide models for design that do not have to based on
assumptions of face-to-face interaction, a sequential medium, or speech specifically, eg. sign
language talk, electronic mail, back-to-back talk when occupied with other activities,
deaf-blind haptic languages, and Bliss symbols for the physically disabled. The issue is not
whether it is appropriate to build 'conversational' computers, but what is involved in the
successfulwelding of computational power and modalities with human interpretative powers.
A basic aim is the recovery of a background of presence in which interactive dialogue activity
is constituted. Also, unfocused - parallel or simultaneous activities - as well as focused
interaction will be common. Dialogue will take place in a virtual world of other entities and
artifacts with a variety of modalities at hand. An understanding of how people coordinate
their participation in similar contexts will help greatly in conceiving of appropriate dialogue
artifacts and environments, and a preliminary study is undertaken later in this chapter.
The first issue implicitly raises the second: is the artifact best conceived of as an active partner
whose competence approaches that of people? Because of the concern with conversational
versus artificial dialogue artifacts, arguments have tended to assume that much machine use
is dialogic. Care must be taken to make clearwhat should be considered as dialogue1 activity
and what is simply the active engagement by the user in activities mediated or supported by
the machine interface. For example it was shown in Chapter 5 that Reichman (1986) had
tried to explain a user's problem with an interface in terms of the conversational metaphor.
Instead a simple explanation was offered on the basis of the fact that the user is engaged in
solitary activity mediated by the machine as artifact, ie. the problem for the user was best
understood in the context of the user's activities in and through the artifact than as a
communication failure in a dialogue between the machine and the user.
1 The emphasis is on dialogue 'with' a machine as the dialogue activities that can be supported
by the machine will be quite different in structure and content from dialogue with people.
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6.2.2 Presence and Interactivity
A conception of the dialogue artifact is now possible that concentrates on situated
interactivity. Chapter 3 argued that the design of dialogue artifacts can be conceived of as
attempting to recover the practices of the local and situated determination of meaning. Texts
are distanced cultural objects by which meaning is constituted in the play of differences
located in the text itself. A competent reader will find sense in the linear text product in a
socio-historical context. With dialogue artifacts the designer seeks to produce intelligible
language in situ drawing upon the model of presence. Thus, in order to understand a
particular piece of language that appears in the course of system use it is essential that its
sequential placement or its situated performance in relation to the actions of the user be
recognised2. Thus an understanding of how mutual orientation and presence is achieved,
managed and sustained in human conduct will be of great help. The analyses in this thesis
contribute to such an understanding. The phenomena investigated in Chapter 5, eg. the
achievement and coordination of dialogue presence, monitoring and participation, illustrate
the situated and circumstantial resources drawn upon by users, that may guide the design
of interactive dialogue artifacts and that are missed in computational models.
Dialogue artifacts should support dialogic presence, eg. a rich context of interaction giving a
background of 'visible' features that allow the coordination of monitoring in dialogue activity,
and interactivity, eg. opportunities and possibilities for organising the mutual participation in
dialogue. Studying interactivity gives a chance for routine and monitored processes that are
situated in the flow of conduct to be incorporated, that hopefully deal with the issues relevant
for practice and not the theory-specific problems of mainstream computer models of dialogue
offer, eg. isolated cognitive processors desperately trying to communicate by recognising the
intentions of the other participant as part of an internal 'understanding' procedure. The
cognitive process view must recognise the situated, interactional and circumstantial nature
of cognition and action. Computational models of language in use, eg. dialogue structure
and cognitive process, are missing an account and recognition of the importance of
interactivity and the situated flow of conduct. However, it is not claimed that the interactional
perspective here is to replace the cognitive models which might be valuable abstractions for
other purposes.
2 In some sense the placement can be interpreted by the user as an interpretation of the user's
prior actions.
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One consequence of the non-interactional perspective is that many phenomena are
explained using models that must operate on much reduced evidence because the
circumstantial production of action has been ignored in the application of the interchange
model. Instead there are many reexplanations that can rely on external circumstances and
are non-individualistic accounts, ie. they are emergent dynamics of the interaction, rather
than the over-rationalisation and time-consuming computational processing characteristic of
dialogue systems that are based on the interchange model. Consider a number of bizzare
scenarios in which the resources of action that are taken for granted are made problematic.
Imagine trying to shake hands with a stranger if only discrete moments of monitoring and
action are possible, ie. hands can only be observed at specific moments without monitoring
of the movement in the interim periods. Imagine trying to coordinate a conversational stroll
in a park with someone if only the alternation of participation is allowed, ie. only one walker
at a time can walk or adjust the pace. Imagine playing a ball sport, for example table tennis
or tennis, where your opponent is not visible. It may be constituted as an alternation of
discrete single moment opportunities for action in the game, but awareness of your opponent
- body position, movement, balance - at all times is essential in order to play a skillful game
with anticipation. Dialogue artifacts based on the interchange model are built so as to play
ping-pong with an imaginary partner - utterances arrive and are produced as discrete units.
Thus the designer has to construct a system that can recognise, plan and infer the user's
actions and intents on the basis of severely limited evidence.
There is much 'out there' in the situated interaction with others and the world in which the
sense of action and 'knowing how to go on' is found, eg. the familiar sense of finding things
in situ but not being able to describe them beforehand, or, in conversation, not knowing what
to say next but finding a next in situ, or not being able to be talk about when exactly to say
something nor when to look at someone but doing it transparently. It might be argued that
the tacit and contingent nature of much of our dialogic activities is unsuitable for computer
implementation, representation and control. But this is not so if one thinks of the contingency
of situated action not as a hinderance or problem to be avoided or overcome by design but
a source of the richness of action and meaning. It would be a dull world to play in if the flux
of the world was really a world of states and pre-constituted objects as mainstream Al would
approach it. A characteristic of performed actions in interaction is the emergence of events
as resources in the very act of doing, eg. the pace and rhythm of conversational conduct.
So, the recommendation is to avoid individual representation and 'out of the moment' planning
of discrete steps with only abstract sequential adjacency as a resource for interpretation.
Similar notions of interactivity are developing in research on interactive media technologies,
like interactive video. The advent of direct manipulation technologies has shifted interface
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design to the investigation of virtual dynamic media or spaces in which users have an active
role (Laurel 1986). The traditional conception of an 'interactive system' is a reactive
environment based on the interchange model in which the user formulates a command and
the system reacts. By decreasing the grain size - the smallest element below which
complementary or interruptive participation is not possible - an 'open'world of opportunity for
action in the environment can be partially created. An appearance of unconstrained situated
participation is sustained by having small grain moments of opportunity to act and many
choices of action in each moment. Thus the user feels that she can actively participate at all
appropriate times. For example, moving icons over a virtual desktop surface with a mouse,
or driving a car around a town exploring side streets and roadside houses as the userwishes
in an interactive video simulation. Simply, a user of a good system feels that direct,
continuous engagement is possible3. However, if the system has too large a grain size, then
only an interchange of explicit chunks is allowed, within which interruptive participation is not
possible. If the choice is narrow, then it is not a very interesting world.
It is not quite correct to say that systems have avoided some of the features recommended
in this chapter because they do unavoidably have peculiar and distinctive characteristics that
users orient to and draw upon in routine use. But these are not necessarily design features.
For example, the sound the computer makes or the length of time for certain operations in
daily experiential use are background features fromwhich odd noises or lengthy delays reveal
problems to be addressed. Also, systems can be interrupted without negotiation using
special commands from the keyboard or reboot, and many systems do not strictly adhere to
the 'wait until I say' principle of interchange dialogue. For example, most systems have a
means of buffering input and output, which to the user gives the impression of opportunities
for action during the normal cycle of a process. Because of the separation of central
processing from input/output devices the user can continue to construct commands.
However, all input is held in a buffer and is operated on in the state that is current and not
the state operative when the user constructed it. Thus the grain size is still the same and the
user cannot interrupt the computer's central processing even though keyboard entry or other
input device activity is possible. The user's input and the system output are buffered, creating
3 This phenomenon is analogous to the way films and video give the appearance of a
continuous movement, by exploiting the propensity of the human vision system to see a stable,
continuous image and not a flicker of distinct frames. If the speed of projection of sequential
frames is fast enough (about 16 frames a second for film movies) then it works but if the speed
is lower then the illusion is lost, ie. the individual frames become visible and are no longer
coherent as a moving image. For interactive technology the notion of a threshold above which
continuity is perceived applies at the point when a user of that technology feels that they can
take the appropriate action without any apparent constraints.
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a temporal distance between observable effect and production that can cause serious
troubles and user impatience.
6.2.3 Dialogue Artifacts and Interaction Analysis
The study conducted as a major part of the thesis contributes to a developing interactional
perspective on the situated achievement of mutual intelligibility. Because the dialogue was
mediated through computers and took place in similar circumstance to that envisaged for a
possible dialogue system it is argued that the methods and findings of interactional analysis
are applicable to the design and evaluation of dialogue artifacts. In particular it is claimed
that the design of interactive artifacts is attempting to represent and thus re-instantiate a
vocabulary for talking about and interpreting dialogue artifact behavior and thus will have to
do the same for the findings of an interaction analysis derived from conversation analysis
(CA). See Mcllvenny (1990) for a comprehensive discussion of this idea.
The notion of re-instantiating is meant to suggest the following idea. Conversation analysis
studies the micro-details of conversational interaction, ie. looking for regularities that are
demonstrable in the data, and positing simple, locally managed practices whereby conduct
is made accountable and sensical. It takes traces of embodied and situated conduct that
has occurred naturally and subjects them to a data-driven analysis. The aim is to uncover
organisations demonstrably oriented to and reproduced in the conduct itself, ie. to describe
and in some ways explain the dynamics of interaction in terms of the work done by the
participants. Research in empirical investigations of communicative action disembody and
objectify the phenomenon - to bracket it, talk about it, and understand it. Therefore CA does
not specify how an action is to be carried out nor how an actor should 'go on' in a particular
instance. This is not a fault of CA because it explicitly does not aim to explain the motivations
or mechanisms that may generate the conduct under investigation. Rather it investigates
how people construct and account for their behaviours as intelligible courses of action.
Because a computer dialogue system must perform, procedural mechanisms for generating
its own behaviour and processing the behaviour of a user must be made explicit and be
computationally feasible. What dialogue artifact design can do is represent the findings of a
descriptive enterprise as structures for constraining the production of appropriate behaviours
and for modelling the user's actions. Thus an attempt can be made to generate and 'give
life to' the findings of CA as relevancies and phenomena reproducible in the user's dialogue
'with' the machine. For example, the turn-taking systematics is a context-free mechanism
locally managed in context-sensitive ways to organise mutual participation. The description
of the phenomenon in the ocnduct is accounted for by the systematics on the condition that
it describes methods or resources that participants use to locally construct their occasioned
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conduct. Dialogue artifact design can draw upon the systematics as a representable
structure that is used procedurally to generate and thus hopefully re-instantiate the
phenomenon it describes, ie. that the machine will engage in turn-taking behaviour and
maybe orient to the 'turn' as people do. It is not at all clearthat such an enterprise will succeed
in the context of dialogue 'with' machines and in the concluding chapter an alternative that
considers re-embodying foundational aspects of interaction and communicative activity in
dialogue 'between' machines will be briefly presented.
The idea of using the findings and methods of CA as the basis for designing in HCI and Al
research was discussed in Mcllvenny (1985) in the context of a prototype study of
advice-giving dialogue, and by McTear (1985) in the context of the repair of breakdowns in
human-computer interaction. Demonstration of the suitability of conversation analytic
methods for analysing the use of interactive artifacts has been undertaken by Suchman
(1987). For Suchman the question is: What resources do users draw upon in interpreting
their interactions with an expert system interface, and what trouble does this engender? She
concludes that users of the system investigated do draw upon some of the communicative
resources found in conversational interaction, eg. that system responses are conditional on
the user's last action and thus inferences can be drawn from an absence of a response in
the same way as the noticeable absences of second pair parts of adjacency pairs in
conversation, but the machine has inadequate access to the resources that people do, and
thus the occasioned breakdowns that occur in expert system use are unavoidable and
irrevocable when the machine behaviour is predesigned. The thesis here further
recommends the appropriateness of an interactional methodology both for human-computer
interaction and computer-mediated communication, and also uncovers some aspects of the
taken for granted interactional achievement of dialogue and the emergence of dialogue
organisations that is called for if the conception and design of dialogue 'with' machines is to
be improved.
6.3 Copresence and Interactivity
The last chapter investigated verbal dialogue in which the main work is the temporal and
participatory contextualisation of largely 'given' communication, ie. the contributions are
inscriptions worked on and over as explicit and abstract objects. What more complex human
interaction dynamics are to be found that may provide an appropriate model for pragmatic
dialogue artifact design? This section will emphasize the rich continuum of communication
in copresent conduct that could be said to be 'given' and 'given off. A complex of concurrent
and sequential resources are routinely co-ordinated and mangaged in the achievement of
shared understanding. The shift in the thesis at this point towards the particulars of full
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copresent engagement is not meant as a recommendation for its replication in the design of
artifacts. Rather it is to rectify the problematic emphasis placed on focused verbal talk as
the most relevant source of insights. Kendon (1988, p. 35) notes that the amount of work on
non-speech interactions is little compared to the close analysis of spoken interaction, and
the following quotation describes some of the problems this can cause.
There are at least three ways in which theories of communicative competence
are limited by construing speaking as mainly talking: (1) by underemphasizing
nonverbal and paralinguistic behavior at the expense of the verbal; (2) by
fostering an analytic separation between speakers and their hearers that
obscures the social organisation of the face-to-face interaction within which talk
occurs; (3) by focusing research attention on social situations in which talk is
the central, 'foregrounded' aspect of the activity, and consequently diverting
empirical research and theory developmentaway from considering interactional
occasions in which talk is a secondary, 'backgrounded'accompaniment toother
action. (Erickson & Schultz 1982, p. 215)
As a consequence, there is a very real danger, if the interchange model is abandoned, that
Al dialogue systemswill still have to operate on the basis of evidence that is quite insubstantial
for people, ie. as if "listening to each other through a keyhole." (Erickson & Schultz 1982, p.
216) An understanding of both routine human dialogue in copresence and the achievement
of dialogue in restricted modalities will help us come to an understanding of the foundational
features of mutual intelligibility in dialogue activity. This may help design, and also make us
appreciate why some dialogue systems do not work when they look ideal on paper.
The discussion that follows considers some features of dialogues that occur in the full
conditions of copresence. The experimental study described in Chapters 4 and 5 used a
'constructive interaction' technique to expose the chronic process of inscription production
in a restricted virtual dialogue space. Two coparticipants worked together on constructing
an intelligible mutually satisfactory route in and through the dialogue space, and thus were
required to organise their collaborative participation in order to achieve thiswithin the dialogue
space provided. The diagram in Figure 4-1 in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.1) illustrates the physical
layout. The coparticpants were seated side-by-side and directly in front of them on a table
were a number of artifacts: a map, a keyboard and a screen, available as resources which
which to achieve success in the task. A number of activities conducted with these artifacts
had to be coordinated by the coparticipants either as a mutual focus of attention or in parallel.
For example, the map was an essential resource for finding the sense of route or location
descriptions. Sometimes coparticipants would mutually orient to the map surface. At other
times only one, usually whoever sat in the chair next to the map, worked on the map while
the other worked over the keyboard or screen. Also, the screen was an essential resource
for monitoring ongoing and past dialogue contributions recoverable from the visual surface.
Often, one coparticipant would attend to the construction of a dialogue contribution while the
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otherwould scan the map surface. Thus, not only do the parties in the VDS have to coordinate
the relevance of their contributions to each other but also coparticipantsmust coordinate their
own collaboration - the copresent coparticipants had a much richer set of resources available
as we shall see. But the setting was quite different from face-to-face conversation because
almost all of the time eye contact was absent between the coparticipants, though not
noticeably for those involved. Coparticipants sometimes worked in silence, at other times in
rapid speech exchange characteristic of conversation, but always their attentionwas directed
to a visual and physical workspace and their bodily actions in and around that space. Their
talk is embedded in and can only be understood with reference to the tasks engaged in, and
the artifacts they work with. Note that silences in their talk are not necessarily significant as
absences of activity. Incipient talk is a term for fitful talk while engaged in other, maybe
primary, activities. Lynch (1985) has noted that incipient talk is a characteristic feature of
scientists' discourse in the laboratory, and it is certainly true in shared offices.
6.3.1 Introduction to the Analysis
The basis for some of the analyses is derived from the empirical findings of Schegloff (1984),
Erickson & Schultz (1982), Goodwin (1981), and Goodwin & Goodwin (1987). Videos of
coparticipants working together were collected that recorded essential details of their
achievement of communication in the VDS. The videos also display the collaborative work
of coparticipants in achieving a task together with a range of physical devices, spatial
representations, etc.. The examples following are from one long fully transcribed fragment
given in Appendix B in which two coparticipants manage their mutual orientation while
engaging in a complex coordination of gesture and talk in a disagreement sequence. At the
beginning of Example B3, both J and R are working on constructing a contribution. However,
while J types the response, R attends to the other party's simultaneous concurrent
construction. The problem is that J is still attending to the construction of an appropriate
response when R orients to the other party's response in his talk. J misinterprets R's actions
as elaborating in some way upon the construction he is still engaged in, and a disagreement
ensues. The misinterpretation is understandable because of the syntactic and semantic
congruity of the half-constructed contribution, "Our starting point is", and the reading of the
other party's contribution as "is the A1303 in the top left hand comer?" The disagreement
claim by J, "no it's not. our starting points down here", displays that J understands by R's
actions and agreement claims that a collaborative turn completion by the other party has
successfully predicted their statement of the starting point and requires a reply confirming
this. For J the gestures by R are interpretable as pointing to the starting point as predicted
by the other party. But for R they are locating the referent of the other party's question that
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is clearly problematic for J. Finally, J recognises 'what R is talking about' and responds in
the VDS with "yes", an answer to the question "is the A1303 in the top left hand corner?".
6.3.2 Preliminaries
Three aspects of face-to-face interaction must be mentioned before the brief analyses
presented in the next sections: copresence, vocal and body activity, and intra-turn dynamics.
First, copresence has already been discussed in Chapter 3 and in Chapter 5 in terms of the
restricted achievements of copresence. Basically, "in the course of their daily activities
individuals encounter each other in situated contexts of interaction - interaction with others
who are physically co-present." (Giddens 1984, p. 64) Second, early research in
conversation analysis concentrated on telephone conversations in order to exclude the
complexity of the face-to-face setting. Upon returning to copresent conversation, it has been
discovered that speech and non-vocal actions of face-to-face communication are highly
integrated. The body in interactional contexts is not irrelevant for the constitution of talk, but
talk and nonvocal activities are closely coordinated and oriented to by
participants in the production and monitoring of each other's actions. If the
participants themselves are rountinely sensitive to the ways in which vocal and
nonvocalphenomena are intergrated, the puzzle of how they work is unlikely to
be resolvedby studying one or other independently of the overall context of the
sequence of interaction. (Atkinson & Fleritage 1984, p. 224)
For example, eye gaze and gesture are systematically related to speakerhood and turn
construction (Schegloff (1984) and Goodwin (1981)). Third, joint communicative action is
accomplished through the participants' continuous engagement in speaking and listening,
and thus the interactional dynamics within a turn are equally important as those between
turns.
By making projections about the future course of an utterance, recipients
demonstrate that they are not dealing with it as a monolithic whole, or simply as
a static string of symbolic components tied together through syntax, but rather
as a process that emerges through time and carries with itan expanding horizon
of projective possibilities that are relevant to the actions that recipient might
engage in while acting as a hearer to the utterance. (Goodwin & Goodwin 1987,
pp. 24-5)
6.3.3 Embodiment of Action
The study of the VDS showed that the monitorable transience of actions yield performance
characteristics that are irrecoverable from the traces of dialogue that are left on display.
Participants in the VDS can orient to certain aspects of the production rather than treat each
other's contributions as transmitted messages. But, the bodily production of those actions
is not monitorable by the other party, ie. there are no directly perceived features of a bodily
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production of an action, only the traces or imprints of observable events instigated by an
actor. The embodiment of action is, however, available as a resource for coordination in
copresence. To illustrate something of the resources available in the embodiment of action
a small strip of activity between J and R will be analysed, namely the slice marked A on
Example B3 of Appendix B. J completes the initial trajectory of the instruction "Our starting
point is" and looks to the screen. Because J is still engaged in constructing a contribution
giving the location of the starting point he begins to orient to the map for material to complete
the construction. The bodily shift and movement of eye gaze also provide R with clues for
what J, who sits beside him, might be up to, eg. looking to the map for a next activity, or for
material, or to check a referent description. As J's gaze comes to the middle of the map
surface, I would guess at Marley primary school, R gestures to the screen and says "oh". R
then moves his arm, starts an utterance and looks towards the map. However, R's pointing
gesture reaches acme on the map at the top left corner. Rather than the gesture appearing
suddenly or 'out of the blue' the embodied production allows J, who has oriented to another
part of the map, to reorient to R's talk by tracking the gesture's course. J's head sweeps
round with the trajectory of R's gesture and at its acme J's gaze has arrived at the top left of
the map. R displays by his gestural identification of The top left corner" that he interprets that
J is ready for the next activity. In fact, J is trying to complete the in-progress contribution from
what is already constructed, viz. "Our starting point is", and finds R's actions as elaborating
on that.
The embodied production of actions illustrated here also enables people to skillfully
coordinate their everyday non-vocal actions as Goodwin (1981) has shown. From a video
of two friends in copresence a skilled achievement of mutual action, namely one lighting the
cigarette of the other, is analysed. After a delay, one friend brings the lighter towards the
cigaratte only to find that the recipient is attending to someone else. The inattention to the
joint work of a lighting of her cigarette by her friend is not disruptive as such because it is
routinely accomodated into the ongoing action. The friend with the lighter modifies her action
to include an attempt to fix the lighter whereupon the lighter is again brought to the cigarette
as a joint accomplishment after attention is resumed by her friend.
In Chapter 5 it was argued that computer models of dialogue have adopted the interchange
model of dialogue of which there are three consequences. One consequence is that the
model does not allow for self-coordination and repair because messages are constructed in
secret and then transmitted. There is no monitoring of the embodied performance of action,
only the traces remain in the complete product that the recipient must wait for. The next
example, the slice marked B on Example B3 in Appendix B, illustrates some dynamics of self
coordination that are missing from computer models of dialogue. The focus is on the
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utterance "is the a- a one th one three oh three" by R. Just prior to the utterance, R had still
not succeeded in achieving agreement with J after claiming "yeah it is yes" plus a pointing
gesture to the screen coordinated with the last "yes". R responds to the uneasy silence, a
potential dispreferred disagreement, with turn holding "ah", reaffirms, and then begins a
repeat of the line by the other party on the screen. The gesture to the screen is withdrawn
and after the cutoff the hung right hand pointing gesture is dissolved as R looks away from
the screen to check for evidence on the map surface. The map is a source for identifying the
referent, given J's potential disagreement. Thus the course of R's action is contingent on the
coordination of his own perceptual and bodily activity. The noun phrase is restarted, along
with the transfer of the right hand towards the top of the map, but self-interrupted again as
his gaze comes to rest at the top left hand corner. It is postponed for a fraction as R scans
the map surface and the gesture reaches completion. The gesture is thus more precisely
coordinated with the noun phrase. The reading aloud is not itself evidence for identification,
so it has to be coordinated with a demonstration of evidence on the map surface. The
evidence now found and displayed, R returns his gaze to the screen, closely followed by J.
So, in this example, a participant coordinates several complementary actions, but
coordination contingencies lead to the self-repair of the ongoing turn construction. It is
important to note that in any multi-modal computer dialogue system the mere fact that
complementary actions, solely by the machine or user, may be possible and are monitored
means that self-coordination will be problematic because of endogenous troubles. This is
not to be avoided, for example by planning ahead, but is an essential constraint and resource
for situated action. In addition, monitorable embodied actions are publicly available for
displaying orientations to one's own conduct.
6.3.4 Complementarity of Actions
Gesture and speech are not necessarily sequentially produced as can be seen throughout
the full fragment in Appendix B. Gesture and speech can occur at the same time in actions
by more than one person as well as by one speaker, which is unlike the normative
organisation of speech itself even though gesture is associated with speakerhood. This is
because of the specific characteristics of the modalities and their use, eg. gesture can be
hung or delayed in progress but remain visually latent. Speakers can comment on or talk
over gestures and activities by other particpants, eg. they can complement each other or
occur simultaneously without relevance. Erickson & Schultz (1982) have argued for a
distinction between reciprocity - The interdependence of actions taken successively across
moments in time" (p. 71); and complementarity - The interdependence of actions taken
simultaneously in the same moment" (p. 71). The notion of complementarity of actions will
-189-
be looked at in this section in contrast to the weaknesses in the interchange model of dialogue,
and an example used to illustrate the coordination of complementary actions.
One consequence of the interchange model of dialogue was discussed in the last section,
and a fragmentwas used to illustratewhat resources have thus been abandoned by computer
models. Here, the other two consequences will be considered. The first is that the model
does not allow recipient design in concurrency because messages, if they are constructed
in public, are not available for redesign, accomodation nor redirection on the basis of the
recipient's behaviour, eg. the recipient must take it or leave it. The second is that the model
does not allow for the mutual management of participation because the exchange of
messages is strictly controlled, eg. do not take a turn until the speaker explicitly says. The
next example, the slice marked C on Example B3 in Appendix B, is concerned with recipient
design in cross-speaker concurrency, and gesture overlap and competition. It is a good
example of third turn repair and re-explanation because R finds that J's actions display a
misinterpretation and so R attempts to repair this in third turn. J begins a turn, after R's
prompts to respond affirmatively, with "no it's not". This is coordinated with a shift of gaze to
the map and the beginnings of a pointing gesture to display evidence for disagreement on
the map surface. However, R simultaneously begins a pointing gesture towards the screen.
This could be because of the second noticeable absence of expected agreement or action
after R's "Yes. (pause) Yes." and short gesture to the screen. At this point two potentially
relevant gestures by different parties and one speech stream are simultaneously produced.
The competitive overlap is resolved by R dropping out and monitoring J's action, but still
holding the pointing gesture to the screen. In this case, speakerhood is a practical issue, so
the occurrence of concurrent gestures is a local problem to be resolved. Immediately after,
latching onto J's disagreement, R responds verbally with "NO NONO", and gesturally, thus
initiating a repair of the misunderstanding. The sketch in Figure 6-1 illustrates the video
image at this point, just before J looks to the screen (marked on Example B3 in Appendix B).
The held pointing gesture by R is now read back into theflow of conduct, post-hitch, by reading
the screen text into the talk once again. It is withdrawn after the reading is complete.
However, during the reading a second complementary display of evidence on the map
surface is managed concurrently with the talk. So in this example the coordination of gesture
in talk is subject to interactional contingencies. It has to be repaired and accommodated on
occasions of concurrent action and recipient monitoring.
The brief analyses in this section are intended to complement the in-depth study described
in Chapter 5. Two interesting features of copresent dialogue have been isolated, viz.
embodiment and complementarity. Together with the findings of the last chapter they shed
light on the complex achievement of dialogic presence and interaction that can inform the
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design of intelligible artifacts apparently able to engage in dialogic activities with people. By
carefully designing for interactivity a wealth of resources becomes available which people
themselves draw upon in the constitution of their actions. For example, the embodiment of
action provides a texture of presence and monitorability for routine coordination of interaction
FIGURE 6-1 - A sketch of the video image from [M5:1 '48"].
and participation. Also, the complementarity of action furnishes immediate feedback on how
the recipient take the action, a resource for mutual adjustment, and a tacit experience that
aids memory. These and the other features documented in Chapter 5 not only provide
resources but also constraints on interpretation.
6.4 Designing for Interactivity
There are two clear directions in using investigations of human interaction for the design of
machines premised on models of dialogue. The first one is to try and reproduce, exploit and
adapt features of human conduct for the particular setting and problems encountered, eg. to
engineer some interactivity into dialogue artifacts that engage in dialogue 'with' a user. The
second is to look at the breadth and particularity of work done and resources available in
human collaboration and communication, and creatively design new mediations and
resources in order to facilitate dialogue 'through' machines. For example, new types of
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synchronous collaboration need facilities for coordinating intelligibility of asynchronous work
and movements between asynchronous and synchronous activity.
In the immediate future, cycles of design, engineering and evaluation will clarify possibilities
for both directions. This is because of the unintuitive development of dialogue in practice
and the contingency of user acceptance. In the long term, understanding and decreasing
the asymmetry between human and machine by incorporating foundational aspects of
dialogue activity which includes presence, performance, participation, embodiment and
complementarity, as well as local adaption and repair, will be a major research development.
Much can be gained from studying the micro-dynamics of intra-turn and inter-turn action, eg.
the mutual coordination of moments of presence and participation, and this has been the
topic of the study here.
6.4.1 Channelling the User
One must design for interactivity in dialogue artifacts but first a note of caution. In order to
design for interactivity the user must be channelled or constrained in order to sustain
practically the metaphor of dialogue 'with'. The asymmetry between user and computer in
terms of access to the resources of action means that user channelling techniques and
alternative resources forthe system will have to be developed recursively and contingently,
with a distinction between particular cases of breakdown and general troubles with a system,
ie. some troubles will recur and be undesirable while others will be locally occasioned and
can never be designed out. The goal is to avoid or manage for contingencywhilst recognising
the essential grounding in human practice and the superior interpretative powers of people.
It is essential to channel the user given the machine's restricted and asymmetric access to
resources of situated action (Suchman 1987). The asymmetry is not only between human
and machine interpretative powers, but also in what can be accepted by the machine and
what can be produced, eg. the system's responses can be quite complex textual units that
are meaningful for a user, but the user can only construct actions using restricted language
forms that are suitable for processing.
With regard to user troubles, they can range from unavoidable breakdowns emerging for a
user but are not routinely encountered, to repeated troubles that occur among the general
user population because of bad or inappropriate design. The first category is implicitly a part
of the nature of action itself and artifact use and cannot be avoided nor successfully
accommodated by current machine-centred design methods. The second can be pinpointed
and maybe resolved in the cycles of evaluation and redesign, eg. by changing the system
organisation or explicitly doing channelling work to avoid the problem in situ. Channelling is
essential for dialogue systems operating in environmentswithout explicit conventionalmeans
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of coordinating participation. For example, speech systems may require explicit means of
turn boundary determination or else the system cannot rely on a context-free determination
of a speaker's participation. Or the user's experience with the system must be manipulated
so as to favour certain responses or interpretations over others. Channelling can be
undertaken in different interactional ways with some degree of success. For instance, a
designer can try to prevent unwanted behaviours by narrowing the choice of possible user
responses, physically constrain the participation of the user, or have the system give standard
first pair parts that require a specific type of response. Also, a designer can try to curb the
user's overextension of the capabilities of the system by displaying the system's interpretation
more explicitly, or designing for a set of restricted resources the same for both the machine
and user so the user can 'empathise' and learn what is interactively possible from engaging
with the system.
6.4.2 Interactivity in Dialogue 'With' Machines
Up until recently, computational approaches have aimed to produce 'natural language'
dialogue systems that allow the user to communicate with the machine using typed language
turns through an interchange mechanism. If such a system is viable and useful, the only
resources available to the user for constituting the significance of actions is through the
sequential organisation of turns and the linguistic resources available. All local interactive
work normal to conversation can only be achieved instead through the constraints of an
interchange system, eg. participation is fixed, so the management of initiative is weak; a
sense of presence and real time monitoring is unavailable, so the local and contingent
construction of turns is lost, as is the visibility of self-coordination; recipient design is much
more tentative; and adjacency becomes an essential resource which leads to multiple
conditional relevances (threads), and more explicit inferences that fail.
The importance of non-vocal and the taken-for-granted achievement of mutual orientation
has been acknowledged in theory by Nickerson (1977). Dialogue systems need to be "given
the means of conveying to the user the type of information that people sometimes convey to
each other in non-verbal ways. In particular, it should be able to do something analogous to
saying 'uh-huh' at appropriate times to assure the user that he continues to have its attention."
Flowever, a difficult problem for designing interactional artifacts is the openness of action.
Boundaries and descriptions cannot be guaranteed by engineering conventional resources
for constituting action interpretable by the machine. The advantage in human interaction is
that these matters are locally worked on and mutually achieved, and thus, are sensitive to
contingencies. Thus there is a need to support dialogue artifacts that can routinely cope with
non-mutual presence because mutual monitoring in copresence is a skilled accomplishment
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and access by the machine to the routine resources of human copresence is not currently
feasible.
Some recent research has begun to design for interactivity. For example, the work of Frohlich
& Luff (1989) exploits an understanding of the communicative resources available in human
conversation to design new and appropriate interactive artifacts that support in principle a
mixed initiative advice-giving dialogue. Of primary interest is their departure from the
interchange model of participation. They model sequential features of the dialogue that
influence the processing and production of utterances, ie. they attempt to re-instantiate similar
organisations to that found in conversation. For example, adjacency pair structures are
categorisations motivated by participants' orientations but are underspecified for the
purposes of giving a second pair part in a particular circumstance. Because a system must
react intelligibly to the user's actions, a proceduralisation has to make explicit just what a
current response should be, in practice. That is, the system must respond in such a way as
to reproduce instances of the adjacency pair as an orientable structure in the dialogue. Also,
Raudaskoski (1989) has explored how repair might be organised in a hypothetical speech
telephony dialogue system based on the findings of conversation analysis. An experimental
evaluation of a prototype system used a 'wizard of oz' scenario. That is, a person mediated
between the system and the user because of the lack of robust speech technology. The
mediator rendered the user's speech into a computer readable form and read aloud the
computer's response. Flowever, participation was not explicitly designed but emerged within
the constraints of the experimental setup. For example, long pauses were common between
the spoken turns of the user followed by the mediator because of the time required for typing
and waiting for the computer's response. This was not a problem most of the time because
the sound of typing was faintly audible on the telephone and thus was a useful resource for
coordinating speaking and listening. The typing sound was an embodied feature of the
production of actions available formonitoring that provided a texture orientable to by the user.
Let us take a closer look at the participation organisation in Frohlich & Luff (1989). They have
attempted to engineer a restricted form of mixed initiative in discrete speaker-controlled
moments of opportunity. This is a design strategy because the crucial resources in
co-present conduct for coordination and conjoint action are taken as the model for
engineering discrete places of opportunity for reciprocal action in the computer dialogue
system. The claim in their system is that turn taking is a resource for managing initiative.
Interchange dialogues use a simple and strict turn taking system that only gives sequential
adjacency as a resource for achieving intersubjectivity. Management of participation and
initiative is only possible through explicit linguistic means. In institutional talk, participation
is mainly fixed in advance through restricted orders of turn taking that are activity and setting
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specific. In conversation, turn taking may be simply described but in actual contexts of use
allows an enormous flexibility of participation. In talk, it is feasible for anyone to speak at any
time and at the same time, so action must be coordinated and organised so as to achieve
sensible participation. However, in Frohlich & Luff (1989) the places are engineered through
the constraints of the system and not as an accomplishment of the participants themselves,
ie. the recipient can only initiate participation at pre-designed speaker-controlled places, and
not, potentially, at any time. In their advice system there are still many restrictions on the
participation of both parties that are fixed prior to the interaction.
In engineering systems that are intelligible through the predetermined self selection options,
Frohlich & Luff (1989) are relaxing the fixed turn ordering engineered in interchange dialogue
systems. The current speaker's opportunity to offer the opportunity for self-selection plus the
selection of next speaker through adjacency pairs gives a better resource for coordinating
intelligibility than the cu rrent speaker selection of next speaker, that must occur in interchange
dialogue. It makes explicit two means of turn management derived from studies of human
conversation which have interesting dynamics. For example, the synchronicity of monitoring
makes time a significant resource for the participants. By creating an environment
encouraging synchronous monitoring - reading speed output - the system reported by
Frohlich & Luff (1989) can be designed to work on the assumption that, at appropriate points,
small chronos time periods are significant in terms of turn transfer, eg. after a given
turn-constructional unit, more than two seconds without a response by the user means that
the system can continue turn construction. In this case the performance of action provides
a resource for constructing a weak dialogue presence that grants inferences based on the
temporal flow of the dialogue. This is an example of the gradual recovery in interactive artifact
design of the referential and interactive qualities of talk.
The claim by Frohlich & Luff (1989) that the user will find the significance of advice through
the sequential organisation of the dialogue as social action appears reasonable, but it needs
empirical investigation as recommended here to see if users continue to engage with the
machine in that way after a long period of use in a community of other users. Also, it seems
wishful thinking that somehow the design of the advice system plus the simple local
management of turns can be claimed to guarantee the intelligibility and appropriateness of
that 'found' advice. Besides these points, the work of Frohlich & Luff (1989) must be
continued in designing better interactive interfaces that move towards artifacts that can react
intelligibly in situations of presence. With the advent of multi-modal interfaces the
organisation of the participation of the system and user can no longer be considered using
the interchange dialogue model, eg. strict exchange of turns, probably with strict modal
sequencing. The organisation of participation and the achievement of intelligibility and
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collaboration in human communication and interaction must be exploited in the creative
design of interactive artifacts.
It was discussed in Section 6.2.2 that interactive technologies should support a user's direct
participation and that the impression of continuous engagement is a priority. An analogy with
moving image technology was made because they exploit the pecularities of human
perception so as to produce continuous flowing images from the projection of static images
one after another at a reasonable pace. Similarly the notion of 'interactive flow' in dialogue
artifact design should be considered as a goal recommended by the findings of the thesis.
That is, systems should support the illusion of continuous participation in which the
opportunties for participation by user or machine in the ongoing activity are manifold.
Designing for interactivity that supports presence, performance, and embodiment will move
towards direct engagement dialogue environments. Consider the opportunity and possibility
variation in interactive systems. The normal conception of 'interactive systems' is an
interchange reactive environment. By decreasing the grain size of opportunity an 'open'
world of interaction can be partially created. An appearance of open participation can be
sustained by having small grain moments of opportunity to act and many possibilities for
action at each moment. The user perceives not a series of discrete opportunities or at worst
a sequence of system controlled and rare opportunities, but a continuum for all practical
purposes. The aim would be to support this illusion in the design of dialogue 'with' the
machine even though the space of opportunities and possibilities is engineered with discrete
materials and the user is constrained by channelling techniques4. For example, the design
of a telephone dialogue system - a virtual talk space - implicitly allows continuous participation
for people, but it is a difficult research problem to design so that the resulting human-machine
dialogue will have the appearance of an 'open floor' of participation rather than a strict turn
order that must be obeyed or breakdown will occur. The systemwould have to be responsive
to the user's interactive demands such that the user would be able to participate in the
intra-turn construction of the dialogue itself.
6.5 Summary
Some consequences of Chapter 5 for computer dialogue artifacts were considered. It was
argued that the conception of the artifact must move away from the interchange model but
4 It may be possible to engineer a credible interactive flow by building on the notion of relevance
places, ie. that at certain predictable points in a dialogue activity a relevant action by the
recipient is expectable. Thus by channelling the user, certain locally predictable points of
relevant action will arise that are of an adequate grain size for the user's smooth participation,
and yet can be managed by the designed machine based on Al techniques.
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not to the adoption of spoken conversation as the model for replication. Instead investigations
of the achievement of mutual intelligibility in dialogue in and through contexts of interaction
must be conducted, and so the findings of Chapter 5 add to an understanding of a complex
interactive practice. Designing for presence and interactivity - a texture of interaction - is
essential to avoid over-representation, time-consuming computation, 'out of the moment'
planning, and limited evidence and constraint that are characteristic of adoptions of the
interchange model. After the success of the empirical methodology, the thesis recommends
the application of interaction analysis to computer-mediated communication and
human-computer interaction for design and evaluation. A brief study of copresent
collaboration over a workspace was described in order to illustrate two more features of
dialogic interaction that are missed by the interchange model, viz. embodiment of action and
complementarity of actions. Thus the thesis has documented a range of features for
consideration if designing for interactivity in dialogue artifacts as well as supporting dialogue
'through' machines. But it is hard to make predictions because of the unintuitive dynamics
of dialogue in new contexts and user acceptance and interpretation, so cycles of design and
evaluation are required. The asymmetry between the machine and user in terms of access
to resources requires channelling techniques to constrain the user's behaviour and
interpretations. The disadvantages of the interchange model are multiplicitous, and recent
research is beginning to recognise the advantages of designing for interactivity. However it
is important that empirical evaluation of user practices over long periods and in a user
community be undertaken at many stages of design. It was argued that 'interactive flow' be
an ultimate goal if designing for interactive dialogue artifacts that are maximally and locally




Parry: I don't understand your motives.
Doctor: Why don't you understand my motives?
Parry: Shouldn't I be?
Doctor: Why do you say that just now?
Parry: That's just the way it is.
Doctor: Suppose that's just the way it were not.
Parry: So?
Doctor: I am not sure I understand you fully.
Parry: You harp on the same questions too much.
Doctor: What does the similarity suggest to you?
Parry: I don't get you.
Doctor: Do you wish that you did get I?
Parry: It's about time you showed some interest in my feelings.
Doctor: Oh? I showed some interest in your feelings?
A brief dialogue between two machines from Cerf (1973).
The main aim of the thesis has been to develop an interactional perspective on computer
dialogue models, mediation and artifacts. The focus has been on the notions of dialogue
adopted in each domain, as well as in interactional studies, and the relevance of findings or
theories in one domain to the other domains. Computer models of dialogue were found to
be problematic and limiting in a number of ways. From the findings and arguments presented
so far, conclusions are drawn in this chapter for the development of more appropriate
computer models. In fact, a radical alternative modelling technique is proposed that is more
in touch with the interactional perspective drawn from ethnomethodology and hermeneutics.
With 'embodied modelling' new forms of dialogue organisation or behaviour itself may be
possible that help us understand the nature of dialogue activity and what forms it could take.
Thus the thesis is relevant to computer modelling of dialogue in artificial intelligence and
computational linguistics as it currently stands and to future approaches. As for empirical
matters, the study indicates that much further work is required in order to understand more
fully the constraints, resources and dynamics of presence and participation. In addition, the
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results of the study as well as the arguments from Chapter 3 are relevant for the design of
novel computer dialogue artifacts and mediations, and some possibilities are considered.
The use of interaction analysis in the empirical study could easily be applied to other
computer-mediated dialogues, and also human-computer interaction as Suchman (1987) has
shown. Thus the thesis is also relevant to the field of human-computer interaction. An
intricate rendering method was developed for the study of the virtual dialogue space. This
suggests that in orderto undertake the analysis of complex dialogue in and through machines,
technology could help at the different stages of recording, transcription and analysis that are
indeed time-consuming and complex. The thesis adds to the development of transcription
systems and techniques for the analysis of human conduct. Finally, returning to the theme
of dialogue and the machine, much work needs to be done to understand human dialogue
and the role the machine can play in supporting or taking part in similar activities.
7.1 Computer Models of Human Dialogue
The interactional perspective was motivated by considering computer models of dialogue.
The emphasis in these models on the procedures instantiated in computers to generate
behaviours is interesting because of the attempt to account for what happens when we
produce and comprehend dialogue, and how a machine could produce and comprehend
intelligible dialogue. The concerns here are those models that simulate or try to engage in
dialogue itself, and which must consider meaningful action and the nature of practical
understanding. However, as argued in Chapter 2, deep theoretical and empirical problems
arise when trying to adopt, use and analyse the models and the data supporting them. The
internal workings of the machine and the rapid adoption of ad hoc accounts have become
too powerful an influence on the conception of what dialogue is and how it should be modelled.
One representative theory was critically analysed in Chapter 2 where problems were found
with the weak theory of action and dialogue, with the poor empirical methodology, and with
the inappropriacy of the model for the conception and design of computer dialogue systems.
The remainder of the thesis after the critique is clearly not an attempt at replacing computer
models such as that of Grosz & Sidner (1986). Rather, the arguments closely examine
assumptions about dialogue and the behaviour of machines, and the study demonstrates the
applicability of alternative empirical methods and documents a range of interesting
interactional and circumstantial phenomena. Thus the aim is to suggest ways to supplement
current models and maybe supplant them in more radical ways.
Let us consider what would happen if we were to follow on in the tradition of computer
modelling. The model of Grosz & Sidner (1986), as well as many computer models of
dialogue, attempt to bring together non-linguistic notions of purpose and linguistic structure
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into a unified processing model. Let us consider the three proposed components of the
model. Firstly, the focus on purposeful dialogue activity is to be welcomed, but it is another
thing altogether to propose the recognition and coordination of intentions as the basis for
dialogue coherence. For instance, it is difficult to show how intentions are recognised in situ
because there is little empirical justification that it is a pervasive practice. However, the
relation between plans and situated action is still important, as Suchman (1987) has pointed
out, and this topic must be on the agenda for the next decade. An intentional vocabulary is
useful and thus worth studying in cases where it is brought to bear on finding sense in
observed conduct or in dialogue activity, when there are troubles in the talk for example.
Secondly, in the processing attentional component the notion of a shared score-board is
problematic, because mutual intelligibility is founded on local practices and not on a
background of shared knowledge in the form of representations. This aspect of the model
(and machine) must be susceptible to supporting presence and the active construction of
participation in situ. The attempt to incorporate structure and purpose is interesting but the
status of the structures and purposes is unclear. The ascription of segments and intents to
the data needs a much better empirical foundation. Thirdly, the linguistic structuring is
remarkably poor in density and consequence. A much tighter understanding of the effects
of interaction on language structure and vice versa is required. Besides the problems with
methodology, the mechanisms that are purported to operate and give rise to segments as
real entities in the dialogue are untenable given the evidence presented in the study. In
authentic dialogue, multiple structures and interpretations abound, as do the ongoing
reconstruction of interpretations and the reclassification of structures. Interaction must be
considered a constitutive domain in which interpretations are contingent, jointly constructed
and renegotiable.
An accommodating argument could be that one must add the interactional domain as another
'knowledge source' to be coded and represented to aid the interpretation and generation of
an utterance. This could be attempted but emergent properties and routine troubles of
dialogue can hardly be represented and planned for purposefully, if they are possibilities
within the model at all. A better direction would be to explore how one can re-explain
interactionallywhat was appropriated as cognitive or individual. At this point the model begins
to split apart: accounts are divided into those that are internally adequate, eg. coded
representation, and those that are externally adequate, eg. in performance. Adequacy can
no longer be judged internally or from the formal products, such as linguistic strings, but
adequacy should be judged from the dynamics of engagement in activities. Thus the
suggestions above cannot be modelled in the original sense of internal modelling. Instead
they are to supplement the traditional modelling techniques to build novel dialogue artifacts.
This is the domain in which 'knowledge rich' computer approaches in artificial intelligence will
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achieve some success and the findings of the study here may serve as fodder. However,
the models as they stand provide a poor basis for artifact design as they reify the interchange
model. Implementing a system may work for limited applications in which analysts agree on
the appropriateness of an output as an action or representation, but processing on the basis
of intent recognition and planning is time-consuming, computationally intractable and misses
the point. So, basic research is required into a system to support an interactional domain,
and, in fact, more appropriate models will most likely come from trying to build novel systems
and evaluating them in use.
With respect to the empirical methodology, a better analysis of the data examples in Grosz
& Sidner (1986) would be desirable, but one would need to study the original set-up from
which the exampleswere derived. The study here has demonstrated that care must be taken
with data, and it must be adequately rendered. In the case of the mediated task dialogue, a
number of features would need to be documented: the activities of the apprentice, the expert
and the human mediator, and the synchrony of the activities, all of which would require
audio-visual techniques and machine-logging.
The suggestions made above to patch up the problems and limitations of computer models
are biased towards the design of intelligible machines, rather than adequate models of
dialogue. Returning to the crucial problem of computermodelling, different architectures, eg.
parallel or connectionist, may help but none of the developments of internal machinery can
benefit without recognising the importance of the interactional domain. The hope is that
computer modelling and a naturalistic empirical methodology may combine the strictures of
computational specification with the pedantic empiricism of conversation analysis but it is not
clear if the rigours are compatible. For instance, the precision and justification of the
turn-taking systematics as a valid set of rules demonstrably oriented to in conversation will
not be better clarified by instantiating them as generatory rules. This style of formalisation
will only lead to disaster because of a gross misinterpretation of the nature of explanation
and rule in conversation analysis (Button 1990). As already pointed out, the specification of
procedures to generate behaviours is not where most of the work is to be done; it is in the
dynamic interaction between machineries and environments of activity. There has been too
much emphasis on explicit representation and control, and there has been a sad performance
due to a fundamental misconception of what action is and because of the inadequate
provision of resources and constraints. It is argued here that a radical shift in the use of
computers for modelling may give rise to a different understanding.
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7.2 Alternative Computer Modelling
An alternative computer modelling technique is to radicalise the way computers are used to
model communicative activity. To complete the perspective gained by considering situated
interaction and interpretation, an alternative modelling paradigm will be put forward and
discussed that attempts to emphasize the empirical method, the social and interactional
aspects of dialogue, and the situated, emergent qualities missing from current computer
models. It is proposed that we reconstruct an alternative computational modelling paradigm
that starts with basic philosophical and methodological issues to explore the nature of
communicative conduct. The proposed technique is not so concerned with the intelligibility
of simulations for a human user, nor with judging the adequacy of a computer model by the
integrity of its formal specification of the representations of action and dialogue. What is
required is an account of practical and situated interaction and cognition such that the primacy
of the individual is surpassed. This could be investigated using machines to see whether
embodied machine architectures can engage in some sort of shared activity, what contexts
of presence are required, and how features might emerge in different ecologies that are
foundational in the development of dialogue activities.
7.2.1 Problematic Notions in Computer Modelling
Several notions that are common currency in computational modelling have come under
attack here and in the general literature. Problems begin with the difficult notion of
representation and the focus on the individual or cognitive domain of explanation.
Plan-based accounts in Al and cognitive science have been criticised by Suchman (1987)
and Agre & Chapman (1989). They express concern over the problematic and unrealistic
conceptual task of action representation and formalisation required for executing actions.
Problems arise with the posited relations between intent, action and events as well as with
the apparently simple step of execution. Many routine, practical features of talk are
rationalised through explicit mechanisms, others are missed or ignored, and this appears to
be the only means whereby properties of the conduct can be said to be modelled or to exist,
ie. properties must be explicitly produced and represented by the model or system. To
formalise these properties and use them in the form of representations in generatory
mechanisms misses the nature of situated cognition and action. Oldman & Drucker (1985)
have claimed that there are deep incompatibilities between the generatory models of artificial
intelligence and the 'toolkit' models of ethnomethodology. But alternatives are not quick to
appear. This is may be partly because of the mind-wrenching task of overcoming the
rationalist tradition and our everyday way of thinking about action, and partly because the
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interpretative and hermeneutic traditions on which the criticism is based espouse a doctrine
that is not easily reconciled with a methodology based on computers.
In contrast to the isolated cognitive processor, which is to engage in dialogue 'with' a person,
one recent development in artificial intelligence, namely distributed artificial intelligence
(Bond & Gasser 1988), has begun to explore what is possible if there is more than one
machine, and thus acknowledges that one machine does not have to process or represent
everything. The original idea of the distribution of computation on the basis of resources such
as time or information gave rise to the notion of a multiple agent system with communicating
agents cooperatively solving a task or problem. Metaphors from the social sciences, eg.
human organisational structures, have been borrowed forthe design of control mechanisms.
One of the first approaches to consider dialogue and the distribution of knowledge between
robots was Power (1979). Rather than build computer programs that model dialogue by
attempting to engage in dialogue with people, his study simulates the behaviour of people
engaged in cooperative problem solving. To understand the difference, consider the
quotation introducing this chapter that shows the result of two models that were built to
engage in dialogue 'with' a user, in 'dialogue' with each other. In Power (1979) two robot
agents have to cooperate in order to open a door by means of verbal communication. Other
approaches have been suggested, for example Kiss (1988/86) and Storrs (1988).
Unfortunately the metaphor of communication is rather weak, as argued in Mcllvenny &
Raudaskoski (1990), and the techniques used are subject to the objections made above, but
it contains the seeds of the alternative modelling technique proposed next.
7.2.2 Alternative Concepts
An ant [hypothesis: man], viewed as a behaving system, is quite simple. The
apparent complexity of his behaviour over time is largely a reflection of the
complexity of the environment in which he finds himself. (Simon 1970, p. 24)
Consider the difference in the computational machinery required for a machine or entity that
gets on and interacts with its contingent world, and an interactive artifact that is intelligible
for a user. Artifacts are designed for human consumption and rely on a pre-understanding
by the user - eg. the social context and the user's experience with machines and the particular
machine - and on channelling by both instruction and by dialogue design, whereas machines
in distributed artificial intelligence are without this resource, and that is why they are not so
'intelligent'. This is the basis for the suggestion made here: the emphasis must be shifted to
the requirements - in terms of environment, machinery, and dynamics - for machines to
engage in interesting practical activities with other machines.
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Important concepts that are raised by this thesis, in the line of other studies in this area, are:
embodiment and presence, and interaction and participation. Emergence and dynamics
have already been discussed, and they will be mentioned again here. Dynamics is a
description or a point of view of patterns of activity, eg. many structures emerge and so cannot
be attributed to an individual machinery, and many are drawn upon and reproduced
unwittingly in situated action and so cannot be reified as governing elements. By investigating
and giving the dynamics of activity prominence, the aim is to go against accounts that put
the emphasis on social structure, ie. creating the 'judgmental dope' (Garfinkel 1967), and
accounts that emphasize the symbol processing individual, ie. the 'cognitive dope'. (Heritage
1984). They are not to be wholly replaced; the important constraints of social structure and
cognitive machinery are recognised. The goal is to add a new dimension. Rather than being
reified as the generative mechanism behind the coherence and orderof action, as in computer
models of dialogue, planning should be seen as emerging, most likely in trouble, in embodied
and situated routine activity. Machinery has an architecture, and we should motivate the
search for reasonable and simple architectures by always referring to the interaction
dynamics that machineries participate in, and by comparing them to human conduct (Agre
1988).
One issue is whether or not the findings about human conduct can be re-embodied or realised
rather than simulated in the sense of building embodied machines, that is, made living as
opposed to being pinned down and discursively objectified by analysts1. Another tricky
question is: does this proposed methodology imply that human behaviour is codifiable,
formalisable or programmable? We should be able to avoid this because it falls into the trap
of talking within the terms of the rationalist tradition that gives sense to the traditional models.
Woolgar (1987) considers the arguments against cognitivism and concludes that there is a
serious danger That anticognitivismwill merely reproduce the assumption of codifiability that
characterizes the cognitivist position" (p. 323). Later, Woolgar notes parenthetically that
codified means "formalised, reduced to a series of rules such as instructions or to an
algorithm." (p. 325). He seems to argue that any possible explanation using computers must
require codification of human conduct. The approach suggested here does not try to explain
solely in social or cognitive terms, but seeks to explore the emergence of primitive behaviours
from interactions between embodied machines - no claim is made for a reproduction of human
social conduct, though insights may be forthcoming. So, the embodied machine need not
1 See Pattee (1988) for a discussion of this question in the context of artificial life research.
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necessarily embody a codification of social behaviour or processes in order to participate in
activities.
7.2.3 Machines, Interaction and Activities
Evidence for the possibility of interesting computer models of activity can be culled from the
studies of behaviours of organisms that we have available. Some investigations of animal
behaviour, such as that of apes, suggest that foundational aspects of human interactional
conduct could be found in lower forms of life (Haimoff 1988). Thus designing for an ecology
of embodied machines, a laboratory world of animated entities could be profitable2. The
argument runs as follows. Artifacts and embodied machines could be present, and thus
potentially dynamically active, in the world and with 'others'. Rather than use 'out of the
moment' resources, why not find ways of using the world as a positive place to act in, and
ways of interacting with 'others'. The machine can involve gears, programs or whatever, but
the big difference from human or animal studies is that the internal sub-personal components
can be manipulated to investigate the properties that emerge. This could be a useful testing
ground for conversation analytic and ethnomethodological ideas at a basic level, viz.
proto-practice and machine-specific 'ethno' methods. Such dynamics as troubles and repair,
dense body interaction, and the coordination and distribution of resources can be investigated
as emergent properties. By looking at human embodiment, some ideas can be gained. There
are time-space constraints on human and machine activity limited by the nature of
embodiment and the physical contexts in which activity occurs, eg. there are strict limitations
on capabilities of movement and perception; time is a scarce resource; multi-task
engagement is bounded; movement in space is also movement in time; and there is singular
occupation of physical space (Hagerstrand (1975)).
7.2.4 Dialogue 'Between' Machines?
Recent research has begun to study solitary embodied activity (see Agre (1988)), but the
further study that this thesis leads to concerns the topic of communicative action and
intersubjectivity in practical collaborative activity. The main technique would be to explore
the emergence and development of human-like organisations, especially communicative
activities, with more than one machine entity. Preliminary, but narrow, questions about
dialogue - linguistic communication - between rational agents have been discussed in a
recent workshop reported in Galliers (1988) which suggests that Tor any agent, human or
2 See Mcllvenny & Raudaskoski (1990) for a discussion of the continuity hypothesis about the
nature of practice and the possible status of embodied machines.
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machine, operating in the ever changing, and unpredictable real-world, the inherent flexibility
and expressiveness of linguistic communication is essential" (p. 11).
There are many problems with such a broad scheme of modelling, but many features are
motivated by the work in this thesis. For example, the notion of embodiment raises the difficult
question of what is being embodied and how. Is it the observable behaviour that is similar
to human behaviour, or is there some claim for 'experiential reality'? Can useful research be
done by looking at societies of machines that 'collaborate' and 'communicate'? Or will the
design of machinery in interaction with its world and 'others' be a useful testing ground for
the notions of practice and social action in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis?
This is a tricky and contentious issue because it is not clear that computational machinery is
adequate for engaging in practical activity that is human-like.
7.3 The Empirical Study
The empirical study is successful in demonstrating a range of constraints and resources that
parties use in achieving and maintaining an intelligible dialogue in the virtual dialogue space
(VDS) from materials at hand. The circumstantial and situated features - temporal, social or
physical - of the constitution of dialogue are essential for intelligible action and this has been
taken for granted or ignored by many computer models of dialogue in both theory and
empirical methodology. Also, it has been shown that interaction analysis is an appropriate
technique for the study of computer-mediated dialogue and that an audio-visual study was
required in this case. A more naturalistic study would have been better but given the difficulty
in tracking the bodily use of the modality in separate locations the experimental setting was
required. If authentic data had been available, or another CMC had been studied, then the
documentation of its use in different social contextswould have been possible. Unfortunately
the experimental context can take no account of social context or culture that may affect the
formulation and solution of any task set. Indeed it may not even be a problem. There are
no natural temporal, work, or motivational contexts, and thus the experiment defines the
problem and in a way suggests its solution through the resources provided. Experimental
factors are present but are not considered relevant in the analyses. The task setting was
probably the cause of the lack of intricate and extended double dialogues observed in
conversational usages. The constructive interaction technique no doubt influenced what
happened compared to the work of one to one participation in the VDS, but the concern was
not really with trying to find out what one person would do but how the dialogue gets
constructed in the setting provided. Also, the setting was unfamiliar and thus unstable
activities emerged; this was intended but it would have also been interesting to compare with
extended natural usage over a period of time.
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Capturing, rendering and analysing activities in the VDS was a complicated and
time-consuming process. Much time was spent on repeatedly inspecting and transcribing
the videos and developing an adequate transcription method and notation system. It is
recommended that similar work be undertaken with the help of video technicians and that
adequate time be set aside. The videos were quite adequate, but for analysing work on the
map surface an overhead camera would be useful. Better mixing of the pictures would have
greatly eased the transcription process. Several other modalities were recorded but were
not used, except for a brief illustration, in the analyses presented here. This reflects the
nature of the method followed where what will be important or relevant in the analyses cannot
be predetermined.
The analyses were documented with many examples from the corpus. It would have been
a small improvement if the full transcripts or an extended fragment of a minute or two could
have been presented . But this would have been difficult because one minute would take up
approximately six to ten pages. A more serious point is that there were no examples of
extended double dialogues, ie. with more than two swaps of topic, in the corpus. In fast
conversational use, extended double dialogues were observed, and if such dialogues could
be recorded then the onset hypothesis could be tested more fully. For future work, a look at
different tasks and how they affect emergent orders of participation would be interesting.
Also, a possible direction would be to examine the same corpus in terms of the situated work
of constructing mutual routes for all practical purposes with indefinite representations, eg.
the maps, and how the construction is managed through the dialogue interaction. Such a
study would add to an understanding of how representations are used to construct other
representations in reference to some future course of action.
The techniques of interaction analysis can of course be extended to the investigation of other
modalities. Studies could be made of novel computer-supported dialogues and the resulting
emergent orders of participation, eg. the telepen. Other orders of parallel participation such
as triple dialogues may be possible. It would be relevant to human-computer interaction to
understand how people deal with novel, unstable or troublesome modalities in situ and over
periods of time in a community of other users. Also, the techniques could be extended to
multiple party CMCs. One possibility would be to examine Grosz's original set-up from which
the corpus was derived, eg. the mediated dialogues between apprentice and expert. In this
case, and in general, the demonstrable orientation to an intentional vocabulary, rather than
the analyst's ascription of purpose and intent to the data, could be investigated, eg. in repair
and troubles talk.
The study of copresent collaboration over a work surface addressed only some aspects of
the interactional features of that conduct. A deeper treatment of the complex but routine
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coordination of embodiment and complementarity should be a long term research issue.
Further studies need to elaborate on the ways in which embodiment is both a constraint and
resource and what perceptual and physical dynamics are involved. The interactional
organisation of complementary actions and activities in dialogue requires a great amount of
study to reveal how simultaneous and concurrent actions are interleaved with talk and other
activities. For example the sign language of the deaf is a rich visual-spatial language with
many simultaneous features that may offer interesting insights for novel artifacts in
human-computer interaction. Studies can also be made of collaborative embodied activities
such as moving a large object together. Much further research is required to understand how
people organise their activities, in and through settings, artifacts, and workspace, which may
involve distributed or mobile dialogue engagements.
7.4 Application to Dialogue Technology
It has been argued here that current computer models of dialogue provide a poor
understanding of dialogue for conceiving and designing dialogue artifacts. Instead, the study
conducted in the thesis and the arguments of Chapter 3 have important consequences for
dialogue 'with' machines. One must abandon the interchange model and design for routine
presence and participation. What computer dialogue systems might benefit or develop from
this perspective?
7.4.1 Dialogue 'With' Machines: Intelligible Dialogue Artifacts
The advantages of designing for interactivity have already been discussed in Chapter 6.
Recommendations are easy to make; what is required and is not undertaken here is the
implementation of interesting, novel computer dialogue systems that break the interchange
model, and draw upon the resources and constraints of supporting participation and
presence. In design and successive evaluation one needs to consider: when can a user act?
How is the 'act' seen to have, or come to have significance in terms of the system's re-action?
Equally, how is the system seen to be re-acting or changing, in terms of its design or of the
user's prior actions? More study is needed to understand the relations between language
use and interpretation in machine environments compared to other forms of language use,
eg. from manuals, signposts and help systems, to sophisticated natural language artifacts in
artificial intelligence. It is not yet clear in what practical circumstances the dialogue metaphor
is oriented to, and thus care must be taken to support the metaphor when it is useful or
needed. Also, innovative work will begin to determine how far the machine can be given
access to the resources of dialogue and action without the need for external restrictions.
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There is always the danger that opening up opportunities and possibilities for action may
raise problems of misinterpretation and the overextension of the machine's capabilities.
Applications of the interactional perspective range from speech or keyboard systems in
artificial intelligence to multimodal interfaces in human-computer interaction which
incorporate gesture, speech, sound, video, and text, among other media, that can be
simultaneous. Domains could include telephone advisory dialogue3 and pedagogic systems.
Cycles of design and evaluation and the novel advances of technology make it hard to predict
what will happen and what the problemswill be. However, for 'intelligent' multimodal systems
it would not be sensible to allow only the sequential production of events in just one modality,
eg. a referential pointing gesture followed by a spoken utterance. Thus there is an intrinsic
problem of self-coordination and overlap. One is immediately confronted with the possibilities
of concurrency and sequentiality in achieving system intelligibility through interaction. The
features of dialogue interaction documented in Chapter 6, viz. embodiment and
complementarity, are extremely important to understand. If visual, audio and spatial, as well
as other modalities are being used and juxtaposed, the system must be designed to allow
the user to coordinate 'listening' and acting in the dialogue supported by the machine. Some
attempts have been made to incorporate artificial pointing gestures into an interface that
integrates verbal (typed) descriptions and pointing gestures for referent identification
(Schmauks 1987). Schmauks & Reithinger (1988) have also tried to implement a dialogue
system that simulates pointing gestures using advanced graphics; thus the machine can
apparently point on the virtual screen. Neal et al (1988, p. 819) report the future "development
of intelligent interface technology that integrates speech, NL text, graphics, and pointing
gestures for human-computer dialogues." Their focus is on "deictic pointing gestures with
simultaneous coordinated NL in both user input and system-generated output." (p. 819) This
work is primitive and mainly concerned with input and output, but now future work must
confront the possibility of complementary modal events in interaction.
One might hope for media independent resources, structures or procedures that can operate
on any media to deal with presentation, participation, or troubles. Given the situated and
circumstantial nature of intelligible action and the special characteristics of each media, it
seems unlikely that this will be the case. Also a difficult question arises: what remains for
global management and traditional Al techniques? An initial step is to move away from work
on pre-anticipation, control and planning, and focus, whenever possible, on machine
3 One such system is currently undergoing construction as reported in Gilbert et al (1990). It is
to be designed and evaluated drawing on the techniques and findings of conversation analysis
in the context of a traditional artificial intelligence implementation.
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behaviour that is local, routine, improvised, circumstantially saturated, and interactional. It
is unlikely though that traditional techniques will be able to create an 'interactive flow', ie. an
appearance of being able to act and participate in dialogue when the moment and need
arises.
7.4.2 Dialogue 'Through' Machines: Computer-Mediated
Communication and Virtual Spaces
As the study conducted here most immediately concerns a specific computer-mediated
modality available on some computer systems, the question then arises of whether the study
suggests how the modality could be improved or extended. It is difficult to recommend design
features as the investigation was to document not how dialogue should be conducted but the
possibility and achievement of dialogue in the first place. One could claim that what is
required to inhibit the emergence of unusual orders of participation and the troubles
engendered is a set of conventions for turn-taking or a physical embodiment of those
conventions, eg. according to the interchange model. This requirement is acceptable but it
denies the local opportunities for constructing participation; rather, if there is a problem, then
internal resources must be provided for. It is true though that education in the use of and
standardisation of practice helps, but ultimately, for elaborations to synchronous modalities,
the examples of electronic mail and the telephone suggest that simplicity and local control
are very important.
In the VDS modality, the permanence characteristics of the medium combined with the lack
of resources for mutual monitoring, allowed parties to construct and address those
constructions as ongoing contributions to dialogue or as contributions to be read later. Thus
a construction could be treated by a recipient as it is transiently performed with emergent
features, or produced as a product - in this case, an inscription on the screen. Such a scenario
is difficult to imagine in the speech medium because of its peculiarities, ie. speech is a linear,
transient event with no visual spatial residue. But a computer system is feasible through
which parties could produce speech documents intended for hearing later but which are
monitorable by the other party at the time of their production. Thus, parties could act as
speakers and hearers as if on the telephone or shift to producing recorded speech messages
and playing the other's messages back when ready. However, the temporality of play-back
and the lack of an analogy with spatial simultaneity means that the numerous past
contributions cannot be perused at a glance.
In any modality that exploits the permanence of a medium, the performance characteristics
that are inherent in transient action are not necessarily intrinsically represented in the
permanent medium. This problem is faced by transcribers of human action because any
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representation of conduct will be faithful to some aspects of the original conduct and
completely ignore others. What is important about the flow of action for the participants may
not easily (if at all) be made permanent and readily accessible, so as to be drawn upon in
retrospect. Can this finding be utilised in building a CMC that exploits permanence and
transience as a differential resource? This could be a possibility in the graphic medium. For
example, imagine a shared, graphic space on which parties could write, scrawl, sketch or
scribble at the same time though they might be spatially separate. Instead of a permanent
record of the inscriptions, as on a blackboard or piece of paper, the medium could be adjusted
to fade in different ways, the simplest being a continuum from immediate fade to permanent.
Also, some degree of mutually accessible embodiment would be required, such as a ghost
of the hand doing the marking on the virtual surface. Parties could write or draw in two
dimensions and they could control in some local, mutually agreeable way the degree of fade,
and thus permanence and transience, of an inscription upon its production. Because of the
participant controlled degree of transience, the mutual monitoring of graphic expression with
conversational characteristics is a possibility with emergent events such as the pace and
rhythm of the mutually monitored graphic stream. Also, because of the participant controlled
degree of permanence, characteristics of writing could be explored, eg. parallel activities and
the product. Properties such as double dialogues would no doubt emerge from the practices
of parties as they contingently organised their participation through the modality.
Another possibility is to give the machine more of a role in supporting the mediation of
dialogue between people. Oviatt (1988) considers whether a computer-interpretermediation
between two participants speaking different languages is feasible and what would be
required. She argues the case for considering brokering - dialogues between the interpreter
and one of the speakers - as a powerful resource for managing the dialogue, instead of the
strict passing of machine translations from one speaker to another. An interaction analysis
of how this is achieved in authentic human contexts, for example on the telephone, would be
interesting. Unlike the problems with the virtual dialogue space, the limitations and troubles
engendered by this sort of technology are deep and socially critical. For instance, it is
reported in Miike et al (1988) that a Japanese prototype dialogue translator based on the
interchange model and mediating the dialogue between Japanese colleagues and English
visitors to a trade show resulted in extended repair initiations by both parties that led into
never-ending confusions and a general breakdown of 'trust'.
Extensions to the computer generated simulation of the shared graphic space used in the
study can be considered with the advent of recent products such as 'artificial realities' that
integrate computers, television, audio and body tracking technology. The question is: how
will people cope with machine-mediated communication in a human-made
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computer-generated world? Such a possibility raises fundamental issues about the
requirements and nature of presence and participation. Before these virtual spaces are ever
going to be constructed sensibly, research on these basic features of communication is
needed and the thesis makes a contribution in that direction4.
7.5 Interaction Analysis: Methods
The use of interaction analytic methods was recommended for further studies of
computer-mediated dialogues, aswell asforthe evaluation of implemented dialogue artifacts.
Such an empirical paradigm is essential lest ad hoc theorising and misconceptions of what
dialogue is, what the machine is capable of, and what exactly goes onwhen a user community
uses a dialogue artifact in its daily practice, prevail. One must pay close attention to
seemingly insignificant details which an abstract account such as Grosz & Sidner (1986) must
ignore in its specification of action sequences and conditions, by using whatever means are
appropriate to record the work of engaging in the activity as intelligible activity. The study
here had to develop special notation and record conventions to enable the representation of
important features of the dialogue in the VDS for the purposes at hand. The technology of
video provided the means to record fleeting events in two separate locations, and the nature
of the dialogue as typed inscriptions with some properties similar to spoken talk made it
reasonable to adapt the methods of conversation analysis. Unfortunately, the transcription
method is not generalisable to the study of the use of computer artifacts, ie. something that
would be a justifiable record of the work done by a user of a computer interface.
A conclusion from the study, and in keeping with the theme of dialogue and the machine, is
that technology can provide tools for doing analysis in future. Computers can be used at
each stage of a study: preparation, recording, transcription and analysis. Some researchers
are investigating this - MacKay (1989) and Have (1990) - and the complex study undertaken
here also motivates further research. There are of course many problems to overcome and,
of course, the dangers of too much unhelpful and unnecessary detail are ever-present. The
search for accountable details in conduct - what is real for the participants in the practical
setting - must remain a guiding principle and cannot be overtaken by technology.
4 An interesting side effect is that automatic records of many aspects of the embodied
performance of action in dialogue activity would be obtained from the computer sensing and
tracking of a person's real body, eg. eye gaze, arm gestures, and body orientation. Thus it
would prove possible to see, not through the eyes of a person, but from the same physical
point of view of any participant or entity.
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7.6 Dialogue and the Machine
The purpose of the thesis was to show some of the ways in which the notion of dialogue has
been used in our machine age, and to show that, in fact, new dialogue activities are possible
with computer-mediation. It is important to see that our theoretical notions of what dialogue
is are very much shaped by the devices used in the investigation and explanation of that
conduct. Moreover, in some cases the devices are to engage in the practice they are to
model and thus demonstrate the model's credibility. With artificial intelligence, research on
the nature of human dialogue has a new tool in its armoury, viz. the computer. Now dialogue
with the computer can perhaps only be understood once it can engage in dialogue about the
nature of dialogue itself. However, in order to better understand human dialogue and the
role of machines in supporting or engaging in dialogic activities we must take an interactional





The structure of this appendix is borrowed and modified in part from the set developed in
conversation analysis, especially by the efforts of Gail Jefferson.
TALK:
The HELVETICA FONT is used for talk and gesture transcription.
SEQUENCING SYMBOLS
Some of these can also be used for marking keyboard activity too.
Overlapping utterances -
A: oooooo
B: 'oo Onset of overlapping utterances. ([)
A: oooopo Termination of overlap. (])
B: 'oo
00//00 Overlap onset point in overlapped speech stream.
Continuous utterances -
00=00 Chaining of utterances (by one or more parties)
or A: 00= without an interval.
B: =oo
Intervals of no speech or absence of activity -
(0.5) Time of pause to nearest 0.5 second.
(.) Micropause of less than 0.2 second.
(pause) Untimed pause in activity.
(longpause) Untimed pause of long duration (>2 seconds).
CHARACTERISTICS OF SPEECH DELIVERY
Intonation -






b) Prosody. Occasionally a linguistic prosodic mark appears, eg. a tonetic nucleus or
contour pattern, eg. \ marks a distinctive falling contour.
Sound -
Standard orthography with occasional pseudo-lexical impressions.
: Extension of sound beyond normal duration.
Glottal stop, cutoff.
* °
Passage is quieter than surrounding speech.
CAPS Passage is louder than surrounding speech.
,t Mouth click, like in "tch tch" or "tut tut".
{ } Distinctive reading or quotation voice - eg. what is being





(word) or (C:) Uncertain speech or person.
( ) Untranscribable speech or unidentified person.
(0) Uncertain whether speech or sound.
TRANSCRIPTION DESCRIPTIONS
((descriptn)) Stage directions or comments on the recorded data fragment.
« » Marks the passage which is commented on by the stage
directions.
PRESENTATION SYMBOLS
-+ Attention is drawn to this utterance.
1 A: ooo Line numbering of utterances for referencing in the text,
[code] Reference code for data fragment in the form
[Mn: time1-time2], where n is the experiment code, and
the fragment is taken from timel to time2 recorded on the
video tape with an electronic clock counter.
Omitted material.
SPECIAL CONVENTIONS: GAZE, KEYBOARD AND GESTURE
GAZE
These symbols mark a transition in the transcript record.





e Eye gaze; eye contact when coincident eye gaze by
participants occurs.
0 Neutral space.
(•••) Potential gaze, but interrupted or incomplete.
Marks a complex passage that is not notated.
KEYBOARD DISPLAY
The courier font is used to indicate keyboard activity on turn-based records.
Standard character set is from an Acorn BBC keyboard.
Space.
® Return or new line.
[ ] Character(s) not visible on display - either hidden or not
recorded on the display.
// // Characters within the // are deleted in the reverse order to
original typing.
T Up-Cursor movement key.
GESTURES
Boundaries of gesture -
((
))















Point at the map.
Point at the screen.
Gesture to the map.
Gesture to the screen.
Gesture in neutral space.
Describes the place referenced by the pointing gesture,
or the movement of the gesture,
be pre or postfixed to the above symbols to indicate the left or
Incomplete point or gesture.
Mark map.




The examples numbered B1, B2 and B3 on the next three pages are referenced in the text
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